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SUMMARY 
Decentralization has become fashionable in governmental development of the third world. 
Theoretically, it is the shift of sovereign responsibilities that includes the planning, 
financing and management of certain public functions to field units of government 
agencies, subordinate units or levels of government, semi-autonomous public authorities 
or corporations, or area-wide regional or functional authorities. Unfortunately, 
Bangladesh became dysfunctional due to rampant political corruption and successive 
political crises since its independence. Every regime has formed a local government 
commission under different names, without giving much real effort to decentralising their 
powers to the local level. Accordingly, every regime has accused their predecessors of 
uncontrolled distortion. The post-liberation experience of the local government (LG) of 
Bangladesh suggests that the national government uses the local government bodies to 
strengthen its own power base in the name of decentralization. The present research asks 
whether the policy and the formation of different structures can achieve decentralisation. 
It engages in a number of theoretical, methodological and empirical debates on rural local 
government institutions. The history of LG in Bangladesh can be characterised as a 
British-invented and Pakistani-installed centrally controlled local hierarchical system. 
Thus, because of extreme political corruption and violence in every sphere of Bangladesh, 
the radical potential of civil society organisations is being appropriated and they are being 
used to fill gaps in service delivery, allowing the state to withdraw, which is justified by 
'roll-back' neoliberalism. However, this thesis argues that the restoration of law and order 
and assurance of transparency are prerequisites of efficient local government. Again, 
endorsing the traditional informal institutions can reduce the pressure on government in 
different affairs like dispute resolution, social awareness, health and safety and so on. In 
addition, delegating responsibility for service provision to other quarters like NGOs and 
civil society can help to address the development concerns of the people, as well as 
capacity-building in local level institutions. 
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Chapter ©ne 
Statement of the problem 
INTRODUCTION 
Decentralisation has become fashionable in the development of third world governance. It 
strives to restructure authority, responsibility and financial resources for providing public 
services among different levels of government. It involves a shift of sovereign 
responsibilities that includes the planning, financing and management of certain public 
functions to field units of government agencies, subordinate units or levels of 
government, semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations, or area-wide regional or 
functional authorities. But the post-liberation experience of the local government (LG) of 
Bangladesh prescribes a reverse meaning of this statement. Panday (2005) questions what 
happens at the local level when the national government uses the local government bodies 
to strengthen its own power base in the name of Decentralisation. Barenstein (2000) 
argues in his seminal paper that, although state policy is encouraging the Decentralisation 
process, power and decisions at the lowest unit of local government are still governed and 
conditioned by central politics, especially by the two major political parties in 
Bangladesh. This gives rise to another supplementary question: is local government self 
government, or is it a creature of the state1} McEwan (2003) elucidates a more precise 
answer. She argues that there is a trend in promoting local government in two ways: 
negatively as a withdrawal of the state, or as a potentially radical model of good 
governance, signalling a shift from 'local government' (the power to govern) to 'local 
governance' (the act of governing). But, unfortunately, in the case of Bangladesh, 'local 
government' is more dominant and, in practice, a shift of central government from the 
power to govern is yet a dream. There has so far been no guarantee of true local 
government, irrespective of the regime in power. All the governments so far have, more 
or less, practised a decentralised structure of administration as a very efficient tool to 
centralise power. 
The counter decentralisation process of Bangladesh is elucidated in Chapter 2. Here, in 
order to maintain the flow of the discussion, I provide some facts in brief. It is only 36 
years ago that Bangladesh earned its freedom from Pakistan through bloodshed. In the 
last couple of hundred years the Mughals, the British and the Pakistanis ruled the country. 
During those times, the power structure was designed to ensure obedience at the local 
level. In 1962 elected local bodies were installed at the Union Parishad (UP) level but 
power was never devolved from the centre. There were no major changes of the local 
government in first few years after the liberation other than the renaming of institutions. 
However, local government has experienced a new dimension since independence in 
1971. In newly independent Bangladesh, democracy was politicised and exploited by 
successive regimes (Lifschultz, 1979). Peiris (1998) identifies political conflicts in 
Bangladesh since its freedom. He notices how the regimes used those conflicts to accrue 
power and 'unearned' money as personal wealth. Siddiqui (1996) suggests that pressure 
on the government to decentralise power came from the aid donors. Different political 
regimes strove to accommodate both external pressures, especially from the donors, and 
their own desire to centralise power, while launching many policy measures in the name 
of 'decentralisation'. Jahan (2004) and Riaz (2005, 2006) discuss the recent patterns of 
political centralisation in Bangladesh. Political desire is one of the prerequisites for 
decentralisation but this was completely absent among all of the country's governments. 
This political culture has gradually weakened the local government institutions of 
Bangladesh in the last 36 years. 
Although modern local government in Bangladesh has a history dating back to the British 
period, a substantial change in its formation has been caused by the globalisation of 
decentralisation (see Chapter 3). It is important to mention that in the last two decades 
especially, a structural form of decentralisation has been observable in developing 
countries all over the world. Lee (2002) examines 18 Asian countries and underscores 
that democratisation here was not a result of economic development, economic crisis, 
religious and political culture, nor even de-colonisation; instead, it has been political 
protests that have led to democratisation in Asian countries. In the case of Bangladesh, 
the popular uprising against Ershad in 1990 and the general election of 1996 under a 
caretaker government are two significant examples in this regard. In addition, the 
survivals of informal local government institutions like salish and samaj open up some 
new thoughts to explore the local government of Bangladesh. 
The reality of continuous political centralisation has emphasised patron-client linkages in 
different service delivery provision at the local level. The increasing involvement of 
NGOs in service delivery is an attempt to counteract this. The Rural Maintenance 
Programme (RMP) of CARE Bangladesh is an example in this regard (see Chapter 5). 
The RMP was established to ensure the sustainable development of the livelihoods of 
destitute women in rural Bangladesh and local government institutions were involved in 
this process as a further guarantee. As a former employee of the programme, I have 
personally observed the patron-clientalism, poor institutional set-up, politicisation, 
ambiguity and so on at the rural level. 
Some interim conclusions: 
• There is no universal local government system, so study of differentiation in space 
is important; 
• Local government is influenced by different internal and external factors under 
successive political regimes; 
Sustainable local government is a discourse of spatial and temporal continuum, in 
the analysis of which geographers have skills to contribute. 
Having elucidated some initial thoughts on decentralisation and counter-decentralisation 
drawn from the global experience, the following paragraphs first outline the objectives, 
methodology and structure of the thesis and then discuss some of the negative aspects of 
national politics of Bangladesh, along with an account of external influences, NGO 
movements and the rationale of the study. Finally, the chapter concludes with the scope 
of this research. 
O B J E C T I V E S OF T H E STUDY 
The objectives of this research project are to: 
• Explore the historical development of local government in Bangladesh; 
• Identify the hidden political goals of different governments in decentralizing the local 
government of Bangladesh; 
• Review global Decentralisation theories focusing on the Bangladesh context; 
• Analyse and explain the existing local government structure of rural Bangladesh. 
• Provide a general understanding of Decentralisation issues of rural Bangladesh in the 
light of political geography; 
• Investigate the existing loopholes (capacity of local bodies, the gender situation, 
negative political patronage) of local government in Bangladesh; 
• Analyse the role of civil society and NGOs in the development of Bangladeshi local 
government; 
• Explore the potential and opportunities to strengthen the local government of 
Bangladesh. 
METHODOLOGY 
The objectives of this research have two major focuses: firstly, reviewing the evolution of 
the Decentralisation practices in Bangladesh in light of the political goals of the former 
and present governments and, secondly, an evaluation of the present rural local 
government institutions' capacity to implement Decentralisation successfully in 
Bangladesh. The former part will be elucidated with the help of a literature review and the 
latter will be viewed through both literature and field experiences. The field experiences 
comprise the qualitative information collected from different groups affiliated with local 
government. The data have been obtained from the RMP1 of CARE International 
Bangladesh. The RMP has operated for around a decade to improve the capacity of the 
LG institutes of rural Bangladesh and in January 2005 they conducted a study of the 
capacity assessment of LG institutions in their programme area. I participated in that 
study as a Technical Officer-Monitoring of the largest region of the RMP. The study 
strove to collect qualitative information from all the groups interacting with LG 
institutions. The study was designed in a way that the multiple groups interacting in a 
common area from different levels could explain their thoughts and experiences, thereby 
enabling the researchers to crosscheck the information in a pragmatic way. 
From the reader's point of view it is important that I set out my role as a Technical 
Officer - Monitoring for the RMP and how my role conditioned the kind of information 
that I received. In addition, the following paragraphs supplement the description of RMP 
given in chapter five. 
The RMP had two different wings to manage their programme: Operations and Research 
Evaluation and Development (RED). The main objective of the Operations wing was to 
implement the programme through the field offices and the RED wing was responsible 
for monitoring programme implementation and to do research to assure better services 
and to identify problem areas and a future focus for the beneficiaries. The objectives of 
1 The RMP is implemented around 4200 UPs out of a total of approximately 4500 UPs in Bangladesh, 
covering 93 percentage of the area of rural Bangladesh. 
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RED led them to qualitative research. The RED wing had two sub-wings, namely the 
Monitoring and the R&P (Research and Partnering). The R&P team concentrated on 
fulfilling the future agendas of the programme according to the PRSP and they were 
based in the headquarters. The Monitoring sub-wing employed a Technical Officer (TO) 
in each field office to monitor programme outputs and outcomes of their respective field 
offices without being influenced by the field office management. It is important to 
mention that earlier the TO-Monitoring was supervised by the Project Manager (PM), 
who is the head of operation in the field office. The PM used to exercise power over 
programme monitoring, especially i f there were any negative findings about programme 
implementation by the field office. In the new system, the TO-Monitoring had substantial 
freedom to work and used to operate as a 'third eye' of the headquarters at field office 
level. However, there is no chance of misinterpreting this role as policing the field office. 
Rather, it was to crosscheck the art of implementation of designed activities at the field 
office level and to provide feedback to headquarters i f there were any concerns. This will 
be clearer i f I describe my own key responsibilities. 
As a TO-Monitoring, my key responsibilities were as follows: 
1. Planning and implementation of monitoring activities in the field office operational 
area. 
2. Ensuring quality monitoring and data processing, analysis and reporting. 
3. Participating in different studies and evaluation and contributing in monitoring 
strategy and the development of tools. 
4. Management and staff development. 
5. Participation in other CARE Bangladesh mission and RMP initiatives. 
I performed my monitoring activities on a sample basis, including the roadwork, IGA, 
Bank and so on. The roadwork monitoring included examining the performance of RMA 
women, PMC and the UP successively in road maintenance, RMA supervision and PMC 
management. In addition, I conducted livelihood security surveys of former beneficiaries 
of the RMP in order to know whether they are leading a better life after being phased out 
from the RMP. To have an understanding about their livelihood, TO-Monitors judged the 
human capital (education and skills), social capital, access to resources, crisis coping 
capacity, savings, fixed capital and so on. 
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The RMP was restructured to provide the RMA women with a sustainable and secure 
livelihood. Besides, it strived to strengthen capacity at local level so that they could take 
over the programme after the withdrawal of CARE. Therefore, they trained the UP and 
the PMC for a long time. Once the UP and the PMC had received training, it was still 
essential to assess their capacity for taking over the RMP. Accordingly, the Monitoring 
sub-wing designed the LGIs Capacity Assessment Study where the TO-Monitoring were 
leading the study on their respective field offices. 
The insights I gained during my time with CARE were an inspiration for further research 
and I believe that my experience has added a dimension to the analysis that would 
otherwise have been absent. As Bangla-speaker, I also had advantages in communication 
and understanding, although I was not undertaking academic work and therefore the data 
generated was not of the type one would plan for in, say, intensive ethnographic 
fieldwork. 
Because CARE has its own policy about the ethics of monitoring research, all of the 
respondents of this study were informed about the purpose of the study before it began. 
Nothing is quoted in this thesis without the appropriate consent. I have been very careful 
in using the names of respondents to avoid any potential harm to them. I also asked 
permission from the RMP Coordinator before using their information in my thesis. 
The methodology of the study is described below: 
Study Design 
It has already been mentioned that the RMP was working with both the destitute women 
and the local government institutes of rural Bangladesh. According to the programme 
design, the effort of capacity strengthening (CS) of the local government institutions was 
with the objective of handing over the programme to them. Thus it was very important to 
assess the capacity of local government to take over the programme. Therefore, the 
purpose of the study was to assess: 
• The role of CS training in implementation, management and supervision of RMP 
by LGIs (Local Government Institutions). 
• Management capacities of PMCs in the implementation of RMC. 
• Participation of women representatives in project management. 
• Unintended benefits. 
• Recommendation for better CS functioning by local government institutions in 
future. 
Sample Design 
The research design was split into two broad segments, namely quantitative and 
qualitative study designs, and these are sequenced below. 
Sample Design for Quantitative Survey 
A statistically valid sampling approach was adopted by CARE in selecting a nationally 
representative sample of respondents for the study. 
A two-stage random sampling strategy was adopted. At the first stage UPs were chosen, 
from which respondents were selected at the second stage. A representative sample size 
of UPs was determined to be n = 45 with 25 per cent design effect. See table 1.1 for 
further details. 
Table 1.1 Sample population of Union Parishads, sample size, and related issues 
Description 
of population 
Population 
size 
Sample 
size 
Anticipated 
standard error 
Co-efficient 
of variation 
Assumed 
design effect 
Union 4,200 45 2% 6% 25% 
Source: RMP/CARE 2005. 
Respondents from the selected Union Parishads were chosen purposively using a simple 
random sampling technique. For such purpose necessary sampling frames were collected 
from the RMP headquarters. 
Sample Design for Qualitative Study 
Besides the quantitative survey, Key Informant Interviews (KII), Focus Group 
Discussions (FGD) and Large Group Discussions with important local level stakeholders 
were conducted for the collection of qualitative information. 
A short questionnaire was developed for the K I I , focusing on key issues, and this was 
administered as a means of collecting information from knowledgeable persons. In 
addition, Large Group and Focus Group Discussions were conducted using checklists and 
guidelines which were developed with the participation of Technical Officers of different 
wings of the RMP. 
Table 1.2 Sample sizes 
Respondent categories 
Sample size Data collection method 
administered 
PMC members (Chairperson, one male 
member, one female member and one 
UP Secretary). 
4x45= 180 Interview schedule 
Knowledgeable person; (UNO and UP 
Chairman) 
15+45= 60 Key informant interview 
Members of UP 
13x 7x 
2=182 
Large group discussion 
(2 in each zone) 
Community People 7 x 7 x 1=49 
Focus group discussion (1 in 
each zone) 
RMP women 7 x 7 x 1 = 49 
Focus group discussion (1 in 
each zone) 
APO-CS 1 Discussion meeting 
Source: RMP/CARE 2005. 
Data Collection Instruments 
Several types of data collection instruments were employed for collecting (a) necessary 
data from the quantitative survey, and (b) required information from qualitative 
investigations. The following tools were used for this data collection: 
Tool-1: Interview Schedule for PMC (assessment of knowledge about the content of the 
modules and practice level; status of management skills of PMC members). 
Tool-2 KII guide for the UNO 
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Tool-3 KII guide for the UP Chairperson 
Tool-4 Large Group Discussion with UP Members 
Tool-5 FGD with participant RMP Women 
Tool-6 FGD with local leaders/opinion leaders/community leaders 
Tool-7 FGD guide for trainers and training managers 
Tool-8 Discussion Meeting with RMP Cell: DG-LGD-MIE & other Members 
Tool-9 Checklist for Union Parishads 
Field Implementation for Quantitative and Qualitative Survey 
The RMP was operated by seven field offices. Therefore, seven teams were stationed in 
the field for fieldwork. Each team consisted of four members to conduct interviews with 
26 PMC members (PMC Chairperson, female member, male member and UP Secretary). 
In a zone, 13 K I I were conducted on an average with the UNOs and the UP Chairmen. 
Two Large Group Discussions were arranged in each zone. In the same way, FGDs were 
conducted with RMP women, community leaders and trainers. 
Quality Control 
As production of high quality output in the study was contingent upon the quality 
assurance system, a system of TQM (Total Quality Management) was instituted, which 
took care of all systematic arrangements and activities directed towards safeguarding, 
maintenance and promotion of quality throughout the study period. The TQM framework 
deployed involved, among others, the following: 
• Ensuring full and effective coordination among the key personnel. 
• Instituting a division of labour by assigning specific and time-bound job 
responsibilities to each member of the key personnel. 
• Recruitment of support staff having appropriate qualifications, skills and 
motivation. 
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• Working out well-defined job responsibilities for each member of the support 
team and implementing them. 
• Imparting adequate and appropriate training to the support staff. 
• Instituting timely reporting and efficient communication mechanisms. 
• Adopting mechanisms for the appropriate selection of study areas. 
• Field checking to monitor survey data collection. 
• Quality control checks of data management. 
• Developing necessary field management arrangements for timely coping with 
unforeseen situations. 
• Instituting time and cost optimization mechanisms in the study. 
One trained and skilled staff member was stationed in each field office. Thus, seven 
skilled staff members performed the whole task of supervising the fieldwork and ensuring 
the collection of high quality data. 
Measures Taken to Collect Quality Data 
In any large scale data collection involving different categories of observation 
measurement units, various types of data collection instruments and a huge number of 
data collection staff, it is usual that in spite of excellent pre-field preparation and design, 
problems do still occur. In order to minimize the possibilities of problems or to minimize 
the extent of such problems in data collection, the following measures were taken before 
and during field data collection: 
• Appropriate design of the data collection instruments (including pre-tests 
before finalising the same). 
• Appropriate selection of field data collection staff with special emphasis on 
commitment and competence of the staff. 
• Instituting total quality management approach in data collection. 
• Deployment of knowledgeable persons as quality control officers by quality 
clusters. 
• Designing all possible guidelines to ensure homogeneity in understanding 
among the field staff. 
• Appropriate mix of members - field data collection team considering the 
workload, task diversions and accessibility status. 
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• Development of expertise among the field data collection staff to conduct 
interviews on specific observation measurement units. 
• In-depth training to the field staff on data collection instruments (including 
field testing, and post-field experience sharing). 
• Regular contacts (day-to-day) with the field. 
Additional Information 
In addition, there were 12 regional workshops with aforesaid counterparts, two 'lessons 
learnt' workshops with RMP employees, and one national workshop with the senior 
officials of the LGD of Bangladesh. I participated in all of these workshops and was a key 
member of the documentation team of the study. Moreover, my relevant observations, on 
different practices of Upazila and UP, while working in the RMP will also be used as 
supporting detail in different areas of arguments. Due to time and budget constraints I 
have not visited Bangladesh during my period of Masters Research to collect more data; 
rather, I have spent a little longer than average on the literature review and theoretical 
background of my work. 
Recent publications on LG issues in the global South, and especially Bangladesh, were 
reviewed in order to understand the general issues in this regard. Literature on different 
theoretical understandings and concepts, especially local government and 
Decentralisation, was also an integral part in this research. 
ORGANISATION OF T H E THESIS 
This chapter has outlined the background, rationale, objectives and methodology of the 
thesis. The next chapter provides a detailed historical political background of local 
government in rural Bangladesh and explains the centralisation culture of Bangladesh's 
national politics. The third chapter is devoted to the theoretical frameworks, where the 
arguments of neoliberalism, global context of power structure and patterns of 
decentralisation are discussed. The fourth chapter covers the structures and functions of 
rural local governance of Bangladesh. The fifth chapter elucidates the field experiences 
and analyses the collected qualitative and quantitative data. Finally, the sixth chapter 
concludes with potential recommendations for a fruitful rural local governance system in 
Bangladesh. 
CONCLUSION 
The conceptual frameworks that I have outlined in this chapter will suffice as a 
background to my research. Their disadvantages are twofold. First, much of the work is 
pitched at a fairly general, and sometimes abstract, level. Second, there is relatively little 
high quality work on my topic for Bangladesh. On both grounds I have needed to 
develop my own conceptual base for my work. The thesis makes an important 
contribution in filling the gaps in the literature on the political geography of local 
governance in Bangladesh. 
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Chapter 'Uw 
Historical political Context of local 
(gobernment tn Panglabeirj 
INTRODUCTION 
Authoritarianism is the most common political culture of Bangladesh and at different 
times has been labelled as Mughal Imperialism, British colonialism, Pakistani fascism, 
Mijubism, and military dictatorship. Even the recent experience of electoral democracy 
has had some elements of authoritarianism about it. I f we review the political history of 
the last 500 years, we can categorise Bangladesh into three major eras: i) the Mughal 
Imperialism - when local bureaucracy assumed the power to collect taxes for the 
sovereign; ii) The British and Pakistani era - a power structure was established to drain 
away resources, and iii) Independent Bangladesh - a power struggle among the 
'praetorian' intermediate class.2 The pattern of extortion and exploitation of the common 
peasants has, of course, changed in these three eras. In the pre-liberation period of 
Bangladesh, undoubtedly, no efforts were made to decentralise power to the local level. 
There were some decentralised power structures in the different hierarchies at local level 
during the Mughals, the British and the Pakistani periods, which were directly nominated 
from the central government. Immediately after the independence of Bangladesh, the 
local government structure was similar to that of the Pakistani period. Afterwards, 
different regimes sought to exploit the political potential at different levels of local 
government by using local politics in the struggle against their political rivals. 
This chapter comprises three major sections, with several subsections in each. The first 
two sections go hand in hand and describe the historical background and political facts of 
the local government of Bangladesh. To keep the flow of the literature review, there are 
some common arenas discussed in both sections, but the first section concentrates more 
on the pre-independence facts and the latter on the post-independence facts. The second 
section illustrates the facts of central politics and strives to link them with the politics of 
local government in successive regimes. Finally, the third section seeks to narrow down 
the former sections and distinguish the key facts of the chapter. 
2 Peter J Bertocci (1982) uses the term 'praetorian' to refer the then political system "with low level of 
institutionalisation and high level of participation". By intermediate class he meant the 'middle class' and 
educated groups associated with the professions and the small-scale entrepreneurs that, in classical Marxist 
view, stands between the capital and the labour in a advanced capitalist society. He identifies i) the civil 
bureaucracy, ii) the military and iii) the civilian politicians and their parties as three major institutional 
groupings of the middle class. 
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T H E HISTORICAL P O L I T I C A L CONTEXT 
Bangladesh has been conquered and ruled by many outsiders since the emergence of the 
concept of local administration in the mid eleventh century until finally, it earned its 
freedom in the liberation war of 1971. Though, from 1050 to 1250, there had been 
demands for "liberties" among the inhabitants of certain parts of Western Christendom in 
the hope of greater privileges from the feudal lords (Wickwar, 1970), in South Asia it was 
not until the Mughal Empire of Akbar (1542-1605) that for the first time there developed 
a highly organised and effective system of administration and bureaucracy (Abedin, 
1973). This system continued for a considerable time but after the death of Aurangzeb 
(1707) it stagnated. The administrative system had almost completely broken down by the 
time the British assumed the administration of India. The experiment of local government 
began in the mid-1760s and worked out some definite principles of the pattern of district 
administration in British India by the end of the 18 th century.4 It identified a more 
accurate way to maximise the tax take (Abedin, 1973).5 
The British Period (1757-1947) 
I f we start from the beginning, boroughs and communes in Europe arose spontaneously 
from the very outset of the emergence of the concept of local government without anyone 
giving much thought to theory. But the theory became important with the arrival of 
Roman law from about 1250 and, thereby, the question was raised whether a borough or 
commune was an aggregate of individuals or a corporate body (Wickwar, 1970). The 
3 The Muslim rulers from Persia, the Mughals, the British and finally by the Pakistanis. 
4 A sound administrative system did not mean a good law and order situation for the well-being of the local 
inhabitants; rather the emphasis was on a more accurate way to collect maximum taxes from them. The 
colonial powers thrived by establishing a restricted and rigid system of government. Participation was 
extremely limited and only those who were proven to be loyal to the colonial rulers and trusted by them had 
access to the influential institutions. Leadership was concentrated in the governors and administrators from 
the parent country. Although a small group of indigenous leaders were trusted, their influence was limited 
and there was no scope for them to initiate radical changes without the approval of the colonial leaders. 
5 During the Pakistani period of 1947-71, the most dominant change in local government was the Basic 
Democracy Rule, which was introduced by the then President Ayub Khan. The Basic Democracy was a 
means of centralizing power which helped the then government to infiltrate at the local level. 
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theory of incorporation, moreover, was deeply influenced by the concept of the 
foundation, that is to say, an undying body of patrons incorporated in order that they 
might manage a perpetual endowment in the interests of a specified clientele. However, 
the philosophical differences that emerged between the rationalists and the Utilitarians 
were disruptive in regards to local bodies. Thus, the process of evolution became further 
complicated during the first half of 19th century by the doctrinal conflict between two 
schools of thought - the Corawallis and the Munro schools (Abedin, 1973) and, 
eventually, district administration in the subcontinent took its final shape. In fact, 
Cornwallis tried to execute the same local government system to the entirety of British 
India, driven by ideas from British political philosophy, especially Utilitarianism 
(Wickwar, 1970). In contrast, the Munro school believed that these systems were 
completely unsuitable for South Asian society and would not have the same beneficial 
effects in British India as in Great Britain (Abedin, 1973). The Munro school criticised 
Cornwallis for not taking the social and political condition of South Asia at that time into 
account while introducing administrative reforms. In brief, the Chawkidari Panchayet Act 
of 1870 was the first step intended to maintain village peace and order by local initiative. 
Subsequently, the Local Self-Government Act 1885 and the Village Self-Government Act 
1919 extended some of their law and order, public service and regulatory functions, and 
gave some new judicial responsibilities.6 
The Pakistan Era (1947-1971) 
After the controversial division of British India in 1947 into India and Pakistan, 
theoretically, the previous local government system was sustained for next 12 years, 
though from time to time these Acts underwent repeated amendments. General Ayub 
Khan, who seized power in 1958, introduced a system of local government known as the 
Basic Democracy (Abedin, 1973; Bode, 2002; Siddiqui, 1992; Mallik, 2004; Panday, 
6 These acts, among other things, introduced election as a mode of choosing one's representative and 
subsequently extended its coverage. But Chairmen and Vice Chairmen of the Municipalities continued to be 
elected indirectly by the popularly elected commissioners. One of the acts, the Bengal Municipal Act of 
1932, strengthened the powers of Municipalities in levying rates and taxes and in the utilisation of funds 
(Siddiqui 1994:47). But the same act provided considerable powers, to the government and local officials to 
inspect, supervise and control Municipalities and negated the powers of taxation of local level bodies to a 
large degree. 
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2005; Hossain, 2005). The concept of Basic Democracy, a four-tier system, lacked 
novelty and innovation in terms of democratic participation of the community in electing 
their leaders. According to this act, a rural area of around of 10,000 people was 
considered as a Union, where a Union Council of 10-15 members was formed; two-thirds 
of the members were directly elected by the community and rest were nominated by the 
central government (GoB, 1997). This modified the colonial system by creating directly 
elected union councils (who then appointed their own chairman); the Thana councils 
comprising union chairs and appointed officials; district councils with representatives 
elected by the chairman and appointed officials; and divisional councils with appointed 
officials and representatives elected by the district bodies (Abedin, 1973; Siddiqui, 1992; 
Mallik, 2004; Panday, 2005). The District and the Union were granted limited revenue-
raising powers and had executive powers, whilst the Thana and divisional councils had 
only co-ordination and consultative functions. Some additional functions were added to 
those already performed at the Union level. The overall effect of the legislation was, 
however, to increase central government control. In the years that followed, the system 
was under-resourced, with no regular provision of central government grants. 
Independent Bangladesh (Since 1971) 
Political Parties and Local Government: Decentralisation or Counter 
Decentralisation? 
Bangladesh, with the great promise of an independent People's Republic, started its 
journey after a nine-month bloody liberation war in 1971. Since then, there have been a 
number of amendments in the Local Government Act which were guided by the various 
ruling political parties (CPD 2002). In the last 24 years, Bangladesh has been governed by 
three major political parties, including two which were initiated through military regimes, 
the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Jatiya Party (JP). The Awami League 
(AL) and the BNP introduced and amended local government policy in the first decade of 
liberation to strengthen their own power at the grassroots. It is well known that the major 
distinction between the A L and the BNP on the local government issue is the concept of 
BKSAL (Bangladesh Krishok Sromik Awami League), introduced in 1975 by the then 
President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and Gram Sarkar (formerly Swnirvar Gram Sarkar) 
introduced by former President Ziaur Rahman in 1976. The JP President Lieutenant 
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General (Retired) Hossain Muhammad Ershad came in power in 1982 in a bloodless 
coup. Ershad, one of the most corrupt dictators any third world country has ever produced 
in modern history (Hussain, 2004), tried to grasp power at the Upazila level. He was 
overthrown in a mass uprising on December 6 t h, 1990. The JP is now (2007) divided into 
three parts and the chairman of the mainstream, Mr Ershad, is very busy saving himself 
from the consequences of his previous deeds. Since 1990, local government structures 
have changed with the election of each new government.7 
The present structures and procedures also reflect the former legacies introduced by the 
British and Pakistanis, and are also a function of the more recent history of a succession 
of civilian and military regimes, followed by an extended period of parliamentary rule. 
The country now has a unitary system of government, which in principle embodies a clear 
separation of powers between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, and a 
constitution that promises to ensure a wide range of fundamental and democratic rights. 
However, the changes tailored to decentralise the LG by both military and civilian 
governments in different times were criticised because of their controversial objectives 
and practices. The reality of these changes matches the observation of Mawhood (1983) 
that they have been ''''experiments with local government that end in chaos and 
bankruptcy; 'decentralised' structures of administration that only act as a more effective 
tool for centralising the power" (p. 1). 
Key Developments of Local Government: 
After a long military regime, Bangladesh has, at last, now experienced electoral 
democracy for the last one and a half decades. Yet the elected government is as alienated 
7 Since the emergence of an independent country there have been frequent policy changes and 
rearrangements of the tiers of local government. At the same time, these bodies are alleged to have been 
exploited by both democratic and military national governments as means for political mobilisation and 
consolidation of power, and not allowed to operate as autonomous, decentralised local government 
institutions. The above has also been reflected in one of the important observations of the Honourable Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh (CPD, 2002). 
8 Constitution of Bangladesh: Article 9. Promotion of local government institutions: The State shall 
encourage local Government institutions composed of representatives of the areas concerned and in such 
institutions special representation shall be given, as far as possible, to peasants, workers and women. 
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from the common people as during military rule. Some very important developments in 
local government are worth recording here: first, the emergence of a powerful class of 
politically-oriented local leaders who are very eager to increase their influence on the 
members of local bureaucracy, and who are officially and hierarchically responsible to the 
central government (Blair, 2005; Abedin, 1973). Second, local officials and the members 
of the local bodies have been required to undertake responsibility for planning and 
implementing the first expanding community development programmes. Third, social 
transformation has resulted in social tensions, which have had a considerable impact on 
the behavioural aspect of local administration and politics (Blair, 2005; Barenstein, 2000). 
Fourth, most of the developmental functions for which local government units are made 
responsible under the legal framework, such as family welfare, education, public health, 
social welfare, and so forth, are administered by different agencies of the national 
government. Fifth, the central or national government primarily exercises its control over 
the LG bodies through its field-level government functionaries such as the Deputy 
Commissioner (DC) and the UNO, the heads of the district and Upazila administrations 
respectively (CPD, 2002). This provision allows the district administration to axe an LG 
unit such as the UP (lowest tier of local government) at any time and consequently, makes 
them extremely vulnerable to the political and administrative whims of the government. 
Sixth, local government bodies have been chronically resource-poor in Bangladesh. The 
local government regulations empowered them to mobilise resources from local sources 
through assessment and levy of taxes, leasing of local Hats9 and Bazaars, water bodies, 
and so on, but they do not receive the total resources generated from their entitled sources 
(The Local Government (Union Parishads) Ordinance, 1983). Seventh, institutional 
capacity includes both human competence and logistics. Relevant studies reveal that the 
overwhelming majority of the chairmen and members of local government units lack 
knowledge and understanding of the operational procedures and functions of these bodies. 
Again, the UP is very dependent on its Secretary for all official correspondence. Eighth, 
accountability and transparency of operations and functions of the Local Government 
units are essential for ensuring their credibility to the electorate. This can only be 
achieved through adequate supervision and monitoring. Legally, the Monitoring & 
Evaluation Wing of the Local Government Department of the Ministry of Local 
Government Rural Development and Cooperatives (MLGRD&C) is responsible for 
9 Local periodic market which is considered as a common property like large water bodies. 
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monitoring the functions of local bodies. But it has been observed that the monitoring 
mechanism of the said wing is weak, inadequate and ineffective (CPD, 2002). Therefore, 
this research wil l strive to identify and theorise the present situation of local government 
of Bangladesh. 
T H E AMBIGUOUS C E N T R A L POLITICS AND T H E F A T E OF L O C A L 
GOVERNANCE IN BANGLADESH 
Though the essence of self local government arose around the middle of the tenth century, 
the abstract term "local government" was first used by Lord John Russell in the House of 
Commons on 5 t h June 1835, in introducing the Municipal Reform Bill (Wickwar, 1970). 
After that, Local Government experienced many successive reforms, which had some 
consequences for the Global U K . 1 0 India, for instance, had connections with British 
theory and practice until 1947." However, there has been another massive global flow of 
decentralisation in the third world since the early 1980s, as a consequence of globalisation 
and the neo-liberalism described above. 
The Pre-Independence Situation 
As we have seen, local government in Bangladesh has a history and tradition going back 
to medieval times. The four-tier local government system during the Mughal era in the 
undivided India had little interaction with rural communities other than to extract [forced] 
tax contributions (Abedin, 1973; Siddiqui, 1992). The British introduced a modern local 
government system in the late nineteenth century and this was later modified, again 
according to the needs of maximising tax collection (Abedin, 1973; Siddiqui, 1992; 
Hossain, 2005). The Basic Democracy Act of 1958, which was later amended in 1962 to 
be more democratic at the Union level (GoB, 1997; Siddiqui, 1992; Toufique and Turton, 
2005), had no fundamental difference from the former British system. 
1 0 As the UK was ruling over many parts of the globe like India, Australia, North America and so on, the 
entire empire is termed the Global UK in this thesis. 
1 1 The British regime of 190 years until 1947 is termed British India throughout this paper. Bangladesh is 
representative of processes and structures of local governance throughout that realm. 
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Post Independence 
It was expected that decentralisation would precipitate more democratic flows of 
participation by the people after the liberation of Bangladesh. Since independence, 
different forms of local government were shaped in various levels, i.e. the UP, Thana 
(Upazila) and District (Zila). In reality, effective power was always vested in the centre 
and, therefore, the objectives of the local government were never achieved (Siddiqui, 
1992; Alam, Haque and Westergaard, 1994; Siddiqui, 1996; CPD, 2000; Toufique and 
Turton, 2005; Hossain, 2005). Central government under all regimes has attempted 
manipulation to retain power and exercise its control over local government (CPD, 2000). 
The different political activities of the successive political regimes explain their hidden 
political objectives. The politics of decentralisation of local government is not alienated 
from central or national politics; rather it is an integral part of it. I f we study the 
emergence of this concept, we will find that the sovereign power pursued the 
decentralisation policy to consolidate their power-base at the local level (Wickwar, 1970). 
Therefore, it is very important to study the successive political situations of Bangladesh to 
know whether the local government decentralisation efforts were for the sake of 
decentralisation or counter-decentralisation/centralisation. The next paragraphs explore 
the political situations of the successive regimes of independent Bangladesh, which helps 
to examine their motives on devolution of power to the local level. 
The Era of Seikh Mujibur Rahman (1971-1975) 
Peiris (1998) strives to place the different conflict situations in proper perspective, and 
examines their highly ramified causal connections, which include destabilising external 
influences, inter-group divergences of interests and aspirations within the country, 
economic stagnation, and the persistence of poverty. He concentrates on the political facts 
and gives a comprehensive idea since the Hindu-Muslim rivalry in pre-partition Bengal 
and includes the disputes in the pre and post liberation periods. Peiris says that the Jatiya 
Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) became the major opposition to the AL after liberation. He claims 
that by August 1974, 62,000 JSD activists had been imprisoned by the then government 
for political reasons. The general election of 1973 was apparently more or less fair (Peiris, 
1998; Ahmed, 2004); but by putting probable political rivals in prison or under threat, the 
AL won the public mandate. Peiris (1998) adds that the constitution of 1972 extended the 
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direct authority of the central government to the hilly area of the south-east which, since 
1900, had been governed under a special administration and legal arrangement known as 
the Hill Tract Regulations (Abedin, 1973, Siddiqui, 1992). This often conflicts with 
'secularism', which is one of the four principles of the constitution that was promulgated 
in 1972.12 I f we just retrieve the argument of the Cornwallis and the Munro schools, 
which was described earlier, we find that, in the same vein of the Cornwallis thoughts, the 
then government has pursued the policy for the Chittagong Hill Tracts, which was 
criticised for its lack of novelty and innovation. 
Key Political Features during the Mujib Regime 
Before going on to a discussion of the BKSAL, it is important to describe the political 
scenario of that time, which ultimately drove the ruling party to introduce the BKSAL. 
The political and economic situation immediately after liberation was chaotic because of 
the losses and disruption suffered during war; the diverse goals of different groups 
(including the regular army and civil servants) developed under a diverse philosophy, 
which was sponsored by the global political elites; global inflation in 1972; natural 
disasters; and, moreover, the enormous corruption of the political elites. 
Fragmented National Consensus: The AL had demonstrated their failure of leadership 
during the formative stages of Bangladesh (Peiris, 1998) especially after performing fairly 
well in their first two years (Ahmed, 2004). The national liberation struggle was itself 
contested and sections of fellow Bengalis fought against the Pakistani soldiers. But, the 
Awami leadership failed to build up a national consensus even among those who had 
constituted the vanguard of the liberation struggle (Peiris, 1998; Ahmed, 2004). 
Therefore, radical young men, who effectively participated in the liberation war but did 
not belong to the Awami League, felt cheated when they were excluded from political 
power after independence. 
1 2 The constitution promulgated in 1972 was based on a political doctrine that had come to be known as 
'Mujibism,' comprising the principles of nationalism, democracy, socialism and secularism. It provided for 
a unitary system of government headed by a prime minister, a multi-party polity, and a legislature elected 
on the basis of a universal adult franchise (Peiris, 1998). 
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Corruption and Economic Collapse: Ahmed (2004) argues that though 86 percent of 
the industries and 87 percent of the foreign trade was nationalised, distribution was 
conducted by the private traders who were issued permits and licenses, among which a 
substantial number were issued to AL activists. These activists, in turn, sold them to 
traders and, as a result, they became owners of a large amount of 'unearned money'. 
Again, the administrators of the nationalised industries were also recruited from the AL 
leaders, without giving much thought to their capacity to hold such positions which, 
eventually, resulted in a declining trend in production (Karim, 2005). The extreme floods 
of 1974 also contributed to this economic collapse. Thus, on the one hand, the national 
economy was stagnating and, on the other hand, under the patronage of Awami rule, a 
new class of 'nouveau riche' mushroomed. Was this due to Mijib's ignorance? Was it 
appropriate that he should place his party's interest over the national interest? What did 
the nation expect of him? It was his party people who got involved in rampant corruption. 
Karim (2005) mentioned, regarding the state of corruption during Mujib's regime, that the 
reputed journalist Lawrence Lifschultz wrote in the Far Eastern Economic Review on 
30th Aug 1974 that: "Corruption and malpractices are nothing new. But Dhaka people 
think the way the corruption and malpractices and plunder of national wealth that had 
taken place during Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's regime is unprecedented". 
Growing Dissatisfaction in the Armed Services: Mujib's pro-Indian attitude and 
socialist principles led to dissatisfaction among those whose property was nationalised, 
and among businessman and military officers. Most of the defence services, and 
especially the freedom fighters, held anti-Indian views and were not happy with the Mujib 
government for the following reasons: 
• Most of the freedom fighters believed that the Indian army only walked in when 
the war was nearly finished, thereby robbing the Bangladesh military forces of 
their glory. The Indian army also took the arms captured from the Pakistani army 
and Bangladesh military officers were not happy with this. 
• Many senior officers believed that the interim government of Mujibnagar signed a 
secret treaty with the Indian government which would eventually be a threat to the 
sovereignty of Bangladesh (Ahmed, 2004). As the then government failed to gain 
any significant concessions from India in disputed issues like enclaves and river 
water, the suspicions deepened. 
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• From the beginning, the regular army did not like the government's concentration 
on the Rakkhi Bahini13 instead of them, which was evident by successive 
decreases in the defence budget and increases in the number of Rakkhi Bahini. 
In much scholarly writing another group of army officers are identified who were all 
repatriated from Pakistan in 1973. This group also had an anti-Indian stand and were 
more influenced by the Pakistan-US policy. 
Political Rivalry and Violence: A class conflict, which was earlier subjugated by the 
demand of regional autonomy, emerged as a crucial problem. The threat came from the 
radical forces that had been working as an underground army before independence and 
surfaced afterwards (Peiris, 1998; Ahmed, 2004). One of these radical groups, named the 
JSD (Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal), was supported by a group of military officers, mainly 
advocated by Colonel Abu Taher and Colonel Ziauddin, who played significant role in the 
war and were followers of the Chinese Model of a productive army. They started killing 
AL workers and other enemies of their revolution. Lifschultz (1979) gives a detailed 
discussion of the radical movement of the day. The revolutionary forces could have been 
confronted by ideological clarity at political level and by governmental performance at 
societal level. But the government declared a state of emergency on 28 December 1974, 
which provided them with special powers of arrest, curtailed the power of the judiciary, 
and muzzled the press. 
Thus, a number of matters made the political situation worse: Mujib's stand with the 
Indo-Russian block, radical movements against Mujib, growing dissatisfaction among the 
military and other pressure groups, enormous corruption in the Awami regime, global 
economic recession, and natural disasters, together with a crippled economy. In response, 
the government tried to grasp power centrally by the virtue of the BKSAL, which could 
never promise an ideal decentralised local government in the interests of the nation. 
The Local Government under the One Party Rule - The BKSAL Concept 
After independence, the new Mujib Government immediately renamed the local bodies. 
The Union Council became Union Panchayet. Accordingly, the Thana and District 
1 3 A special paramilitary security force responsible directly to the Prime Minister. 
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Council appeared as Thana Development Council and Zila Board. Public administrators 
were appointed in each of them. Union Councils were headed by the Circle officer, while 
the Thana and Zila boards were controlled by the sub-divisional officer and the deputy 
commissioner respectively (Siddiqui 1992, Mallick 2004, Hossain 2004). According to 
the recommendations of the then Administrative Reform Committee, a complete 
restructuring of bureaucracy was attempted, which organised all civil servants into a 
single class. However, Siddiqui (1992) has argued that the President's Order No 22 of 
Box 2.1: Presidential Order of January 25,1975 (Karim M A, 2005) 
4th amendment sated: 
"Before this law had been promulgated, the person who was the President will not remain as President 
and the post of the presidency will fall vacant. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman will be the President of the 
People's Republic of Bangladesh and shall take over the powers as the Executive President, and will 
continue as the President made by law under this constitutional amendment. According to the 
constitution the republic wil l have one President and one vice-President. The people will directly elect 
the President. The President will nominate the Vice President. Tenure of the President and Vice 
President will be for five years. President will have all executive powers to administer the Republic. He 
either directly or through his nominee will execute those powers. The Vice President will have powers 
to act as decided by the Presidential orders. A cabinet will be formed to assist and advise the President. 
The President will have the power to nominate a Prime Minister, Ministers, deputy Ministers, state 
Ministers from among the Parliament members or anyone from outside who is considered fit to be a 
Parliamentarian. Every Minister can speak and take part in other activities in the Parliament. But i f he is 
not an elected member then he cannot take part in voting. The President will chair the cabinet meetings. 
On his order the Vice President or the Prime Minister can chair such meetings. The Ministers wil l 
remain at their posts as long as the President desires. 
Under the amended bill the President has been authorised to form one political party in the country. 
This party will be the national party. According to the amendment no legal action can be constituted in 
any court of law against the President. And no court can issue any warrant of arrest or detention order 
against the President. No citizen is allowed to form any political party or join in any political activities 
other than the national party. The President will also be the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces." 
1973 promised no major change in any sphere of local government beyond the Basic 
Democracy Order of 1959, other than some marginal compositional changes at Union 
level. By that Order, the Union Panchayet was again renamed the Union Parishad. 
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However, the effort was seen in a soft light of decentralisation by the change that the UP 
Chairman was to be no longer elected by the members of the Parishad, but rather directly 
elected by the entire voters of the UP (Mallik 2004, Siddiqui 1992, Hossain 2004). A 
position of Vice-Chairman was created along with the Chairman in each UP, who was 
also to be elected by direct mandate of that community. 
The above discussion suggests that the government did nothing to provide an elected local 
government at every tier other than the UP. Furthermore, the local government felt under 
tremendous threat by a Presidential Order of January 25, 1975 and article 117A (Box 1), 
which would assure the AL supreme power and would make the country a one party state 
under one leader. In accordance, on June 16, 1975, a Newspaper Cancellation Act was 
promulgated, which permitted only four national dailies to be published along with a few 
weeklies (Karim, 2005; Ahmed, 2004). This was simply an irony for a supposedly 
democratic local government system, which was guaranteed by article 59 of the 
constitution. However, according to the order, all sub-divisions were upgraded to districts 
and districts were to be governed by the District Governors who were to be appointed by 
the government (Banglapedia, Mallik 2004, Siddiqui 1992). But a bloody military coup 
on August 15, 1975 prevented the implementation of this system and Mujib was killed 
along with other family members at his residence. 
The Evolution of the Military Regime by Ziaur Rahman (1976-1981) 
As mentioned previously, at the end stage of the Mujib era, and especially from 15 th 
August to 7 l h November 1975, the country was in a disorganised state. Ordinary 
Bangladeshis were extremely confused with the whole situation as there was no political 
leadership to direct the nation along the right path; to make matters worse, Mujib was 
brutally killed by a group of junior military officers in association with Mujib's close 
fellows. Zia was appointed as the Chief of Army Staff on 15 August 197514 but he was 
also arrested by Khaled Mosharof in another coup on 3 r d November 1975. The next four 
days were crucial to the people of Bangladesh and there was great uncertainty while the 
four national leaders of the Mujibnagar Government were brutally murdered in the 
1 4 Khondakar Moshtaq Ahmed, one of the closest associate of Seikh Mujibur Rahman, assumed the chair of 
presidency after the assassination on the 15 August and appointed Major General Zia as the Chief of Army 
Staff (http://banglapedia.search.com.bd/HT/R_0028.HTM; accessed on 16.04.2006). 
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Central Jail in Dhaka (Ekushey TV, 2001). The 3 r d November coup was a counter attack 
to re-establish the former government, which was functionally handicapped after the 15th 
August. However, a third uprising came from the revolutionary army group in association 
with ordinary people, led by Colonel Taher on 7 t h November 1975, bringing Zia to power 
by the killing of Khaled Mosharof. In www.col-taher.com, developed by Colonel Taher 
Sangshad, it is mentioned that Taher helped Zia to assume power with an objective and/or 
unwritten treaty to free the JSD prisoners who had been sent to jail during the Mujib era. 
However, Zia then assumed the power as the Chief Marshal Law Administrator15. 
Zia's Successive Involvement with Power and Formation of the Bangladesh Nationalist 
Party: 
As President, Zia announced a 19-point programme of economic reform on 30 April 1977 
and began dismantling the Marshal Law Administration. A nationalist front called 
Jatiyatabadi Ganatantrik Dal (Nationalist Democratic Party) was formed in 1978 under 
his patronage, with Vice-President Justice Abdus Sattar as its convenor.16 Being 
motivated by the nationalist activities of Jatiyatabadi Ganatantrik Dal, Ziaur Rahman 
formed the BNP on 01 September 1977, having in view the forthcoming elections for the 
National Parliament, which he promised to conduct by 1978 when assuming the 
presidency. Zia won the June 1978 elections with a 76 percent mandate and assumed the 
presidency for five years (Peiris 1998). Thus the military emerged as the ruling elite in 
Bangladesh. 
Mentioning Mujib as a charismatic leader, Ahmed (2004) suggests that in their first two 
years the Awami League performed fairly well. He describes then the sordid politics of 
the AL in last two years of their first spell after 1971 by mentioning emerging class 
conflicts, autocracy, corruption, bureaucracy, nepotism and so on. However, he is 
influenced by Mujib's successor, General Zia, when he mentions that: 
1 5 Though the Chief Justice Sayem was the Chief Marshal Law Administrator and Zia was his chief deputy, 
but power was in the grip of Zia and he became the Chief Martial Law Administrator on 19 November 
1976, when Justice Sayem relinquished his position and ultimately, the Presidency of Bangladesh on 21 
April 1977 (http://banglapedia.search.com.bd/HT/R_0028.HTM; accessed on 16.04.2006). 
1 6 http://banglapedia.search.com.bd/HT/B_0226.htm; accessed on 16.04.2006 
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"...Zia assumed power by default rather than by design...Zia's loyalty to 
and reliance on the military was deep... initiated a number of participatory 
programmes... One of the reasons why Zia was killed in the abortive coup 
of 30 May 1981, some scholars have argued, was his 'over-
democratising' of the political system...The senseless and dastardly 
assassination of Zia by a section of the armed forces not only endeared 
Zia to the nation but also created a kind of abhorrence towards men-in-
uniform..." (Ahmed, 2004. pp. 109-110) 
However, Zia was confronted by different interest groups and tried to make checks and 
balances, either by offering lucrative amenities or by dint of his power, to defuse his 
rivals and strengthen his powerbase. 
Zia's Political Rivals: 
After assuming power, Zia continued to face opposition from both civilian organisations 
and sections of the armed forces. Peiris (1998) explains the political rivals of Zia in his 
initial days. According to him, civilian opposition came from several sections such as the 
leaders of BAKSAL and other pro-Awami groups, the radical JSD (which had 
considerable support among urban youth and rank and file of the army) and other 
numerically small but militant Marxist groups. He continues that, on the military side, 
apart from remnants of the Jatiya Rakshi Bahini, there were the regulars who were loyal 
to the radicals among the military elite. 
Strategy Taken to Counter the Opposition: 
Now, i f we look back to 7 November and its aftermath, we will find that, though the JSD 
people were freed immediately after Zia took power, they were again pushed back into 
prison at the end of 1975 and Colonel Taher was accused of revolutionary activity and 
sentenced to death in July 1976. In the latter half of 1976, Zia subdued several minor 
revolts in the army in the course of which some of his military rivals were killed or 
sacked. According to Peiris (1998), one of the bloodiest episodes in the military history of 
Bangladesh occurred in 1977, taking the form of a mutiny staged by the army radicals, 
evidently at the instigation of the JSD and its suppression involved a ruthless purge with 
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more than 1,100 executions and the disbanding of several army units. Thus, Zia 
encountered the radical forces. 
It was mentioned earlier that the Awami League was basically an urban-based political 
party before independence, which extended its arena to all spheres of urban and rural 
areas by organizing the Awami Jubo League and the Awami Krishok-Sromik League. 
Zia, on the one hand, created openings for the assignment of retired military officers to 
lucrative jobs in other sectors (Ahmed, 2004), which helped his power base in the urban 
areas and, above all, in the central government. He also tried to form the Gram Sarkar at 
the rural level as the lowest tier of the local government, dominated by his entrusted 
followers (Panday, 2005; Hossain, 2005). Ahmed (2004) writes that in March 1979, 25 of 
the 625 people in the senior policy pool who were responsible for policy-making in the 
secretariat were military officers. He continues that, in June 1980, out of 101 Chairmen 
and Managing Directors of the public corporations, 42 were military officers and retired 
bureaucrats. In January 1981, 22 of the 40 District Superintendents and Additional 
Superintendents of Police were army officers. Moreover, 500 retired military officers 
were employed in industry, business, foreign trade, or supply and contracts under the 
patronage of the government. As all of these administrators were loyal to Zia, it was 
easier for him to strengthen his own power base by eliminating his rivals in urban areas. 
His rural rivals, mainly from the Awami League, were overpowered by his new policy of 
the Gram Sarkar, which is described later. 
The Local Government under the first Military Regime 
Just after taking power, Major General Ziaur Rahman (1976-81) disbanded District 
Governorship and promulgated the Local Government Ordinance 1976, which provided a 
three tier local government system: 
1. Union Parishad for a Union; 
2. Thana Parishad for a Thana; and 
3. Zilla Parishad for a District. 
Though the ordinance provides for elected councils at all levels except the Thana, there 
was no attempt to install an elected government at the district level (Hossain 2004). 
Following previous practice, the Sub-Divisional Officer and DCs remained the 
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administrators at the Thana and District levels respectively. President Zia abolished the 
Vice Chairman's position and introduced a provision for nominating two women 
members at the UP level. Moreover, he introduced the Gram Sarkar (later, the word 
'Swanirvar' was added in front) as the lowest tier of local government by an amendment 
in the Local Government Act, 1976 and formulated rules for its organisation and 
administration (GoB, 1997). The Swanirvar Gram Sarkar was headed by the Gram 
Pradhan (Village chief) and consisted of two members from different functional/interest 
groups to ensure their representation. They were chosen through consensus of the villager 
elders present in a meeting. The Swanirvar Gram Sarkar was assigned the responsibility 
of increasing food production, eradicating illiteracy, reducing population growth, and 
maintaining law and order in the village (Siddiqui, 1992; GoB, 1997). The Swanirvar 
Gram Sarkar movement enjoyed enthusiastic support from the national government. But it 
became stagnant with the assassination of president Zia in May, 1981 and was abolished 
by the successor military government headed by Ershad who assumed the power in early 
1982 by a bloodless coup. 
Politics of Gram Sarkar: 
In a similar vein to Mujib, the Zia regime introduced nothing newer than the pre-BKSAL 
system of the Gram Sarkar. Zia abolished single party politics by allowing some extreme 
religious parties (especially those banned during the Awami regime) to participate (Peiris, 
1998) and once again gave the bureaucracy a free hand to control local councils, which is 
simply contradictory to the concepts of decentralisation and democratisation. After the 
presidential election in June, 1978 and the formation of the BNP, efforts were made to 
extend its organisation to the village level to counteract its arch rival the Awami League 
in rural areas (Hossain 2005) and to consolidate its power there. Zia replaced Secularism 
from the preamble of the Constitution with "Absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah, 
the Beneficent and the Merciful"; Socialism was dropped, and "economic and social 
justice" replaced it. This cosmetic surgery was meant to woo the voters, most of whom 
were practising Muslims (Hussain 2004). As Peiris (1998) notes, Zia's method of building 
up trade union and youth support for the BNP through favouritism also resulted in the 
blatant exercise of violence by pro-government groups operating at the level of 
institutions such as universities and urban work places. Evidently, according to Peiris, the 
government made no attempt to curb the rising tide of corruption and lawlessness. Karim 
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(2005) indicates that Zia was incorruptible in terms of money and wealth; but he turned a 
blind eye towards the corruption of those around him. However, both the Mujib and the 
Zia governments were concerned about firmly cementing their powerbase and, thus, were 
apathetic about the effective reorganisation of local government institutions. 
Ershad (1982-1990): Another Era of Military Regime 
After the assassination of Zia, Justice Sattar assumed the position first of temporary 
political successor and then of elected President from November 1981. However, he was 
overthrown by Lieutenant General H M Ershad. Following his predecessors, Ershad 
suspended the constitution and - citing pervasive corruption, ineffectual government, and 
economic mismanagement - declared martial law on March 1982 (Peiris, 1998). This 
continued until November 1986 (Ahmed, 2004). It was the personal quest for power, and 
the political vacuum left within the BNP after the death of Zia, that took Ershad to the 
office of the presidency. Yet he had to face rivalry from both the BNP and the AL. 
Through Martial Law he prohibited all kinds of political activities within the country, 
divided the country into five administrative units to execute the judiciary activities under 
military tribunals, launched a campaign against the corruption of the former BNP 
government, and imprisoned many BNP political activists, including some ministers. 
Thus, he tried to work in the same vein as Zia to undermine his potential opponents. In 
addition, he gave greater emphasis than Zia to converting the country into an Islamic 
state, for instance by his attempt to introduce compulsory Arabic Studies into the school 
curriculum (Peiris, 1998). This was an attempt to gain mass popularity since most 
Bangladeshis are Muslim and apparently conservative. 
Formation of the Jatiya Party: From Military to Political President 
Ershad took over the country's Presidency from Justice AFM Ahsanuddin Chowdhury on 
11 December 1983 (Banglapedia Online), removed the prevailing ban on the political 
parties, and formed an organisation named 'Janadal' to launch an Eight-point programme. 
He sought public approval in a so-called 'ha-ncC (yes-no) vote in March 1985 and 
obtained a 94 percent mandate (Peiris, 1998), although the turnout was very small 
(Ahmed, 2004). Ershad then converted his 'Janadal' into an electoral organisation named 
the Jatiya Party, designed as his political vehicle for the transition from martial law. He 
was then elected for a five-year term in the Presidential Election of 1986, which was 
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boycotted by both the AL and the BNP. Controversially, the AL participated in the 1986 
general election in which the Jatiya Party managed an absolute majority in the National 
Parliament (Banglapedia Online; Peiris, 1998). The opposition protested against a 
controversial bill to include the military in local administrative councils. The government 
then began to arrest scores of opposition activists under the Special Powers Act of 1974 
which had been introduced by the Mujib government. Accordingly, the then government 
declared a state of emergency, dissolved the parliament and scheduled fresh elections for 
March 1988. This time the main two opposition parties unanimously refused to participate 
on the grounds that the government was incapable of holding free and fair elections 
(Peiris, 1998; Banglapedia Online). Despite the opposition boycott, the government 
proceeded and the Jatiya Party won 251 out of the 300 seats. At this point opposition to 
Ershad's rule began to gain momentum, escalating by the end of 1990 in frequent general 
strikes, increased campus protests, public rallies, and a general disintegration of law and 
order, and on December 6, 1990, Ershad was compelled to offer his resignation due to 
massive public demonstrations and international pressure as well. He handed over the 
power to a nonpolitical caretaker government headed by the Chief Justice Shahabuddin 
Ahmed. 
Local Government Politics during the Ershad Regime 
It has already been mentioned that the previous local government was dissolved by 
Ershad at the very outset of his regime. He then introduced the Upazila system in 1985 
and held elections for these local councils in May of the same year. Siddiqui (1996) 
argues that the original idea of making the Thana (then renamed the upazila) the nerve 
centre of administration came from Aktar Hamid Khan during the Pakistan era, which 
Ershad took up and gave shape to under pressure from the donor community. Under the 
threat of Ershad's political rivals, a decentralisation measure like the upazila system 
opened up the way to reach out to the vast majority of people living in the rural areas. 
Ershad, on the one hand, reduced the power of the union councils (where he would have 
faced his political opponents) by shifting the responsibilities from them to the upazila 
level (Siddiqui, 1992; Wastergaard, 2000), which became evident in his effort made in 
1987 to put the military on the local councils, and by the Local Government (Union 
Parishad) Act 1983, where the 28 income sources of the UP were reduced to only 5 and 
the rest were handed over to the Upazila (GoB, 1997). On the other hand, he ensured, 
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through 'vote robbery' and similar practices, that gangsters and thugs supporting his party 
became Upazila Parishad Chairmen (Siddiqui, 1996). Rahman and Khan (1997) criticise 
the politicisation of the upazila in favour of the ruling elite under the Ershad regime and 
compare it with its antecedents like the Basic Democracy Act in the 1960s and the Gram 
Sarkar Act in the late 70s. They add that being against the upazila reform of Ershad, 
Khaleda Zia (widow of Ziaur Rahman) attracted a large number of allies from civil 
bureaucrats who were unhappy with losing their substantial power to the politicians. 
However, in theory, it was (and still 'is') a genuine decentralisation, because: 
1. The upazila chairman was elected by the entire adult population of the upazila; 
2. The upazila parishad was vested with resources; 
3. The upazila was given power to implement development activities; and 
4. Al l government organisations at that level were made responsible and accountable 
to the upazila parishad. 
Though the AL and the BNP collectively boycotted the Ershad regime from 1987, 
controversially, both of them participated in the Upazila election in early 1990 in which 
the BNP received a handful of seats (24 out of the 460). The AL also participated in 
another election in 1986, as mentioned earlier. This gives rise to two important questions. 
Did the opposition accept the then government as democratic and fair by participating in 
elections? I f not, why did they participate? However, the above example/event will help 
to provide links with the activities of the political parties. 
The above discussion suggests that, on a large scale, three successive governments 
followed almost the same strategy to counter their opposition and, often, used Local 
Government as a pawn in their political contests. 
The Khaleda Zia Regime (1991-1996): From Autocracy to Electoral Democracy 
After the 1991 general election, which is regarded as the country's first fair election, 
Khaleda Zia became prime minister. Under her the BNP won by 170 seats, including the 
indirect elections on reserved women's-seats and by-elections, while the AL, the Jatiya 
Party and the Jamaat-e-Islami won respectively 91, 35 and 20 seats and accordingly the 
BNP formed the government. The tie between the BNP and the AL was short-lived during 
the last days of the Ershad regime and not sustained once the BNP came into power. 
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Peiris (1998) pointed out that the affiliation of the Jamaat-e-Islami (who fought against 
the liberation along with the Pakistani Army) with the BNP as one of the reasons for the 
Awami League's dissatisfaction on the BNP, though, ironically, the Jamaat-e-Islami had 
been an ally of the Awami League in the non-cooperation movement under the caretaker 
government (Banglapedia Online). The situation worsened in March 1994 when the A L 
accused the BNP of rigging a by-election in the Magura Constituency. It is assumed that 
the massive losses of the BNP in the Mayoral elections of Dhaka and Chittagong city 
drove them to win in that election at any cost in order to regenerate the enthusiasm among 
their activists. However, this conspiracy gave rise to similar allegations to those which the 
AL and the BNP had made against the Ershad government and, thereby, boycotted the 
1988 election. The opposition then continued a campaign of marches, demonstrations, and 
indefinite strikes in an effort to force the government to resign. The opposition including 
the BNP's ally, the Jamaat-e-Islami, boycotted the scheduled election on 15 February 
1996 under the Khaleda Government. But, the government initially stuck to its position 
and enjoyed a massive victory in the absence of the major opposition but, finally, handed 
over power to a neutral caretaker government headed by former Chief Justice, 
Mohammad Habibur Rahman. 
The Local Government under the Khaleda Regime 
After 15 years of military regimes, it was debatable whether the democratically elected 
government would retain the upazila system. At the very least it was expected that the 
existing chairmen would be suspended and fresh election held to bring genuine 
representatives into power. Surprisingly, it took Khaleda a few months to abolish the 
Upazila system and replace it by a bureaucratic Thana system (Rahman and Khan, 1997; 
Siddiqui, 1996; Panday, 2005; Hossain, 2005; Mallik, 2004). Siddiqui (1996) feels that 
this was like throwing out the baby with the bath water but there were many reasons for 
dissolving the Upazila system: 
1. The BNP had only a handful of Upazila chairmen, as mentioned above; 
2. There was an overt and covert consensus among MPs from the main political 
parties for abolition because they did not want any powerful rival in their own 
constituency exercising substantial power over development resources. For 
instance, Siddiqui (1996) recalls the bitter fights between the Jatiya Party MPs and 
Upazila Chairmen during the Ershad regime, from which other political parties 
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learned a lesson. MPs in Bangladesh make political gains through the use of 
development funds (The Daily Star, August 03, 2005). 
3. Bureaucratic power helps any government to extend its powerbase efficiently in a 
short period of time. 
The government explored other opportunities to resolve the conflict of power between the 
MPs and the Upazila chairman; ironically, the democratically elected BNP government 
indulged itself in an anti-democratic practice as regards decentralisation. They did nothing 
to develop a decentralised local government in this spell but promulgated the Local 
Government (Union Parishad) Act 1993, which promised some insignificant structural 
change and formation of Thana Development Coordination Committee (TDCC) by 
another official Order. 
The Sheikh Hasina Regime (1996-2001) 
In the general election of 12 June 1996, the Awami League won 146 seats and was able to 
mobilise an absolute majority by forging an alliance with the Jatiya Party. However, the 
Jatiya Party and its president Ershad, withdrew his support from the government in 
September 1997. From the last half of the former BNP regime, the main opposition, the 
Awami League, stayed away from parliament, accusing the government party of not 
cooperating with the opposition by participating in parliamentary debate. Following the 
same track, the BNP walked out at the end of 1996, charging the government with 
harassing and jailing BNP activists and they only returned in January 1997 on the basis of 
a four-point agreement with the government. Again, they walked out in August 1997, 
asserting that the agreements were not being implemented and returned in March 1998. 
From early 1999 the BNP boycotted all elections, stressing the lack of transparency and 
fairness in elections held under the AL regime. 
The Awami League failed to promise anything better in terms of democratic politics, 
rather following the example of their predecessors. They did make a significant effort on 
the Ganges Water Treaty, the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord, increasing food grain 
production, and so on. But they were pilloried in the media for massive corruption, 
charges of violence against the sons and relatives of a few leaders (especially against the 
sons of Kamal Majumdar and M . Chowdhury Maya for murder and extortion), nepotism, 
substantial violence by the AL student wing (Jashimuddin Manik, the Chatra League 
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president of Jahangirnagar University became legendary for his anti-social violence), a 
great fall in the share market and government's silence on that, and, above all, the rise of 
gang leaders like Jaynal Hazari under the shelter of the government. Al l of these events 
were well known and were punished by the voters in the 2001 poll when the A L was 
elected in only 62 seats. 
The Local Government reform under Shiekh Hasina 
The Awami League constituted a Local Government Commission, which came up with a 
report in May 1997. According to the recommendations of that commission, the Awami 
League tried to form a Gram Parishad (with some modification), but this was in vain after 
a verdict by the high court. There were no major steps taken during this regime, other than 
the introduction of direct elections for reserved women-seats at the Union level. 
The Four Party Alliance Government (2001-2006) 
There has been no major change in the political environment under the various 
governments since 1991. Each government has been corrupt and concerned with 
politicisation at the local level, and in turn the opposition has called strikes and involved 
themselves with different types of violence and destruction. 
Reorientation of the Gram Sarkar 
A second era of Gram Sarkar has started in recent years after the victory of the four party 
alliance headed by the BNP in the general election of 2001. In August 2002, Prime 
Minister Khaleda Zia announced the formation of the Gram Sarkar (Mallik 2004) and the 
bill was piloted in Parliament by the LGRD Minister, Mannan Bhuiyan, in February 2003. 
The proposed organisation, to be set up in every ward, would not be an administrative 
unit as defined in Section 152 (1) of the Constitution, but rather it would be a supporting 
unit of the UP {The Bangladesh Observer, February 17, 2003). The representatives of the 
organisation, however, would be selected. In an interview with The Daily Star, Mr 
Bhuiyan said the Gram Sarkar was an improved version of some previous attempts 
including the abolished Swanirbhar Gram Sarkar Provision of 1980, introduced by the 
former president Ziaur Rahman. It also drew elements from the Palli Parishad Act of 1989 
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formulated by the Jatiya Party, the Gram Parishad Act of 1997 by the Awami League and 
the recommendations of a local government commission formed in 1992. 
The Protest and Government's Response 
The initiative drew fire from all of the major political parties. An eminent lawyer, Dr 
Kamal Hossain, filed a writ challenging the legality of the Gram Sarkar Act 2003 on 
behalf of the Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust (BLAST) on July 06, 2003. He 
argued that articles 3, 4 (4) of the Act, assented to by the President on February 27 2003, 
were contradictory to Articles 7, 9, 11, 27, 28, 29, 59 and 60 of the constitution. The High 
Court Division of the Supreme Court then served a show-cause notice on the government 
asking it to explain why the Act should not be declared illegal and beyond the 
constitution. The government replied to the notice (The Daily Star, August 03, 2003). On 
August 02, 2005 High Court declared the Gram Sarkar Act 2003 to be "illegal and 
unconstitutional". Since the law was enacted two years before, the coalition government 
had already constituted 39,786 Gram Sarkar units of the target to form 40,392 such non-
elected bodies - which neither serve as part of the administration, nor of local government 
(The Daily Star, The New Nation, August 03, 2005). Al l of the Gram Sarkar units were 
formed through selection, comprising the supporters and activists of the ruling parties. In 
their budget, the government had allocated Tk 600 million for the Gram Sarkars, each of 
which has 13 members plus a headman and an adviser (The Daily Star, August 03, 2005). 
Political Objectives of the Gram Sarkar Formation 
In the course of constituting of the Gram Sarkar, many reports were published by the 
media providing evidence of the politicisation of the Gram Sarkar. Some highlights 
included (a) reference to a statement of a law-maker of the majority party of the coalition 
government that they would have to make sure to fill the Gram Sarkars with their party 
loyalists, (b) aspirants for membership of the Gram Sarkars started visiting the houses of 
ministers, (c) the government hurriedly constituted the Gram Sarkar for political gain 
(Ali , 2005). Chowdhury (2003) mentions irregularities in Gram Sarkar formation such as: 
keeping voters in the dark by allowing false voters, titular presence of the voters,17 
1 7 As there is no definite identity of voters in any administrative jurisdiction, government parties try to 
obtain their mandate in different ways in the elections held in their time. For instance, they hire voters who 
are proactive to them from neighbouring areas to cast votes in their favour. This is a very common picture 
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preparing the list of the Gram Sarkar in advance, influence of local BNP leaders, 
manipulation, and so on. Moreover, the government's hurry to form the Gram Sarkar, 
even after the writ, raises some suspicion in the public's mind. Many political parties 
strongly voiced their opposition to the Gram Sarkar. The Worker's Party went so far as to 
say that it would call a national convention against the Gram Sarkar (New Age, August 
18, 2005). Its general secretary asserted that the Gram Sarkar "would just be a lower unit 
of the BNP and trigger an ultra-partisanship and anarchy in the rural areas". 
The government's politics with the grassroots institutions are more evident by the recent 
activities of the BNP's Senior Joint General Secretary, Tarek Rahman. According to the 
daily newspapers, Tarek organised the grassroots assembly of the BNP activists at Union 
level by segmenting the country into 20 regions. In this three month long programme, 
which started on 04 January 2005 in Thakurgaon and ended on 30 March 2005 at 
Gazipur, Tarek strove to reorganise the BNP at the proletarian level by settling internal 
disputes and tried to come closer to them by breaking the hierarchy which, in turn, 
inspired the local leaders to work for the BNP targeting the next general election (The 
Daily Ittefaq, 08 January 2005). However, such assemblies have encouraged the BNP 
marginal activists and, specially the Gram Sarkar, to bypass the elected Union Parishad in 
different development activities, which is evident in my field observation and also in the 
literature. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the power struggles in Bangladesh and has determined that 
successive governments have tried to grasp power by virtue of abusing every possible 
means like corruption, nepotism, muscle power and so on, which is highly controversial 
in a democratic environment. I f we summarise the features of the national elections 
(Table 2.1) and the nature of the successive regimes' power transfer (Table 2.2), we get 
an idea of political trends in Bangladesh. These give rise to one question: while the 
decentralisation of local government promises higher reflection of public opinion, how 
found in the dailies immediately after the elections in Bangladesh. The most recent example is the by-
election of the Parliament for the Dhaka 10 constituency in which the government candidate won by a huge 
mandate. 
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can such government assure and/or execute a prosperous and fruitful flow of 
decentralisation? 
Table 2.1: Features of the National Election 
Year Type 
Officially reported to have been secured 
by the ruling party or the regime under 
which the poll was conducted 
Features 
1973 Parliamentary 97.6% of seats A* 
1977 Referendum 98.9% of votes B & C 
1978 Presidential 76.0% of votes B 
1979 Parliamentary 69.6% of seats B 
1981 Presidential 65.5 % of votes B 
1985 Referendum 94.0% of votes B & C 
1986 Parliamentary 51.0% of seats B & C 
1986 Presidential 84.0% of votes B & C 
1987 Parliamentary 83.7% of seats B & C 
1991 Parliamentary Under caretaker government A 
1996(Feb) Parliamentary 84.3 % of seats B & C 
1996 (June) Parliamentary Under caretaker government A 
2001 Parliamentary Under caretaker government A 
Source: Edited from Peiris (1998), Banglapedia Online 
Features: 
A = fair poll, results accepted without challenge; 
B - extensive vote rigging and intimidation of voters; 
C = Election boycotted by most of the opposition parties. 
* = Please follow the description on page 18 and below this table. 
The above table suggests vote rigging on almost every occasion unless under a caretaker 
government. Though the 1973 election was apparently fair, it was tailored in another way. 
While describing the election 1973, Peiris (1998, p. 48) argues that "the election hustlings 
were not free of the crude exercise of muscle-power and other malpractices by the ruling 
party". Again, both Peiris (1998) and Ahmed (2004) comment on the exercise of power 
by the Awami League against their main opposition the JSD, as described before. It seems 
that no political party has a sense of moral obligation to conduct a free and fair election. 
Of course, once the parties are immensely corrupted, they might not have that level of 
confidence to conduct a free and fair election. Again, i f there is lack of transparency and 
accountability in the national administration system, the political parties might try to 
exploit every possible means to stay in power. 
The above discussion indicates that the government, formed by whichever party, has 
always exploited local government according to their own formula for strengthening their 
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Table 2.2: Nature, Duration and Transfer of Power of Successive Governments 
Period Nature of the regime Duration Transfer of Power 
10/01/72 to 
28/12/74 
The Awami League 
government headed by Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman with multi-
party parliament 
3 years By declaring "the state of emergency" 
25/01/75 to 
15/08/75 
The one party (BKSAL) rule 
under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 7 months 
Military coup and 
assassination of Mujib 
15/08/75 to 
21/04/77 Transition to military regime 
1 year 8 
months 
By official order to change 
the power from military to 
political government under 
common ruler 
21/04/77 to 
30/05/81 
Military regime headed by 
Ziaur Rahman 
4 years 1 
month 
Military coup and 
assassination of Zia 
30/05/81 to 
24/03/82 Transition to military regime 
10 
months Bloodless military coup 
24/03/82 to 
06/12/90 
Military regime headed by 
Ershad 
8 year 9 
months Popular upheavals 
06/12/90 to 
06/02/91 Caretaker Government 2 months 
Peaceful transfer of power 
to democratically elected 
government 
06/02/91 to 
30/03/96 
The BNP government headed 
by Khaleda Zia with multi-
party parliament 
5 year 2 
months Popular upheavals 
30/03/96 to 
12/06/96 Caretaker Government 
2 months 
+ 
Peaceful transfer of power 
to democratically elected 
government 
12/06/96 to 
15/07/01 
The Awami League 
government headed by Sheikh 
Hasina with multi-party 
parliament 
5 year 1 
month 
Handed over to caretaker 
government 
15/07/01 to 
10/10/01 Caretaker Government 3 months 
Peaceful transfer of power 
to democratically elected 
government 
10/10/01 to 
27/10/06 
The four-party alliance headed 
by Khaleda Zia with multi-
party parliament 
5 years 
Handover to controversial 
caretaker government (see 
chapter six) 
power. They have tried to dominate to lowest tier of administration in the name of so-
called decentralisation. According to Sirajul Islam, BAKSAL, as a system, aimed at 
achieving an exploitation-free and socialist economic and administrative order more or 
less close to spirit and practice of systems of government in contemporary socialist 
countries (Banglapedia Online). Again, the court said on Gram Sarkar "the concept is 
very noble, but its goals have to be achieved within the framework of the constitution, the 
court noted, adding, i f the need for such a body is overwhelming, it could have been 
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achieved under the Union Parishad Ordinance" (The Daily Star, August 03, 2005). The 
country's political history suggests a lack of interest among successive governments to 
democratise the administration. The decentralisation policy, which apparently derives 
from a democratic environment, is assumed as an insecticide to kill the insects of 
corruption and autocracy. But, when these policies themselves turn up as a virus, what 
will be the fate of local government? The BKSAL of Mujib, the Gram Sarkar of the BNP 
during Zia and his widow's regime, the Upazila and Palli Parishad of Ershad and the 
Gram Parishad of Sheikh Hasina are like the same wine in different bottles and have all 
been used to centralise power in a putatively decentralisation process within Bangladesh. 
The question then, which is developed in the next chapter, is how we might conceptualise 
decentralisation in order to rethink local government in Bangladesh. 
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INTRODUCTION 
'Decentralisation' has a dictionary meaning of a mode of governance that distributes or 
transfers a certain level of power (authority and responsibility) from central government 
to regions, organisations and so on. Accordingly, decentralisation brings central 
government close to the local community and, thus, can be used as a functional synonym 
of 'democracy'. Decentralisation is not a new phenomenon of the modern state; it can be 
traced back to the eleventh century. Since the history of feudal lords and sovereign kings, 
centrally governing powers were decentralised in different situations and with various 
objectives. In Western Europe, the demand of 'liberty' on free-hold of property, toll-free 
access to markets and fairs and so on gave rise to a certain level of decentralisation and 
thus, some authority was given to a body-corporate or a group of individuals. However, 
Wickwar (1970) argues that "... this legal personality was something that had not grown 
naturally, but had been artificially created by the sovereign; the body corporate was a 
persona field" (p. 10). In South Asia, the Mughals, introduced four-tier local government 
headed by Subadars (Governors) in provinces, by Shikdars in Districts, by Fauzders in 
Parganas and Matabbor (Headmen) in villages (Siddiqui, 1992), which were mainly the 
tax administration units. Thus, it can be argued that decentralisation was a very strong 
tool to the ancient sovereigns to centralise their power bases. 
In the twentieth century the major European powers 'exported' their systems of local 
government to the new developing countries (Wickwar, 1970; Humes, 1991), which was 
facilitated by colonialism, the influence of development assistance, and the aspiration of 
less developed countries to modernise by developing governmental systems similar to 
those of colonial powers with which they had been associated (described in section three). 
Added to this, particularly in the case of Bangladesh, there was the desire to grasp power 
(as illustrated in the previous chapter). However, in the early 1970s, the concept of 
'decentralisation' diffused globally in different shapes, conceptualised by neoliberalism 
and politicised by the US and UK governments of President Reagan and Prime Minister 
Thatcher. Nowadays, decentralisation has become a prescription of good governance, 
poverty alleviation, economic sustenance and so on by academics and donor agencies. 
But, the perceptions of the concept vary substantially among countries, political 
ideologies, academics and donor agencies. For instance, the World Bank (2002) 
emphasises privatisation as a tool of decentralisation, whereas Manor (1999) denies 
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privatisation as a form of decentralisation. Again, some countries have pursued political 
devolution at all levels and some partial and/or a combination of both administrative and 
political decentralisation. In addition, though a considerable number of academics 
recognise administrative decentralisation as one form/aspect of decentralisation, 
Mawhood (1983) considers that to be deconcentration rather than decentralisation (Table 
1). This chapter will deal with all of these debates and the author's argument will be 
extended in the following chapters. 
This chapter will strive to conceptualise the different global practices of decentralisation. 
The first section introduces the concept of 'decentralisation' and hints at some of the 
debates that will be discussed in the following sections. Section two concentrates on the 
development of the new concept of 'decentralisation' from neoliberalism. Section three 
generalizes global forms of government and the distribution of power. This section will 
explore the vertical and horizontal (areal and functional) relationship of state power. 
Section four conceptualises the distribution of power and introduces the meaning of 
different forms of decentralisation and the following section illustrates its different 
aspects. Section five illustrates the positive outcomes of decentralisation all over the 
world. Section six explores considerations in pursuing a decentralisation plan. Finally, 
section seven concludes the chapter and comments on favourable circumstances for 
pursuing a decentralised local government policy. 
N E O L I B E R A L I S M 
Decentralisation has experienced a new dimension since the early 1980s, influenced by 
global flows derived from neoliberal globalisation. Neoliberalism, derived from 
Keynesian welfare economy, is a term used to describe a variety of movements away 
from state control or protection of the economy, particularly beginning in the 1970s. 
Neoliberalism, often closely associated with particular governments and their economic 
doctrines in the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Australia, New Zealand 
and India, argues that free markets, free trade, and the unrestricted flow of capital will 
produce the greatest social, political and economic good. This form advocates minimal 
government spending, minimal taxation, minimal regulations, and minimal direct 
involvement in the economy. It also ascribes a significant role in the governance of the 
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international economy to global financial institutions (World Bank, IMF, WTO), which 
play a major role in international development and thus in countries such as Bangladesh. 
There are, of course, many critics of neoliberalism. According to Elizabeth Martinez and 
Arnoldo Garcia18, who argue that the main points of neoliberalism include: 
1. THE RULE OF THE MARKET. Liberating "free" or private enterprise from any 
bonds imposed by the government (the state) no matter how much social damage 
this causes. Greater openness to international trade and investment, as in NAFTA. 
Reduction of wages by de-unionising workers and eliminating workers' rights that 
had been won over many years of struggle. Eliminating price controls. Al l in all, 
total freedom of movement for capital, goods and services. To convince us this is 
good for us, they say "an unregulated market is the best way to increase economic 
growth, which will ultimately benefit everyone." This resembles Reagan's 
"supply-side" and "trickle-down" economics - but somehow the wealth did not 
trickle down very much. 
2. CUTTING PUBLIC EXPENDITURE FOR SOCIAL SERVICES like education 
and health care. Reducing the safety-net for the poor and even the maintenance of 
roads, bridges, water supply - again in the name of reducing the government's 
role. Of course, they don't oppose government subsidies and tax benefits for 
business. 
3. DEREGULATION. Reduced government regulation of everything that could 
diminish profits, including protection of the environment and job security. 
4. PRIVATISATION. Selling state-owned enterprises, goods and services to private 
investors. This includes banks, key industries, railroads, toll highways, electricity, 
schools, hospitals and even fresh water. Although usually done in the name of 
greater efficiency, which is often needed, privatisation has mainly had the effect of 
concentrating wealth even more in a few hands and making the public pay even 
more for its needs. 
5. ELIMINATING THE CONCEPT OF "THE PUBLIC GOOD" or 
"COMMUNITY" and replacing it with "individual responsibility". Pressuring the 
Both the writers attended the Intercontinental Encounter for Humanity and against Neoliberalism, held July 27 -
August 03, 1996, in La Realidad, Chiapas. 
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poorest people in society to find solutions to their lack of health care, education 
and social security all by themselves - then blaming them, i f they fail, as "lazy". 
Thus, i f the state devolves power to local hierarchies, more resource mobilisation will be 
accomplished. According to Peck and Tickell (2002), in the asymmetrical scale politics of 
neoliberalism, local institutions and actors were being given responsibility without power, 
where the international financial institutions and actors were gaining power without 
responsibility: a form of regulatory dumping [was] is occurring at the local scale, while 
macro-rule regimes [were] are being remade in regressive and marketised ways. 
These broader trends in neoliberal governance provide an important backdrop to changes 
in governance in Bangladesh. As a recipient of World Bank development loans, 
Bangladesh has come under the purview of international neoliberal governance. In 
November 2005, for example, the World Bank cancelled three development projects after 
alleging corruption in the bidding process and Bangladesh was named the world's most 
corrupt country five years in a row up to 2005 by the global corruption watchdog, 
Transparency International (Rahman 2005). Local governance in Bangladesh, therefore, 
needs to be understood within the broader contexts of global neoliberalism, post-
independence democratisation and prevailing structures of governance at the local level. 
G L O B A L DISTRIBUTION OF POWER TO GOVERN 
In general, global governmental power is distributed in two ways: spatially and 
functionally. On a spatial basis, governmental power associated with regional and local 
levels is distributed to lower, local tiers. Functionally, power is distributed among a 
number of specialized ministries, autonomous bodies and other agencies concerned with 
one or more related activities. The state distributes power to govern locally and their 
central agencies exercise power both spatially and functionally. The spatial and functional 
institutions depend upon each other (Figure 3.1); they supplement one another, they 
overlap, they compete and they conflict (Humes, 1991). 
It is not obvious that the combination of both principles has to be same in all 
governmental activities; rather the nature of the activities determines the level of 
involvements of the principles. For instance, defence strategy and foreign affairs are 
supposed to be dealt with on the functional principle, as local communities do not have 
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of Power: Aerial and Functional Channels (Humes, 
1991). 
any direct involvement with these kinds of activities. Accordingly, health, education, 
sanitation, and similar kinds of activities are more likely to be governed by local 
authorities where central authorities and their subordinate ministries provide some 
logistics through their field agencies. However, the combination of spatial and functional 
principles varies among different countries and this research will strive to explore the 
combinations in the Local Government of rural Bangladesh. 
To study the local government system it is important to consider two criteria for 
distinguishing approaches, which are: 
1. The extent to which hierarchical control is either inter-organisational or intra-
organisational; and 
2. The degree to which this control is focused in a single agency or spread among 
many functional or specialised hierarchies. 
Here the extent of hierarchical control can be assumed as the degree to which the local 
bureaucratic chief relates to the hierarchical authority and to the local elected authority. 
From the previous chapter we learned that in Bangladesh the UP is apparently more areal 
than other upper local government tiers, as (theoretically) the UP is controlled by the 
Chairman who is elected by the elder voters of his constituency. Again, i f we conduct a 
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time series analysis, we wil l find a spectrum extending from low to high hierarchical 
control in time as well as different tiers. However, Humes (1991) has generalised the 
global pattern of local government and identified four variations that may be noted: 
1. Inter-organisational: A system that makes the local bureaucrats fully responsible 
to an elected local council instead of their upper hierarchical bureaucrats. Local 
government in the UK provides an example. 
2. Hybrid (Subsidiarisation): A system in which the local executive is substantially 
responsible to the elected local council and, in addition, responsible to a higher 
bureaucratic authority to implement specific central policies. Germany and Japan 
have this type of local government. 
3. Hybrid (Supervision): While the local executive is partially responsible to the 
elected local council and, for being a designated member from the central 
government, is directly loyal and responsible to it and supervised by it. This is 
termed Hybrid (Supervision). France, Colombia, Morocco have this kind of local 
government. 
4. Intra-organisational (Subordination): In such a system the local government itself 
is a part of central hierarchy and, thus, fully subordinated to a central authority. 
Such local government system is/was practised in communist countries such as the 
former Soviet Union and China. 
The local governments of different countries do not always fit exactly in the forms 
mentioned above. In practice, these categories blur and overlap as part of a single 
continuous spectrum. 
Having described hierarchical control as the first criterion in distinguishing approaches to 
the study of local government, it is also important to identify the central control of local 
bodies, both elected and designated, that is focused in one central ministry or agency or is 
distributed among a number of specialised ministries and similar central operational 
agencies. Therefore, the following will illustrate the degrees of functional control. Similar 
to hierarchical control, four types of functional control can be traced as below: 
1. More Areal: In this category, a central ministry or agency is responsible for 
overseeing the general purpose of local bodies and coordinating their activities 
with the help of functional ministries. The functional ministry, in principle, 
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communicates through the central ministry in its effort to advance and supervise 
local programmes. For instance, the education of local councils is coordinated by 
the central ministry with the help of the education ministry. Germany has this kind 
of practice. 
2. Dual Areal: In this system, a general central body exercises the overall control of 
the local government and specific ministries/agencies direct specific local 
services; like China, whose central agency is the party bureaucracy. 
3. Dual Functional: In this system the specialised body controls specific local 
services. The general purpose is supervised by the elected local bodies, which 
coordinate local affairs. This system maintains both the areal and the functional 
approach. For instance, the local unit of the specialised central agency is 
accountable to the elected local council as well as the upper hierarchy of the 
agency itself. The French system provides an example. 
4. More Functional: A system in which specialised bodies directly provide and 
supervise specific local services. The central ministry has a relatively weak 
coordinating role in comparison to the functional bodies. For instance, a local unit 
of the specialised agency is fully accountable to the local elected authority and, 
thus, has the opportunity to work more independently, eliminating the central 
bureaucracy. The UK government adopted such a system. 
Extent of Control 
from intra to inter 
organisational 
Subordination (intra 
organisational) 
Supervision 
(Hybrid) 
Subsidiarisation 
(Hybrid) 
Regulation (inter-
organisational) 
Type of Control: General to Functional 
Aerial Dual Functional 
Dual Subordination 
(Soviet) 
Dual Supervision 
(France) 
Aerial Subsidiarisation 
(Germany) 
Functional 
Regulation ( U K ) 
Figure 3.2: Four Traditional Approaches to Local Governance: A Conceptual 
Framework (Humes, 1991) 
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A continuum of the functional variety exists in different countries of the world. Again, 
different systems have different tiers of local government within a single country. 
Bangladesh is an example in this regard which is elucidated in the next chapter. The 
power distribution from areal to functional depends on a number of characteristics like 
local autonomy, fragmentation of local government structures, resource mobilisation and 
so on. It is important to know about the hierarchical and functional distribution of power 
before going to the broader context of meaning and concepts of decentralisation. I f we 
place the hierarchical and functional divisions perpendicular to each other, it gives a 
clearer two dimensional picture of the distribution of power, as shown in figure 3.2. 
However, the local government systems in practice and in principle often vary within a 
country system, which is a major issue discussed in this research. 
DECENTRALISATION OF L O C A L GOVERNMENT 
Meaning and Concepts 
Decentralisation and the development of democratic local governance continue quietly to 
sweep the world from Bolivia to Bulgaria, and, from West Africa to South Asia, a wide 
variety of countries are increasing the authority of local governments and working to 
make them more responsive and effective (Hossain, 2005). But in reverse, 
decentralisation can also be interpreted as counter-democratisation and a means for the 
centralisation of power, which mainly depends on the hidden political objectives of the 
central government (Hill, 1974). Decentralisation itself is popularly used as an umbrella 
term depicting at least three leading methods of shifting governance responsibilities from 
central to local levels: devolution, deconcentration and delegation. 
In an operational sense, "Decentralisation is the process of transferring power to the 
popularly elected local governments. It brings about change in the operation of 
institutions and almost invariably occurs gradually. Decentralisation requires the 
existence of elected local governments because local officials do not have meaningful 
autonomy unless they answer to constituents. Appointed local officials must ultimately act 
according to the interests of those in the national capital who gave them their jobs: they 
are effectively agents of the national government. A local system in which government 
officials are appointed, thus, is a centralised system that has not begun to decentralise'" 
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(p. 4) . 1 9 Rondinelli et al. (1981) have generalised this definition. They argued that 
Decentralisation is the transfer of responsibility for planning, management and resource-
raising and allocation from central government to (a) field units for central government 
ministries or agencies; (b) subordinate units or levels of government; (c) semi-
autonomous public authorities or corporations; (d) area-wide regional or functional 
authorities; or (e) NGOs and Voluntary Organisations. 
Table 3.1: Decentralisation 
Terms 2 0 associated with 
Organising Principles 
Structure in which the 
principle dominates 
Practice 
in Brief 
Deconcentration 
Bureaucratic 
Decentralisation 
Administrative decentralised 
Field administrator 
Regional administrator 
Prefectoral administration 
Delegation of powers 
Decentralisation 
Democratic decentralisation 
Political decentralised 
Local government 
Local self-government 
Municipal administration 
Devolution of powers 
Source: Mawhood, P. 1983. pp 3-4. 
Devolution means empowering people politically, and it is often considered as the closest 
term to Decentralisation. Formally, devolution is the creation of or increased reliance 
upon lower units of central government with some degree of political autonomy, that are 
substantially away from central influence yet subject to general policies and laws, such as 
those regarding civil rights and the rule of law. Cheema and Rondinelli (1983) clarified 
the process of devolution by identifying five fundamental characteristics. 
i) Powers are transferred to autonomous units governed independently and 
separately without the direct control of central government; 
1 9 Decentralisation and Democratic Local Governance Programming Handbook Centre for Democracy and 
Governance. Cited in Ellison (2004). 
2 0 The term 'deconcentration' is used both by the French writers and the United Nations Report; but 
'Decentralisation' becomes 'devolution' in the United Nations Report. 
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ii) The units enjoy corporate status and powers to secure their own resources to 
perform their function; 
iii) The units maintain control over a recognised geographical area; 
iv) Devolution implies the need to develop local government institutions; 
v) It is an arrangement of reciprocal, mutually beneficial and coordinate 
relationship between central and local government. 
Panday (2005) questions whether the aforesaid characteristics are fundamental and argued 
that they seem to ignore any possibility that interests and aims are differentiated and 
uneven either in social or spatial terms. 
Deconcentration denotes the transfer of power from the central administrative unit to its 
lower tiers. This means the redistribution of administrative powers and responsibilities. 
Ellison (2004) argues, "1 Deconcentration is frequently the Decentralisation method 
preferred by national government personnel because it preserves control over resources 
and priorities. This may be true even where legal reforms seem to enable a political 
power shift more akin to devolution; central bureaucracies may actively put 
administrative mechanisms in place that in effect keep real control over resources and 
decisions in the hands of their regional offices''' (p. 4). 
The United Nations advocated this form of Decentralisation because people will have a 
better understanding of government programmes, use the services offered, and eventually 
participate in using its resources. On the contrary, Mawhood (1983) argues that any hope 
of cracking open the blockages of central bureaucracy, curing managerial constipation 
and stimulating the whole nation to participate in national development plans ends in 
chaos and bankruptcy. Manor (1999) agrees and adds that "When leaders in a central 
government transfer administrator to lower levels without subjecting them to influence 
from elected representatives at those levels, these administrators tend to remain loyal to 
those at the apex of the system. They enable central leaders' influence to penetrate more 
effectively into lower-level arenas - which in practice makes the political system more 
effectively centralised" (p. 20). There is also the issue about what is 
deconcentrated/devolved. Very often this is about responsibility for service provision and 
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accountability, but budgets are not devolved and remain centralised. This creates 
"unfunded mandates" that make local government very difficult. 
Delegation is the transfer of 'managerial responsibility' for a specific defined function 
outside the usual central government structure (Ellison, 2004) that is not completely 
controlled by the central government, but which is ultimately accountable to it (Hossain, 
2005). It implies the transfer or creation of board authority to plan and implement 
decisions concerning specific activities within specific spatial boundaries to an 
organisation that is technically and administratively capable of carrying them out without 
direct supervision by a higher administrative unit (Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983; Panday, 
2005). Ellison (2004) argues that delegation is weak i f local governments have some 
reasonable measure of competency and experienced personnel. He added that, i f local 
government is new to governance and/or without a basic skill base, delegation can be an 
effective means to start the process of Decentralisation by steadily shifting more and more 
management responsibility to local jurisdiction. 
Many writers like Ellison (2004), Panday (2005), Hossain (2005), have often referred to 
privatisation and deregulation as two more forms of Decentralisation. According to 
them, privatisation is an arrangement that allows private agencies to plan and manage 
activities which were previously performed by the government. According to the World 
Bank Thematic Team, privatisation can include (Hossain, 2005): 
i) Allowing private enterprise to perform functions that had previously been 
monopolised by government; 
ii) Contracting out the provision or management of public services or facilities to 
commercial enterprise. There is a wide range of possible ways in which functions 
can be organised and many examples within public sector and public private 
institutional forms, particularly in infrastructure. 
iii) Financing public sector programmes through the capital market (with adequate 
regulation or measures to prevent situations where the central government bear the 
risk for this borrowing) and allowing private organisations to participate; and 
iv) Transferring responsibility for providing services from the public to the private 
sector through the divestiture of state-owned enterprise. 
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However, deregulation reduces the legal constraints on private participation in service 
provision or allows competition among private suppliers of services that in the past had 
been provided by government or by regulated monopolies. Manor (1999) denies that 
privatisation is a form of Decentralisation and gave two reasons for this. He argued that 
"Privatisation often entails the horizontal transfer of tasks from the public to private 
sector, rather than a downward transfer (which is Decentralisation). And it often entails 
the transfer of tasks to private firms which are not local in character - to firms owned by 
people who operate at higher levels in the economy or sometimes even internationally. 
Neither constitutes Decentralisation" (pp. 4-5). 
It is very important for practitioners to understand the difference between these types of 
Decentralisation. This is, firstly, because, being widespread among donors and recipient 
countries, Decentralisation programming suffers from a popularization of its terms 
carelessly applied to many activities that are not related to Decentralisation. Secondly, 
when designing and implementing programmes, it is important that managers know which 
type of Decentralisation tools they are supporting and the likelihood that they can achieve 
their objectives with these tools. Thirdly, political realities and some good judgement 
usually dictate that a mix of these is more common than a singular approach. The above 
discussion dictates that each of the different forms of Decentralisation has a different 
implication for deferent organisational purposes in the degree of power and authority to 
be transferred, but the forms are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
Dimensions of Local Government 
There are three major dimensions of Decentralisation that are widely accepted as the 
essential attributes of power relations: administrative, political and financial 
Decentralisation. 
The administrative dimension is sometimes called deconcentration. This is the full or 
partial transfer of an array of functional responsibilities, administrative personnel and 
resources from higher to lower levels. Thus, it often encourages bureaucracy. Shah and 
Thompson (2002) argues that "Administrative Decentralisation requires lack of any ex 
ante controls over the decision to hire, fire and set terms of employment of local 
staff...Furthermore, local government should have the authority to pass bye-laws in their 
spheres of responsibility without having to obtain prior clearance from the higher level 
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government" (p. 7). However, Manor (1999) and Mawhood (1983) argue that it is a 
means of centralizing power, as mentioned earlier. The administrative dimension is 
approximated by the degree of subdivision of the nation state, and by the size of country 
in terms of population (Braun and Grote, 2000). 
The political dimension is synonymous with devolution. It involves the transfer of 
political authority to the popularly elected local level institutions through the 
establishment or re-establishment of elected local government, electoral reform, political 
party reform, authorisation of participatory processes, and other reforms (Decentralisation 
and Democratic Local Governance Programming Handbook). There are three insights in 
this definition. First, i f local, elected government has been posited as a first - essential -
step in establishing decentralised authority, it is highly unlikely that other legal and 
structural reforms can take root without elections actually being held. Second, while 
programming activities to support power shifts occasioned by decentralised reforms, we 
should not limit support for the central authorities to the area of policy reforms. Rather, 
we should also support whatever needs to happen within the operations of national 
agencies to enable these shifts. Third, political Decentralisation is usually the first step in 
the reform process and tends to get ahead of the financial dimension, while administrative 
changes can often lag behind both and are used as a means to slow the process by a 
recalcitrant national bureaucracy. Political Decentralisation aims to give citizens or their 
elected representatives more power in public decision-making. It is often associated with 
pluralistic and representative government, but it can also support democratization by 
giving citizens, or their representatives, more influence in the formulation and 
implementation of policies (World Bank Thematic Team). The political dimension is 
captured by the degree of Decentralisation in elections at all tiers of local government 
(Braun and Grote, 2000). 
The financial dimension (often referred as to fiscal Decentralisation) entails the 
definition of authority over the raising of revenues or access to the transfer of, and making 
decisions on, current and investment expenditures (Braun and Grote, 2000; Manor, 1999; 
Ellison, 2004; Shah and Thompson, 2002). The fiscal dimension often lags far behind the 
political dimension. Ellison (2004) argues that this can happen because revenue-sharing 
formulae take time to calculate and restructure in centralised financial agencies, because 
national agencies charged with sharing resources resist doing so, or a host of other 
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reasons. He continues that resources are always limited, so the criticism that the local 
does not get enough resources can often be a straw man, because such resources do not 
exist at any level. Fiscal Decentralisation can be assumed from the share of sub-national 
expenditure in relation to that at the national level (Braun and Grote, 2000). 
Al l the aforesaid forms and dimensions of decentralisation have their deficiencies. Again, 
no individual form or dimension can satisfy the entire decentralisation process of a 
country, as the context varies with every country. A mix of concepts is usually apparent in 
any given context. Giving an example from the Ukraine, which has adopted devolution in 
its local government system, the UNDP (2005) reveals that it has been a challenge for a 
weak, unstable central government to keep local governments functioning with vastly 
shrunken resources and little or no civil society engagement at the local level. More 
complexly, different concepts even prevail in different tiers of a particular country. For 
instance, some tiers may be constituted by devolution and some other tiers may be 
confined with only deconcentration or/and delegation. In addition, the devolution may be 
limited in terms of the political dimension and may have a lag in terms of the financial 
dimension. Thus, a cross-section of forms and dimensions of decentralisation gives a 
more accurate picture of the level of decentralisation of any particular country. 
Elucidation of the Meaning of Decentralisation 
The above discussion gives a more general idea about the forms and dimensions of 
decentralisation. The following paragraph wil l detail what decentralisation is and what it 
is not. 
What Decentralisation is: 
1. A counter point to globalisation: In the second section of this chapter it is argued 
that the recent flow of decentralisation is indirectly developed from the concept of 
globalisation, but in definition, decentralisation is a counter point to globalisation 
(Hossain, 2005), because, globalisation often moves from the local to the national 
and global spheres of multination or non-national interest. On the contrary, 
decentralisation brings the decision-making back to the regional and local levels. 
In this connection, it is important to mention that the perception of 
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decentralisation varies among the global financial institutions and academics 
which are already mentioned. 
2. An integral part of democratisation: the ideal decentralisation can be referred to 
as an integral part of democratisation. I f the power is devolved to the elected 
autonomous local bodies with allocation of financial resources, it is likely to be 
more democratised. Otherwise, decentralisation might be used by the central body 
as a strong tool to bureaucratise power. Therefore, it is very important to identify 
decentralisation in theory and in practice. 
3. Involvement of multiple actors and sectors: Decentralisation efforts are strongly 
influenced by a country's size, population, history, political climate and 
geographic entity, social sectors and actors and ethnic diversity. The geographic 
entity includes international, national, sub-national and local; the social sector 
includes public and private sector and civil society and social sector includes 
development themes such as political, legal, social, cultural, administrative, 
environmental and so on. These differences call for different arrangements 
between central and sub-national levels, including devolution, delegation and 
deconcentration. For example, in a state with ethnic diversity different forms of 
local government might be needed considering the politics, culture and tradition of 
the particular region. 
4. A combination of dimensions: Hossain (2005) explains that decentralisation is a 
combination of four dimensions - the collective/exterior, the collective/interior, 
the individual/exterior and the individual/interior. In the collective group, the 
exterior dimension deals with the institutional and legal forms and procedures and 
the interior deals with the social culture - the set of values and assumptions, which 
are often unspoken and unacknowledged but, nevertheless, play a powerful role in 
human relationships. The individual group, both in exterior and interior levels is 
deep-rooted at the micro-scale; it is the context for the individual's mindset, 
mental models, emotions, individuals within the institution, and so on. 
5. Central control over decentralised procedures: A debate prevails about 
whether decentralisation is a means of centralising power, as described earlier. 
Referring to the gap between de jure and de facto equality, McEwan (2002) 
emphasises the pluralisation of politics. She interprets good governance as 
requiring local government to liaise with communities before making decisions, 
- 5 5 -
and to promote the rights and duties of communities to govern, which will result 
in a more radical version of governance at the local level. 
What Decentralisation is not: 
1. An alternative of centralisation: It is evident from the literature on third world 
countries that a decentralisation policy is frequently adopted in order to centralise 
power, which is contradictory to the spirit of the term. Hill (1974) strives to 
differentiate the national power structure from the government service delivery 
and argues that local government is concerned with citizens' micro-level interests, 
which is apart from the national power structure. He, ultimately, tries to make the 
distinction of two terms: 'local government' and 'local self-government'. 
However, in theory, decentralisation refers the latter, which is not an alternative to 
the centralisation of power. 
Driving Forces of Decentralisation 
Braun and Grote (2000) have identified the internal and external pressures and demands 
for Decentralisation: 
• Regional Political Freedom, Participation and Conflict Resolution: 
Decentralisation is seen as a way to reconnect central regimes to social groups 
from which they have become increasingly divorced (Manor, 1999). 
• Pressure of Global Competition: Decentralisation, curiously enough, is not just a 
parallel trend of globalisation, but is very much driven by it. 
• Demand for Stabilisation: A response from the regional and local level is to gain 
power over protective and stabilissation related policy instruments. 
• Demand for Equity and Efficiency in Local Public Services : Partly related to the 
forces of global competition, mentioned above, major changes in development 
strategies have been adopted by many countries. 
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WHAT CAN DECENTRALISATION DO? 
Decentralisation involves a central government transferring to local entities some of its 
political authority and, crucially, some of its resources and administrative responsibilities. 
These local entities then provide some basic public services and functions. It is widely 
believed that decentralisation increases popular participation in decision-making because 
it brings government closer to people, making it more accessible and more knowledgeable 
about local conditions and so more responsive to people's demands. But does the 
evidence support this idea? More importantly, does decentralising authority and resources 
help advance the pro-poor agenda? When decentralisation initiatives are pursued with 
appropriate institutions and resources, they mobilize pressures from civil society and 
engaged citizens. Such reforms can yield significant benefits not just for poor and 
excluded groups but also for governments. In recent years a wide variety of countries in 
transition and developing, solvent and insolvent, authoritarian and democratic, with 
governments of the left, right and centre - have pursued decentralisation. Decentralisation 
has worked - as in parts of Botswana, Brazil, Colombia, Jordan, South Africa and many 
states in India (Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, West Bengal), which can 
be traced from significant improvements as below: 
• Faster response to local needs. In the definition, decentralisation is unanimously argued 
as the means to break down the national hierarchy and, thus, to bring the government 
closer to the common people. Therefore, i f a national administrative system is 
decentralised, local authorities tend to act more in line with local preferences and 
conditions, and no longer have to wait for permission from higher levels before acting. 
Decentralisation also provides opportunities for women to participate at the local level, 
enabling a more gender-sensitive approach to policy formulation and implementation. 
Moreover, education, rehabilitation, nutrition and health and so on - central programmes 
become more widely used as it is easier for the locally elected representatives than 
bureaucrats to explain the rationale for them in terms so that local people can understand 
and contributing significantly to the success of those programmes. Decentralised entities 
are more efficient at delivering services than top-down bureaucratic hierarchy because 
local planning and participation ensure stronger links between interventions in health, 
education, water and sanitation and other services 
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• Better information flows. Once the local councils are governed by the elected 
representatives and the central hierarchy become more flexible, it is assumed to increase 
the information flow automatically and significantly. In general, the democratic practice 
and fair competition among the political parties helps to increase the information flow 
from centre to the local level. On the other hand, the bottom-up information flow also 
increases as the decentralisation provides bureaucrats with early warnings of potential 
disasters—disease outbreaks, floods, droughts—and allows empowered local authorities 
to take swift remedial action. For example, in the Dhar district of Madhya Pradesh, India, 
a rural community intranet project, Gyandoot, started in January 2000, enabling prompt 
responses to an early e-mail warning and so preventing an outbreak of a cattle epidemic 
(UNDP, 2005). 
• More accountability and transparency, and less corruption. Better information flow 
eventually brings the transparency, makes the government more accountable and, thus, 
reduces corruption. Because decentralisation tends to enhance transparency, the amount 
of money corruptly diverted from development programmes often declines in countries 
that pursue it. A recent study of UNDP 55 countries found that decentralisation of 
government spending is closely associated with lower corruption among bureaucrats and 
reduced rent seeking by private parties - leaving more money to spend on basic services 
for poor people (UNDP, 2005). 
• Improved delivery of basic services. Decentralisation can make a particularly big 
difference in the provision of social services. It facilitates community participation in 
decision-making and can help resolve issues related to sharing the costs of service 
delivery. For example, the Bamako Initiative has ensured the supply of essential drugs to 
remote rural communities in Mali and helped identify poor community members who 
cannot cover certain costs (UNDP, 2005). 
In a bureaucratic or subordinate system, as the local level government officials are not 
responsible and accountable to the local council, they often might misuse the 
privilege/system. Dual and/or political decentralisation often reduces such irresponsibility 
among government employees in local service centres like schools and health clinics 
because, on the basis of complaints received from their constituents, elected local officials 
can impose discipline. Thus basic service delivery is improved without any additional 
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cost. Increased accountability also encourages local people to monitor programme 
implementation and to protest when government employees perform badly. 
• More sustainable projects. Decentralisation makes development projects more 
sustainable because local people are more likely to be involved in their design, execution 
and monitoring. In addition, participatory budgeting and accounting enhance efficiency 
and transparency and make projects more gender responsive. 
• Stronger means for resolving conflict. A study by the UNDP (2005) reveals that 
empowering regions and localities helps promote national unity and resolve conflicts, as 
in Ethiopia and Rwanda. The same study argues that in Namibia and South Africa 
decentralisation was undertaken to redress inequalities among regions. Reallocating 
resources ensured a more equitable distribution of national funds to regions previously 
neglected by dominant groups at the centre. It also enabled debate and renegotiation on 
the allocation of national resources - a source of long-standing conflicts between regions 
and ethnic groups. 
• Increased energy and motivation among local stakeholders. Once the central system is 
decentralised, it ultimately reduces the workload which characterised the centralised 
hierarchical system. More participation of people also reduces the workload and 
endeavours to generate more innovative ideas to find solutions to their everyday 
problems. In addition, the central government can also concentrate on more national 
issues rather than the local, which also improves their efficiency. 
• Expanded opportunities for political representation. Decentralisation provides people 
with a much stronger voice in public policy decisions that affect their lives. In particular, 
it has increased representation among women (as in India one-third of council seats are 
reserved for women at the panchayat and nowadays in Bangladesh, at the Union Parishad 
and the Pourashava election one third of the members are elected women) and among 
previously marginalized ethnic groups (such as the Quechua and Aymara communities in 
Bolivia, the Kalingas and Gaddangs communities in the Philippines and rural ethnic 
groups like the Songhai and Dogon in Mali) (UNDP, 2005). 
• Improved Implementation and Monitoring of Service Delivery. Decentralisation also 
improves implementation and monitoring of service delivery and expedites responses to 
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bad performance. Around the world, increased transparency and improved scrutiny have 
reduced both the level of corruption and the scale of embezzlement. Thus, political power 
is no longer concentrated solely in the hands of national elites. Therefore, all state 
employees, including local elected representatives, civil servants or service personnel, are 
held accountable not just to the most powerful segments of society but also to the poorest 
citizens who elect the government. Such a setup is critical when planning policy 
interventions for the enhanced growth of the nation. 
CONSIDERATIONS IN DESIGNING A D E C E N T R A L I S E D PLAN 
Any Decentralisation attempts must have some considerations, such as the following: 
i . Consider the existing cultural elements: Before introducing any decentralisation tool 
to any particular area it is important to consider the cultural elements of that particular 
community - the images, assumptions and internal psycho-social expectations of the 
population regarding the issues of authority, the role of government, the role of the 
citizen, conflict, consensus, power, the role of elites, the role of the poor, the role of 
women, and a host of other issues. For example, India has adopted the Panchayat in their 
local government system, which has a long tradition. 
i i . Consider changing relationships: This might appear to conflict with the above as in 
major parts of the world efforts at local government were being made by generalised 
global prescription, eliminating their own traditions. However, this changing relationship 
does not necessarily mean to generalise a national system by example from the first 
world, rather to focus on the spatio-temporal changes of power structures among different 
socially interacting actors within that particular territory. These changes can be 
threatening or can be seen as enabling for all parties in a win-win situation. 
i i i . Consider timing and sequence: Decentralisation is long-term effort in which timing 
and phasing are crucial. The UNDP (2005) suggests pursuing the decentralisation policies 
according to the capacity of the existing government structures and to move from 
bureaucratic to more democratic structures step-by-step instead of directly devolving 
power to the local level. Hill (1974) discusses the French structure, where power is given 
to the local authorities according to their ability to carry them out. So, before making a 
plan of Decentralisation, time sequences need to be considered. 
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iv. Consider enhancing mechanisms of participation and partnership: 
Decentralisation is increased in effectiveness through mechanisms of ful l participation 
and partnership. Participation must involve all the societal actors playing their optimal 
and legitimate roles in policy formulation, resource management and service provision. 
v. Consider the mental model that is being used: Decentralisation as a term comes 
from a mental model containing a centre and a periphery. This is only a model, just as a 
pyramidal social structure is only a mental model. When we view a society as a whole 
system, we do not see vertical layers (as in a pyramid) or concentric layers (as in the 
concentric model), but rather a horizontal-environment with autonomous yet interrelated 
actors, sectors, and geographical areas. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter provides a generalised review of the theoretical ideas about the 
decentralisation of local government. Since there has been an emergence of demand for 
decentralisation among local communities in different contexts around the world, the 
process has been subject to negotiations about power. Thus, decentralisation is 
fundamentally political. Decentralisation can be brought to any country i f there is political 
will from the leadership and there is political cooperation from bureaucrats within 
particular regions. This usually depends in part upon the degree to which political and 
bureaucratic staff thoroughly agree on the strategy's long term advantages and commit to 
the process needed to make the transition to a decentralised system. Another important 
issue is the enabling environment for decentralisation, which incorporates the capacity of 
political leaders and bureaucrats, to mobilise civil society, and to generate long-term 
commitment to sustain the shift in government. The next chapter explores issues 
surrounding processes of decentralisation in the formation of the structures and functions 
of rural government in Bangladesh. 
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Chapter ^our 
Structures? aub Jf unctions in &ural 
Hocal (gobernment in panglabegl) 
INTRODUCTION 
Though the major political parties of Bangladesh unanimously agree that to meet the 
development demands of the grassroots, there is no alternative but to strengthen the local 
government institutions. However, when the question has been raised to devolve power to 
local government institutions and/or to strengthen them, governments have always been 
confused in their political decisions. Alam, Haque and Westergaard (1994) argue that 
decentralisation policies are usually presented and debated in the technical language of 
administrative efficiency and/or constitutional principles, whereas in fact they represent 
political objectives that are rarely made explicit. In the parliamentary elections of 2001 
both the major political parties, the Awami League and the BNP, had a manifesto 
commitment to establish elected Upazila Parishads but, unfortunately, after the election 
this was kept in cold storage. In an interview with the BBC Bangla Division on 1st 
December 2005, the then minister of Local Government, Rural Development and 
Cooperatives (LGRD&C), Mr Abdul Mannan Bhuiyan, said that that the delay was due to 
'some problems'. However, he confirmed this election would be carried out in future as 
both the Awami League and the BNP agreed upon this point. However, a discussion 
series on local government on BBC Bangla radio in December 2005 identified some 
obstacles in decentralising the local government of Bangladesh, as follows: 
• Enormous politicisation of the local government institutions; 
• Scarce of resources of the local government institutions; 
• Dependence upon the central government for resources; 
• Ascribed dependence, in the name of hierarchy, between the local government 
tiers; 
• Vicious cycle of bureaucratic administration at local level. 
Theoretically, the local government system is not a bureaucratic body but formed by a 
public mandate. This elected body assumes power, which comes through legislation from 
the state. However, they have another duty, which is to aggregate and unite the people. It 
is often difficult to aggregate people in formal structures as eight out of ten people in rural 
Bangladesh have little access to the formal institutions (Islam, 2002). Therefore, informal 
institutions have room to influence most of the country's population in their regular 
livelihoods. Westergaard (2000) and Westergaard and Alam (1995) explain the role of 
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informal institutions in settling local problems, such as uniting conflicting groups together 
in the local interest. 
This chapter strives to outline the existing local government structures and their functions. 
The first section describes the formal local government institutions and the second section 
focuses on the informal institutions. 
F O R M A L L O C A L GOVERNMENT INTITUTIONS 
The local government of Bangladesh can be divided into two main types: i) rural and ii) 
urban. A l l of the political regimes so far have experimented with their own 
decentralisation therapy and tried to innovate with new combinations of local government 
tiers and, finally, bureaucracy was given a free hand after the abolition of the Upazila 
system in 1991. There are debates between the bureaucrats and the civil society in fixing 
the number of tiers required for a well governed local government system. Former 
Secretary of the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs Mujibul Haque said on BBC Bangla 
radio (February 2007) that the reconstitution of the Zila Parishad by dissolving the 
Upazila Parishad would be more effective; he identified two underlying causes for this: 
• As the number of upazila is too high (approximately 500), the governance at this 
level might be diluted; and 
• Upazila lags with the depth of operation as the UP and the Zila exists in its 
immediate lower and upper hierarchy. 
In the same programme, Dr Hossain Zillur Rahman, a promising economist, rejected this 
argument by attacking bureaucrats for their efforts to grasp power through the Zila 
system. However, in this section we wil l discuss the formal local government structure 
according to the latest legislation. The rural local government as proposed in May 1997 
by the most recent commission on local government was to have four tiers: 
. Gram (Village) Parishad21, (40,000); 
2 1 Gram Parishad was proposed in the Local Government Institutional Strengthening Report in May 1997. 
during the Avvami League Regime, by the then Local Government Commission. However, the successive 
BNP regime passed the Gram Sarkar Act 2003 in parliament. Therefore, the Gram Parishad w :ll be 
discussed under the heading of Gram Sarkar. 
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• Union Parishads (4480); 
• Thana/Upazila Parishads (460); 
• Zila (District) Parishads (64). 
Here, the Union is the lowest administrative unit and is itself divided into nine parts, each 
called a Gram or Ward. The immediate upper hierarchy of the Union is Thana/Upazila 
which consists of 10-15 Unions. Accordingly, a Zila is usually constituted by 10-15 
Upazilas. It is important to mention that it is difficult to distinguish an Upazila and a Zila 
under rural local government. This is because, according to the Zila Parishad Ordinance 
2000, the Pourashava or Municipality and the Wards of a City Corporation within a Zila 
will be administered by that particular Zila Parishad. Again, the Upazila Parishad Act 
1998 confirms a composition of the Union Parishads and the Pourashavas under its 
Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives (MLGRD&C) 
Local Government Division 
Urban Levels Rural 
City Corporation District / City Zila Parishad 
Pourashava Sub-District / 
Municipality 
Upazila Parishad 
Union Union Parishad 
Village / Ward Gram Sarkar 
Figure 4.1: The Hierarchy of Local Government in Bangladesh 
jurisdiction. However, as this thesis is only focusing on the rural local government of 
Bangladesh, I will not pursue any elucidation of urban local government beyond a little 
discussion in the next paragraph. 
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Urban areas have a separate set of local governments. The Bangladesh Census 
Commission recognized 522 urban areas in 1991 (with a population of about 5000 or 
more) but only about 289 of the larger urban areas among these have urban local 
governments named Pourashava or Municipality, which again are classified according to 
financial strength. The six largest cities have City Corporation status. In addition, there 
are also some urban centres that are governed by the military under Cantonment Boards. 
A large number of small urban centres are administered under the Union Parishad system 
of (rural) local government as they have not yet been declared a Municipality. 
Gram Sarkar 
Clause number 8 of the Union Parishad Ordinance 1983 is refashioned by law amendment 
number 20 of 1993, which divided the Union Parishad into nine wards instead of three. 
The demarcation of the wards is made by the lowest unit of the land use map, which is 
called the 'Mouza'. A Mouza consists of one or more parts of a village. A Union Parishad 
consists of 10-15 villages. The higher number of villages in a Union Parishad, the greater 
are the physical distances and the potential alienation of communities from participation 
in the regular activities and development efforts of the Union Parishad. Making the 
administrative units of the upper hierarchies more participatory, with democratic 
grassroots participation, is essential and can be achieved by organising the people at that 
level. This philosophy was politicised by Ershad's Polli Parishad Act 1989, Hasina's 
Gram Parishad Act 1997 and, finally, Khaleda's Gram Sarkar Act 2003. Though the 
Gram Sarkar was declared illegal and unconstitutional by the High Court on 02 August 
2005, it is incorporated in this section as every political regime wants such an 
organisation. The following paragraphs wil l focus on the latest act: the Gram Sarkar Act 
2003, which replaced the Local Government (Gram Parishad) Act 1997. 
Structure of the Gram Sarkar: 
According to the clause 4 of the Gram Sarkar Act (2003), the structure of the Gram 
Sarkar is as follows: 
1. One headman, one advisor and thirteen members of a ward will constitute the 
Gram Sarkar of the ward; 
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2. The elected UP member from the ward wil l be the headman and the UP 
member for the reserved seat wil l be the advisor; 
3. The UP member from the reserved seat will be the advisor for all three Wards 
for her constituency; 
4. The members of the Gram Sarkar will be: 
a. One respected person; 
b. Three women members, including one trained member from the Village 
Defence Party (VDP); 
c. One trained male member from the Village Defence Party (VDP); 
d. One peasant; 
e. Two landless peasants; 
f. One member from cooperatives; 
g. One freedom fighter; 
h. One teacher; 
i . One businessman; and 
j . One doctor or any serviceman. 
However, i f the members are not available from any of the aforesaid groups 
the difference wi l l be covered by increasing the number from group d. 
5. The members wil l be selected by verbal vote of at least one-tenth of the adult 
franchisees of the ward and wil l be coordinated by the UNO (Chief executive 
of the Upazila) or the Circle Officer or their appointed employee. However, i f 
there is any argument about any member, the decision of the coordinator will 
be final. 
Function of the Gram Sarkar 
According to the clause 16 of the Gram Sarkar Act 2003, the functions of the Gram 
Sarkar are as follows: 
a. Make plans for development of local roads, bridges, culverts etc. and review 
the progress and financial matters of existing projects; 
b. Maintain law and order and control terrorism, violence against women, etc. 
and to submit reports to the UP; 
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c. Monitor governmental efforts on the elimination of illiteracy, observe the 
curriculum of primary and Madrasa educational institutes and submit reports 
to the UP; 
d. Motivate parents to send their children to school and create better awareness 
for adult and female literacy and submit reports to the UP in any failure of 
such motivation; 
e. Cooperate with the authority involved in the primary healthcare activities, 
including nutrition and immunisation, and report to the UP about the activities 
of the fieldworkers on those programmes; 
f. Cooperate with the authority involved in the family planning activities and 
report to the UP about the activities of the fieldworkers working on those 
programmes; 
g. Provide adequate support for the pure water and sanitation programmes; 
h. Collect primary statistics on births-deaths registration, marriages etc. and 
submit them to the UP; 
i . Be informed on fertilizer, insecticide and seed distribution and tell the UP and 
respective authorities of any shortage; 
j . Provide support to the law and order authorities and settle disputes within the 
ward; 
k. Initiate activities to develop the sports and cultural sector; 
I . Encourage cooperatives, small entrepreneurs, poultry, fisheries and livestock 
farms for the economic development of the village; 
m. Encourage and initiate tree plantation programmes; 
n. Instigate any welfare activities for the overall development of the village 
including child and women's affairs; 
o. Supervise the VGD and VGF activities within the village; 
p. Accomplish all other activities which are initiated by the government from 
time to time. 
The headman and the advisor of the Gram Sarkar wil l be responsible for 'a' and 
'b' of the above-mentioned activities and each member wil l be responsible for 
each of the remaining activities. I f the position of the advisor remains or becomes 
vacant, the advisor wil l be responsible for both 'a' and 'b ' and s/he wil l assign a 
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member for additional activity i f any position of the members remain or become 
vacant. 
Sources of Income: 
The UP wil l bear all the associated costs for the activities of the Gram Sarkar, like 
registration of birth, death, marriage, divorce and so on, which are listed in the activities 
of the UP. 
Union Parishad 
The Union parishad is the oldest and lowest level of the local government system. K has 
been functioning for more than a hundred years for the rural development of the country. 
There are 4480 Union parishads, which are run by the directly elected representatives. Its 
roles and representatives are guided by different levels, rules and circulars that are made 
from time to time. 
Structure of the UP: 
1. Chairman: One chairman of Union Parishad directly elected by the voters of the 
Union. 
2. Members: Nine members elected from the nine wards constituting the Union. 
3. Women members: Three seats are reserved for women. Each of the woman members 
is directly elected by the male and female voters of three wards within a Union. 
4. Official members: The Block Supervisor (Directorate of Agriculture), Health 
Assistant, Family Planning Assistant, Family Welfare Worker, Ansar/VDP and all other 
field staff of government departments working at Union level (for example, UP secre'ary) 
are official members of the Union Parishad but they have no voting rights. 
5. Others members: Representatives of freedom fighters, Cooperative Societies, 
disadvantaged groups/trades, i.e. weavers, fishermen, landless workers, destitute women, 
etc) are members of the Union Parishad without voting rights. 
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Functions of the UP 
1. Preparation of a comprehensive Union Plan and inclusion of inter-ward 
development projects after identification and prioritization. 
2. To assist and cooperate in the development of primary schools, supervise their 
functioning and motivate people for spreading literacy. 
3. Ensure provision of health services at the Union Health Centres, supervise family 
planning-related activities and services and monitor the same. Arrange for a 
supply of safe drinking water and promote sanitation programmes. 
4. Construction of inter-ward roads, maintenance of the same, management of small 
scale irrigation and water resources. 
5. Implementation of afforestation programmes along the Union Parishad roads and 
all earthen embankments. 
6. Peaceful resolution and amicable settlement of inter-ward disputes. 
7. Promote social resistance over violence against women, terrorism, all types of 
crimes and cooperate with the administration and maintenance of law and order. 
8. Up-to-date registration of birth, death and marriages based on reports recc'ved 
from the Gram Parishad. 
9. Assist the Upazila parishad in the preparation of inter-ward agricultural and 
fisheries development projects and take the necessary action. 
10. Cooperate with and advise all agencies within the Union having credit 
programmes and help rural poor to participate in the same. 
11. Increase awareness for women and child development and take concrete actions 
where necessary. 
12. Encourage people to undertake cottage industries with good potential and facilitate 
the involvement of disadvantaged and poor people in various income generating 
activities. 
Upazila Parishad 
The Upazila Parishad (Sub-District) is an important unit of administration in Bangladesh. 
Most of the Upazilas have now been developed with infrastructures into fully-fledged 
administrative centres, particularly during the period when the Upazila Parishad was, for 
the first and only, functioning as a local government body (1982-1991). Though the 
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Upazila Parishad system was abolished in 1991, yet for the greater interest of public 
services, there was a strong justification and necessity for establishing a local government 
body at the Upazila level. The principles of good governance require that the activities of 
government departments must be brought under the supervision of public representatives 
and thereby give a broader scope of public participation. In view of the above reasons, the 
Government felt the urge to reintroduce Upazila system and, in 1998, the Upazila 
Parishad Act 1998 was passed in the Parliament. This Act came into force on 1st February 
1998 by notification in the official Gazette. 
Structure 
According to this act, an Upazila Parishad consists of: 
a. A chairman directly elected by the voters of the Upazila; 
b. Al l chairmen of the Union Parishads and Pourashavas, i f any, under the 
jurisdiction of the concerned Upazila are members of the Parishad; and 
c. The women's seats numbering one-third of the total number of Unions and 
Pourashavas are reserved and the women members/commissioners of Union 
Parishads and Pourashavas elect these members among themselves. 
Period of Upazila Parishad 
The term of the Parishad is 5 years from its first meeting. The Upazila Nirbahi Officer, 
the chief executive of the Parishad deputed by the Government is the Secretary o. the 
Upazila Parishad. 
Standing Committees 
For smooth functioning, the Upazila Parishad has seven standing committees: 
a. Law and Order 
b. Health and Family Planning 
c. Agriculture, Irrigation and Environment 
d. Education 
e. Social Welfare, Woman and Child Development 
f. Communication and Infra-structural Development 
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Functions 
At present (January 2007) there are 469 Upazilas in 64 Districts under 6 Divisions. 
As in the previous system, functions at the Upazila level are divided into two categories, 
namely "retained" and "transferred". The regulatory functions and the major development 
activities, which are of national and regional scope, are retained by the National 
Government. According to Upazila Parishad Act 1998 functions entrusted to the parishad 
include: 
1. Preparation of Five Year Development Planning and development planning for 
different periods. 
2. Implementation of activities of Government departments transferred to the Parishad, 
monitoring and 
3. Co-ordinating the functions of those departments 
4. Construction, maintenance and repair of inter-union connecting roads. 
5. Ensuring optimum utilizations of surface water through small scale irrigation schemes 
and implementing the same. 
6. Ensuring public health, nutrition and family planning services. 
7. Development of sanitation and sewerage works and ensuring the supply of pure 
drinking water. 
8. Motivation work for expansion of education and assistance for the same. 
9. Supervision and monitoring of Secondary and Madrasa (schools for Islamic religious 
studies) education. 
10. Promoting cottage and small industries and providing assistance for its success. 
11. Assistance in the activities of Co-operative Societies and NGOs and co-ordination of 
the same. 
12. Co-operation in and implementation of programmes for the development of child, 
women and social welfare and provision of assistance for promoting youth, sport: and 
cultural activities. 
13. Undertaking programmes for the development of agriculture, livestock, fisheries and 
forest resources. 
14. Reviewing the law and order situation and the activities of the Police Directorate and 
regularly submitting reports to the concerned higher authorities. 
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15. Promotion of self-employment activities, providing assistance for poverty alleviation 
programmes, and assisting the government in the implementation of its programmes. 
16. Providing necessary help and co-ordinating the activities of the Union Parishads. 
17. Guiding public opinion and taking other defensive measures against the offences of 
woman & child torture/oppression. 
18. Taking measures to encourage public opinion against offences like terrorism, theft, 
robbery, illegal trafficking, use of drugs and so on. 
19. Facilitating different programmes, including social forestry, for the preservation and 
development of the environment. 
Zila Parishad 
The chairman and the members of the council are directly elected for a five year term. 
However, the elected Zila Parishad has never seen the light in any regime and bureaucrats 
have as a result dominated this institution since its birth. In addition, there are debates on 
the essence of this institution. 
The structure of the Zila Parishad is: 
1. A Chairman; 
2. Fifteen members; and 
3. Five female members in reserved seats. 
The Chairman, members and female members are (in theory) elected by the specific 
voters defined under the clause 17 of the Zila Parishad Act 2000, which is described 
below: 
Clause 17: 
1. The Mayor and the commissioners of city corporation ( i f one exists), the Upazila 
chairmen, the chairmen and commissioners of the municipal corporation, the chairmen 
and members of the UP under the jurisdiction of the concerned district wil l be eligible to 
vote to select the Chairman and the members of the Zila Parishad; 
2. The election commission should provide a voters' list for each ward; 
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3. None should have the right to vote except the voters as mentioned in subparagraph 
' 1 ' of clause 17. 
4. Being a member of any institution, as described in subparagraph 1, a potential 
voter loses his/her right to vote. 
INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS IN R U R A L BANGLADESH 
'Institution' means 'a regular pattern of behaviour' or 'a way to get things done'. Formal 
institutions are structured organisations and committees, such as government departments 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Informal institutions are more difficult to 
understand; these incorporate issues such as culture, power relations, religious customs 
and other social norms. The literature on the rural local government of Bangladesh 
focuses on the particular mix of formal and informal institutions, which is a key 
determinant of development outcomes. Again, in policy and practice there are 
considerable difficulties in articulating formal organisational realities with the rules and 
norms embedded in informally constructed social structures. However, a field study 
conducted by the author presents a complex scenario in this regard. This study is 
concerned with the women who were the primary beneficiaries of the RMP. A brief on 
the RMP is given in the next chapter. The case studies of two women, one successful and 
one failed, will help us to find the interactions between the formal and the informal 
structures: 
Jahanara Begum: A Success Story 
Before being selected for the RMP roadwork Jahanara had been staying with her disabled 
husband, three daughters and only infant son in her father-in-law's house, which was 
hypothecated at that time. She used to earn wages from household work and paddy 
husking in neighbours' houses. Then, a four year job in the RMP and seven months in the 
Post-Flood Rehabilitation Project (PFRP)2 2 have supported her to make every endeavour 
to change her life. The job in the RMP and a loan from the PFRP helped her to accrue a 
good amount of savings along with the mandatory savings. 
2 2 The PFRP was a C A R E initiated project which provided loan to the flood victims without imposing any 
interest on the loan. 
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After graduating from the RMP, she had added together her mandatory saving of 7000 
taka, 13,000 taka savings from her RMP wages over four years and a loan of 20,000 taka 
from neighbours and, at last, was able to purchase her existing homestead land, which, 
she feels, has given her much mental relief and helped to boost her potential. When she 
was asked to describe how the homestead land would boost her potential, she replied that 
this land was like a base to her which had assured her shelter. She further added that a 
homeless person never feels that they can move forward. In addition, she said that it was 
possible to get the 'huge loan' from her neighbour as she had a regular income during that 
time and also had grown a social network during the four years working in the RMP. Her 
elder brother had also given her a 5,000 taka loan, which she had used to purchase a cow 
for selling milk. In the following year, her monthly income from milk selling had reached 
1500 taka, up from 600 taka a month. In addition, she has established a corner shop oi, her 
homestead land to make the best use of her husband's potential. She has concentrated on 
saving and profit maximising. For instance, she had given less priority to paddy 
cultivation because the accessory costs of cultivation, such as irrigation, fertilizer and day 
labourers' wages, had increased to the point of reducing profits. 
Table 4.1: Jahanara's I G A at a Glance (Local currency 'Taka') 
Initial Status (5 l h Year) Present Status (7 l h Year) 
Name of IGA 
Investment 
Monthly 
Income 
Investment 
Monthly 
Income 
Cow for Milk 5,000/= 600/= 20,000/= 2,000/= 
Goat Fattening 0/= 0/= 1200/= -
Corner Shop 0/= 0/= 5000/= 550/= 
Banana Cultivation 0/= 0/= 2000/= 2500/= 
Vegetable Cultivation 0/= 0/= 2000/= 1500/= 
Handicrafts 0/= 0/= 0/= 500/= 
Physical Asset Status 5,000/= 150,000/= 
In next two years she purchased 18 Decimals more of cultivable land, costing 9000 taka, 
which at the time of the interview was being used for banana and vegetable cultivation, a 
5 decimal pond for 2500 taka. Her operating I G A S are given in table 4.1. 
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Her shop was losing customers due to the lack of a grain grinding machine but she could 
not install a machine because her husband would not be able to operate it due to his 
disability. Therefore, she started a business of goat fattening and duck raising as a coping 
strategy. Now she has her own house, 10 decimals of homestead land, a 5 decimal pond 
and 18 decimals of cultivable land worth more than 120,000 taka, a couple of successful 
IGAs like milk production, goat fattening, a shop, a banana garden, crop and vegetable 
cultivation and fishing in her own pond, and is earning more than 5000 taka per month. 
She has a very good affiliation with local elected bodies, NGOs, market retailers and 
wholesalers, government agricultural extension agencies and so on, involved in small 
group cooperatives and enjoying substantial support when needed. 
She is producing sufficient protein for her family from the fish cultivated in her own pond 
and milk from her cow. She is independent-minded enough to refuse to give a dowry in 
her eldest daughter's marriage.23 Also her other two daughters are in school, in classes IX 
and V, and her son is in class IV. Her daughters are also earning from stitching and 
handicrafts in their spare time. She has a very good understanding with her husband. 
Sajeda Khatun: A Failed Case 
Sajeda, abandoned by her husband when she was pregnant, was fully dependent on wages 
from household work before joining the RMP. Her neighbours informed me that she had 
again got married after being released from the RMP and that her husband had left her 
after only seven days. They assume that he might have taken Sajeda's withdrawal 
amount, which is provided from the mandatory savings to initiate an IGA or IGAs. They 
also claimed that Sajeda is not serious about her business and that she has consumed all of 
her earnings from the RMP, instead of making any further investment. Now she is staving 
with her only daughter on a local dam (a public resource) in her sister's poorly 
constructed house and living from hand to mouth. 
2 3 While working in the RMP, as a Technical Officer-Monitoring of a field office, I had to submit a 
household livelihood security survey report in each quarter of a year where, in a section, I evaluated the 
perception and practice of the respondents on the subject of dowry. On the evidence of my survey, it would 
be very surprising if anyone refused to give dowry for a daughter's marriage. I cross-checked the 
information provided by Jahanara with her neighbours and the elected member of that ward and found that 
the information was true. 
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After being released from the RMP Sajeda used to ferry dried fish and earn wages by 
working in agricultural lands, especially in chilli fields. When she was asked to provide 
the breakdown of her withdrawal amount she replied, 'some I had consumed, some were 
stolen and rest I used to pay o f f debts'. She said that she had invested only 500 taka for 
the IGA of dried fish. However, she sold the goods on credit and then failed to retrieve 
her money. It should be mentioned that from her f if th year business follow-up report, 
conducted by the RMP, I observed that she was lending money to others which she denied 
during the interview. 
Though she seems to be approximately 35-40 years old, she is getting Aged Allowance 
under special consideration of the Char Bani Pakuria Union Parishad Chairman. In 
addition, she was surviving on begging from door to door during the interview and failed 
to describe future plans to move on from that situation. While talking with Sajeda's next-
door neighbour as a key informant of Sajeda, she said, "she was very idle and was always 
rude to her neighbours and relatives, which altogether pushed her down". 
Conceptual Issues 
The above two case studies hint at the importance of social structures like kinship, 
networking with professional groups, community groups, and so on. None of the 
respondents had any affiliation with formal institutions at their pro-poor stage. Jahanara 
has taken advantage of informal institutions to ameliorate her livelihood, eventually, 
obtaining access to formal institutions; she is thus an example of what Blair (2005) 
defines as 'gainers', with links in the patron-client system as they use their patrons to 
protect their positions and to sustain them in their development concerns (i.e. economic 
growth, education, health, dowry, gender issues, transportation and so on). On the other 
hand, Sajeda remains in the group of 'submergees' who depend on their patrons and/or 
formal structures for their security concerns like, food, shelter, clothing, environmental 
disaster, extortion, violence and so on. The following paragraphs wil l explicate the 
informal institutions that exist in rural Bangladesh. 
Kinship is one of the fundamental building blocks in a wider social order and is primarily 
expressed through patrilineage ('ghusti' in local term). The 'ghusti' often has some 
physical expression in a residential neighbourhood, called 'para', where composite 
dwellings are usually inhabited by people from the same family tree. To extend this 
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kinship, both Muslims and Hindus prefer to avoid marriage within their own 'ghusti' or 
'para', and they try to be strict respectively in social status and caste, which eventually 
promises stronger social capital and/or networks to them (Bode, 2002). Thus, big farm 
households are likely to retain an elongated joint structure; in contrast, poorer households 
are likely to have a segregated nuclear structure. The headmen of big farm households 
usually exercise power within the household and its threshold, which altogether makes a 
'samaj'. 2 4 Islam (2002) identifies the changing pattern of community leadership at 
grassroots level as follows: 
• In pre-colonial Bangladesh there were three categories of local leaders: a) 
'zamindar' and/or his associates, b) religious leaders ('Imam' for the Muslims and 
'Purohit' or caste leaders for the Hindus), and c) lineage elders. 
• In the colonial period, until the establishment of the Union Boards in 1970, the 
'zamindars' enjoyed greater decision-making powers in all matters other than 
religion. 
• The Chawkidari Panchayet Act of 1870, for the first time, led to the emergence of 
the dichotomy between formal and informal institutions in rural society. However, 
the formal leadership was backed by the rulers and 'samaj' remained as a strong 
launch pad for accessing formal authority. 
• The change in national power in 1947 witnessed no major change in rural power 
structures in the 1950s, thus, local leadership was vested in the rich families. 
• The 'Comilla Model', later renamed the Bangladesh Academy for Rural 
Development (BARD), united the small farmers together, first in Comilla and 
gradually defusing all over Bangladesh, under cooperatives since the 1960s. Such 
effort brought a new type of leadership, which consisted of cooperative managers, 
model farmers, tractor drivers and so on. 
• As the Awami League was basically an urban-based political party, there were no 
significant changes in rural leadership in initial years after the independence. 
Usually, the new central power, after 1975, felt the urgency of buildLg a 
powerbase at the rural level, which created substantial opportunities in rural 
2 4 Here 'threshold' means the neighbouring households which directly and/or indirectly depends on the big 
farm household and obey its decision. 
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leadership. Accordingly, there was some room for leadership from the middle and 
lower class farmers. 
• Factional leadership emerged from the increasing number of local leaders. 
• The increase of N G O activities, especially the micro credit, reduced the 
dependence of marginal people on their patrons and united them together. 
• Since the beginning of military regimes, the political parties were duelling with 
each other to establish themselves in villages, and this led to the emergence of 
party leadership. Local party leaders have assumed and practised significant 
power in last few years, especially by establishing the Gram Sarkar, which once 
again give birth of the dichotomy between formal and informal institutions. 
The above points reveal the origins of factionalism and explain the change in leadership 
through the years. The factionalism in leadership eventually divided the old 'samaj' into 
several parts. Islam (2002) suggests that ten Muslim 'samaj' in 1947 divided into 17 in 
1975-76 and further separated into 34 in 1985. However, the major roles of 'samaj' are 
local justice and conflict resolution through 'shalish', which is a rural version of the 
judicial system represented by a panel to adjudicate over disputes. 'Shalish' was first 
accommodated at the UP level judiciary system in 1961 by the 'Shalish Court Ordinance', 
then replaced by the 'Village Court Ordinance' 2 5 in 1976. According to the act, UP 
chairmen preside over the 'shalish', which legally brought the elected body into power 
instead of wealth. However, the act has never been implemented successfully, which 
results in a long queue of formal court cases (Chondo, 2006). Again, the wave of 
politicising the local government institutions has eventually weakened the reputation of 
the 'shalish'. A revision and modernisation of this informal judiciary system is essential. 
The elimination of political influence and the exploitation of power will help marginal 
people and women to change socio-political reality. 
2 5 Once a case is filed in the village court, the chairman calls the 'shalish' and asks both group/persons to 
attend. In addition, s/he asks both of them to appoint two jurors, and one elected member of that UP. 
making a jury of five members. If the UP Chairman refuses to chair the court or if any confusion arises over 
her/his neutrality, the UNO will appoint another elected member of that UP to conduct the 'shalish'. If the 
verdict is a 4:1 vote majority there will be no chance to appeal, but at 3:2 an appeal can be placed in the 
formal lower court within 30 days of the verdict (Chaodo, 2006). 
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There is also a less formal arrangement of informal institutions. As an example, Islam 
(2002) quotes the empirical study of Hossain and Westergaard (1998) in Boringram of 
Bogra district. Here the villagers wanted to have a person from their village elected. There 
were three candidates willing to compete in the local election but none of them was likely 
to be elected as the voters (villagers) were split. Eventually, the 'samaj' leaders sat 
together, selected one person from them and other two candidates were paid Lheir 
expenses and everybody agreed to the decision. 
This is a very traditional example of informal local governance in Bangladesh. Another 
example of informal local governance on a larger scale is the Terrorist Extortionist 
Resistance Action Committee ( T E R A C ) of Natore district, popularly known as the Stick-
Whistle Committee 2 6 (Lathi-Banshi Samity). The T E R A C is the best known informal civil 
society movement in Bangladesh and it experienced huge print media coverage in 2003. 
Initially the T E R A C was a group of a hundred small entrepreneurs who were forced to 
pay protection money to local musclemen who were backed by the political leaders. 
Within two months of the registration, anti-drug activity was added to their aims. Within a 
few months, the T E R A C become very popular among the community, increasing its 
membership to several thousands. Gradually, the T E R A C has raised its voice on social 
justice, citizen demands and so on. Its success was recognised and in many other parts of 
Bangladesh it became a model of good governance. One significant feature of the T E R A C 
is its fundraising, and they managed to obtain substantial currency support from the 
overseas Bangladeshi community. 
CONCLUSION 
The above discussion has introduced the formal and informal legal institutions of Rural 
Bangladesh. Building upon previous chapters, we can say: a) no regime has yet had a 
thoughtful local administrative hierarchy, despite a few changes; b) local government 
institutions were always being politicised, which has prevented successive regimes from 
2 6 The name, Stick-Whistle Committee, is because of their use of whistle and stick to protect themselves 
from any illegal payments to the musclemen. The committee planned to blow a whistle upon the entrance of 
any musclemen into their shops so that a crowd would gather a drive the musclemen away. The 
organization imposes a 5000 taka on any member who sits tight after hearing the whistle. The committee 
registered their name as T E R A C on 16 November 2000. 
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devolving power to the local level; c) the decentralisation efforts in Bangladesh are more 
characterised by donor enthusiasm, indicating the influence of global neoliberal 
governance; d) the overall local government system does not follow any particular mgdel. 
For example, the UP is 'functional' and the other two upper hierarchies are for 'areal' 
governance. Again, considering the existing structure of the UP, the UP Secretary is not 
accountable to the elected bodies, but rather to her/her upper bureaucratic hierarchy, 
which is partially similar to the 'dual supervision' of the French Model. In reverse, as the 
UP depends on the funds from the Upazila, the elected UP Chairmen remains loyal to the 
bureaucratic authority of the Upazila, which is conceptually similar to the 'subordination' 
of the Russian Model, e) However, though the elites (at the centre) still control resources 
at national and local levels and opportunities distributed by the state, land is no longer the 
principle basis of power and status. Rahman (2002) claims that nowadays agriculture 
contributes less than 50 percent of household income; f) there is substantial change in the 
traditional informal structures because of structural change at the centre; g) informal 
institutions have never been promoted politically; h) informal institutions have much 
potential as a powerful instrument for local justice. 
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Chapter (^ive 
Capacity gfatteggntent of local 
<@ouernment in &ural Panglabesfy 
INTRODUCTION 
Though a substantial number of scholars consider the global flow of decentralisation as a 
product of neoliberalism, it is unanimously accepted that 'true' decentralisation is one of 
the prerequisites of democratisation. Here 'democratisation' emphasises resource 
mobilisation and empowerment at the local level. In a country like Bangladesh, the 
marginalised people first learn about 'mobilisation and empowerment' from the NGOs 
because of weak local structures. Many efforts have been made in restructuring the local 
government in Bangladesh through the years since liberation. The Government of 
Bangladesh (GoB), with assistance of some NGOs, is now trying to capacitise local 
government institutions. The Rural Maintenance Programme (RJMP) of CARE 
Bangladesh is one of the projects that have brought community, social elites and the 
Union Parishad (UP) together with its upper hierarchies. In this chapter I do not focus on 
the change of capacity levels of local government as an intervention of RMP; rather I will 
try to portray my observations as a former employee of this programme. Therefore, this 
research is not aimed at a comparative analysis of the local government before and after 
the intervention of CARE. Instead, the research extracts the facts to develop an 
understanding of the competence of rural local government institutions to operate the 
development programmes. 
Before discussing the field note findings, it is important to introduce the RMP. Therefore, 
the first section of this chapter discusses the RMP, its successive developments, 
components and so on. The following section focuses on the information from different 
strata who are directly or indirectly involved with the RMP operation. 
RURAL MAINTENANCE PROGRAMME 
Poverty is a process of accelerating deprivation, destitution, vulnerability and 
disempowerment. It is worthwhile mentioning that women are unevenly affected in those 
aspects of poverty. The RMP has been framed by addressing these issues. The RMP has 
been one of the largest and most successful development programmes of CARE 
International, funded by the European Union and CIDA and implemented by the GoB's 
Local Government Division (LGD) under the guidance of CARE Bangladesh. The 
programme was designed to employ destitute women to maintain rural roads and provide 
them with extensive training in new skills for life changing activities. It has contributed to 
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the betterment of life for a fraction of the most disadvantaged and marginalized rural 
women in the country, improving self-reliance through employment creation and 
livelihood development. The RMP was being implemented in 4,200 unions under 61 out 
of 64 districts (except in 3 Chittagong Hill Tracts districts) where 42,000 destitute women 
(the majority of whom were divorced, separated, widowed or outcast) were employed for 
4 year cycles to maintain roughly 84,000 kilometres of rural earthen road year-round. 
Each year approximately 10,000 women graduated from the programme and the same 
numbers were replaced. 
This programme had arranged year-round income-generating activities and helped to 
increase income of the poorest of the poor through partnering local government 
institutions (LGIs include UPs and the Upazila Parishads). Since inception, the 
programme had been working closely with the UPs and the Upazila Parishads. The key 
stakeholders of this programme were the destitute women at community level, LGI's 
officials and the UP representatives and concerned officials of LGIs. 
The expected impacts of the RMP Project were as follows: 
a. The livelihood security of rural poor, especially the destitute women would 
improve, 
b. Rural roads would sustain the transfer of goods and services to markets and link to 
rural institutions, and 
c. Rural women would be recognized as agents of development. 
The purpose of this Project was to improve the socio-economic status and food security of 
RMP women in a sustainable manner, and to maintain year-round traffic flow on 
important designated roads. The expected outcomes of the project include the following: 
a. RMP women are economically self-reliant, 
b. Status of RMP women and their self-confidence, social recognition and 
opportunities are improved at household and community levels, 
c. The health and nutritional status of RMP women and their household members is 
improved, 
d. Year-round use of maintained rural roads by light traffic is improved, and 
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e. Local government institutions effectively manage road maintenance 
independently. 
The overall expected outputs of the RMP Project included the development of human 
capital and community assets, accumulation of financial capital, and improvement of 
institutional capacity. 
Different Phases of RMP 
RMP Phases I, II and III 
Between 1983 and 2001, three phases have been funded through LGIs/ Union Parishads 
by the Government of Bangladesh from general revenue, by local government Union 
Parishads, and by successive multilateral Food Aid grants from the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA). CARE initiated the RMP in 1983 as a cash-for-work road 
maintenance project within a food security framework in 7 Unions under 7 Districts. 
In 1992, the project was redesigned as a food security and sustainable development 
project, extending the continuum from food relief to sustainable poverty alleviation, 
including promoting the economic and human security of destitute women. The project 
added an "income diversification component" (IDC). The IDC has added some skills 
training to the RMA women so that they can earn equal or more than their RMP wage 
after graduation from the RMP. 
Figure 5.1: RMA women are operating Income Generating Activities (IGAs) for their 
economic amelioration (Photo: RMP/CARE). 
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In 1998, after the amendment of government legislation, the RMP started capacity 
strengthening of local government institutions to hand over its road maintenance part to 
the Union Parishads. The project thereafter was expanded in Phases I I (1989-1995) and 
Ill-stages 1 and 2 (1995-2001) to cover road maintenance activities and the employment 
of destitute women in Bangladesh. 
RMP III - Stage 3 
The new stage in RMP Phase I I I , hereafter referred to as RMP III-3, has been jointly 
funded by the Government of Bangladesh, the Government of Canada, and the European 
Community. This phase began in 2002 for three years. Under this phase, the RMP has 
provided wage income for approximately 42,000 destitute women who maintain up to 
84,000 kilometres of important rural earthen roads. 
Because of the global flow of decentralisation, the donor organisations have stressed the 
use of local resources to regulate the RMP. Accordingly, the new focus of the programme 
has been to involve and strengthen the capacity of LGIs in all daily project management 
and monitoring activities so that they can take over the programme operation fully-
fledged. In this regard, the 4,200 participating UPs are considered to be frontline 
grassroots partner and beneficiary organizations in the project's local roadwork 
maintenance planning and implementation activities. Finally, the programme has been 
handed over to the LGD and MLGRD&C and they have been executing the RMP since 
July 2006. 
Different Components of RMP 
It has already been mentioned that at different times the RMP has changed its programme 
strategy and, thus, amended its components. The programme was initiated with the rural 
earthen road maintenance, added income generating activities in the early 90s and 
capacity strengthening of local government since 2002. Finally, the RMP has consisted of 
three components: 
1. Road Maintenance Component (RMC). 
2. Income Diversification Component (IDC). 
3. Capacity Strengthening Component (CS). 
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Road Maintenance Component (RMC) 
This component covers technical aspects of road maintenance management. It deals with 
the recruitment of road maintenance workers, commonly known as Road Maintenance 
Association (RMA). The UPs manage this component with support from the Upazilas 
under the auspices of the LGD under the Ministry of Local Government, Rural 
Development and Cooperatives (MLGRD&C). 
The RMA Women were being paid Tk. 54 (42 pence27) daily (as of May, 2006) for their 
work, of which Tk. 14(11 pence) were being transferred to mandatory savings accounts. 
Wages were being paid straight to the Road Maintenance Crew accounts that were kept 
with local banks and each woman also has her own bank account for deposits of 
mandatory savings. The crew wage payment and banking system was leak-proof. RMP 
women employed for roadwork were selected by the Project Management Committees 
(PMC) with support from the UPs: only 10 women were selected per Union. Since 
numbers of eligible destitute women far exceed project limits, final selection was done 
through an impartial lottery draw. On the basis of a set of criteria and strategy, the UP 
recruited 10 women in each union through a lottery for the RMP. 
< 
• 
f . 
Figure 5.2: The RMA women are maintaining the rural earthen roads to keep 
it passable year-round (Photo: RMP/CARE) 
In this research the currency is converted by considering U K £1 = Taka 130 
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Selection Criteria of RMP women (Source: RMP/CARE) 
• Permanent resident of concerned Union. 
• Widowed, divorced, separated/abandoned or married. 
• Priority to widowed, divorced or separated/abandoned first. 
• Age between 18 and 35 years. 
• Priority to most disadvantaged and dependents (Dependents = children, mentally or 
physically handicapped husband and dependent parents). 
• Candidate must be mentally sound and physically capable of performing road 
maintenance work. 
• Former RMP crewmembers who have worked less than one year in the RMP and met 
the above criteria will automatically be selected. Other than that, no former RMA 
member(s) can be selected. 
Recruited RMP women received training from Project Management Committees on road 
maintenance techniques in order that rehabilitated roads meet required standards. 
Following technical training on road maintenance methods, RMP women are organized 
into 10-person work crews, named "Road Maintenance Associations" (RMAs), with one 
RMA per Union. Each RMA is then assigned responsibility for maintaining 
approximately 20 km of earthen rural roads. 
The management and monitoring of road maintenance activities are primarily carried out 
through Project Management Committees (PMCs) in each union. The role of CARE is to 
observe and monitor the quality of training given to the 1 s t year and 2 n d year women as 
well as monitor the project-integrity. 
Income Diversification Component (IDC) 
Women's life skills training and counselling have been provided with a strong focus on 
developing self-reliant business skills for managing sustainable income generating 
activities, enhancing understanding and ability in establishing women's rights, health, 
reproductive health and money counting. 
As part of the women's wages, known as mandatory saving, a sum has been saved and 
deposited in their individual bank account for use as start-up capital for self-managed 
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income generation activities. Each RMA has received a sequenced 4-year training 
programme on various issues and topics. Each woman has been assisted with selecting a 
viable business interest, which generates adequate financial returns on her labour, and 
savings and investments. Once each RMA member has been engaged in her chosen 
income generating activities in the fourth year, she is given regular counselling and 
advice. Women have been given both group and individual counselling in order to 
critically review and share their business progress, thereby learning from each other about 
problems or constraints encountered and gaining suggestions from peers about possible 
ways of solving such problems. 
Barriers 
to IGA 
like 
eviction, 
natural 
disaster, 
accident, 
etc. 
Destitute 
Women 3 Join in RMP 
IGA counselling 
and follow-up 
Voluntary savings 
Social & 
organizational 
affiliation 
V 
Regular Wage 
Income 
Training on 
numeracy, business 
management, etc. 
Mandatory Saving 
Initiation of IGA from the beginning of 4 year 
The success or failure in IGA operation depends on 
the above-mentions factors. 
Figure 5.3: The Framework of IGA Operation by the RMA Women 
One of the major responsibilities of RMP-IDC was to monitor the performance of 
participating UPs in regard to recruitment of RMA women, supervision, management and 
reporting of the road maintenance part, and problem solving of the RMA. RMP-IDC has 
made periodic visits to UPs to assess their performance and provide necessary guidance 
for improvement. 
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Capacity Strengthening Component (CS) 
The project has covered the institutional strengthening of LGIs with an emphasis on 
planning, management, implementation and monitoring in the road maintenance part of 
the RMP. Membership in LGIs has continually shifted because of local level elections; 
whereas continuity of direct local community representation is necessary to make the 
RMP more responsive to the decision-making influence of local residents. Therefore, for 
the purposes of managing the RMP at the local level, each Union Parishad establishes a 
"Project Management Committee" (PMC). Each PMC consists of a female UP member 
as the PMC Chairperson, the UP Secretary as the Member Secretary and three elected 
members from local communities (at least one of whom must be a woman) as General 
Members. 
The activities performed by PMC are: 
• recruitment of RMP crew members, 
• formation of RMA, 
• imparting training to RMA on quality road maintenance techniques, 
• identification and selection of the 20 kilometres of earthen road to maintain, 
• developing quarterly work plans for RMA activities based on the priority of road 
repairs, 
• follow-up monitoring, appraisal and scoring of road repair works completed by the 
RMA, 
• depositing 10% of RMA wages in to the RMA crewmembers bank accounts each 
year, 
• ensuring that the RMA receive their wages every 14 days, 
• keeping a record of all work plans and road maintenance activities on file for 
review, 
• consolidated reporting on a quarterly basis, and 
• reporting on project progress to the Upazila Parishad. 
The specific objectives of the capacity strengthening component of the RMP were to 
strengthen the management capacity of local government to manage the development 
activities (including the RMP), to enhance participation of female representatives in the 
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LGI planning and decision-making process, and to encourage the participation of the 
community members in development activities. 
CARE has been providing a comprehensive training package on the project management 
cycle and project management skills to each UP and its affiliated PMC. The Capacity 
Strengthening component included important training issues such as local governance and 
conflict resolution. CS training has four separate modules ranging from one day to three 
day sessions. 
The training covers issues such as the importance and scope of community and women's 
participation in development, community and local resource mobilization and techniques 
of project planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation with community 
participation and feedback. The RMP has encouraged women's leadership roles in the 
different project committees at the local level and in support of this objective has 
undertaken special additional training programmes designed to support and enhance the 
leadership and management capabilities of elected women members of the Union 
Parishad and Project Management Committees. 
Following this training, the UPs and their associated PMCs have become responsible for 
undertaking specific RMP management and monitoring activities. The summary purpose 
of involving UPs was to create a strong element of local responsibility for RMP 
investments in road maintenance, with a special view of using road maintenance public 
works as a longer-term "social safety nets" programme for sustainable improvement of 
food, livelihood security and the social status of destitute women. 
Capacity Strengthening Training Courses and their Contents for the LGIs are as follows: 
1 day Orientation on Development and Local Government (Participants: the 
Chairman, the Secretary and all elected members of the UP) 
- Structure of Local Government Institutions 
- Governance and the role of LGIs in establishing good governance 
- The role and function of UP 
- Women in development 
- The role of community in development 
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- Conflict resolution 
3 days Training on Road maintenance Management Training (Participants: All 
PMC members) 
- Improving project committee management 
- RMP and its components 
- Role and responsibilities of UP, PMC and RMA 
- Steps of planning and implementing RMC activities 
- RMA selection policy and procedures 
- Road maintenance criteria the techniques of RMA tasks 
- Assignment and work supervision and monitoring 
- Technique of RMA training 
- Project problems identification and solving 
- Monitoring and reporting systems 
2 days Training on Development Project Management (Participants: the Chairman, 
the Secretary, all female members and three selected male members of the UP) 
- Concept of participatory development 
- Role of women in development 
- Description of RMP components 
- Project management 
- Planning, Budgeting, Local resources mobilization and its linkage with RMC 
management 
- Organising and establishing of RMC management 
- Project implementation and its linkage with RMC implementing activities 
- Establishment of RMC monitoring and reporting systems 
1 day Roadwork Maintenance Management Refresher Training (Participants: All 
PMC members) 
- Sharing of experience on RMC operation and identifying the areas that need to be 
improved 
- Training to identify weak areas 
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- Discuss the roles and responsibilities of different parties 
1 day Experience sharing session (Participants: All female members and female 
Chairman of UP) 
- Review of previous action plan and share experience on success, failures and problems 
faced in achieving the action plan; 
- Discussion of ways to overcome failures and problems identified; 
- Techniques of enhancing communication and coordination with each other and with 
supporting organization at the local level. 
2 days Training on Leadership and Development (Participants: All female members 
and female Chairman of UP) 
- History and the need for female members in Local Government; 
- Barriers faced by the elected members and ways to overcome barriers; 
- Leadership skills (meeting conduction, presentation, communication, networking and 
organisation of women. Problem-solving and decision-making. 
In the present study, the performance of Local Government Institutions (UP, PMC and 
Upazila Cell) is assessed in terms of planning, management, implementation, monitoring 
and supervision, leadership capabilities and women's participation in decision-making. In 
addition, empowerment status of women is assessed through measuring control over 
work-planning, mobility, and participation in decision-making, knowledge and 
information. This study also covers the issue of empowerment of LGIs including their 
self-confidence, opportunities and capabilities. 
E X P E R I E N C E S OF T H E PARTICIPANTS 
Project Implementation: 
The process of RMP implementation starts when a Union fulfils the requirement of 20 km 
of earthen roads and a minimum number of participating destitute women chosen by 
lottery. The recruitment is advertised by the UP so that everybody can participate and ten 
women are selected from each intervention Union. 
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There are issues with the system of operation. First, according to the opinion of CARE 
staff, many Unions would not be eligible i f the aforementioned criteria were followed 
strictly.2 8 However, all the respondents unanimously agree that the drawing of lots is 
unbiased and transparent in the recruitment system. There are allegations of negligence in 
announcements before recruitment, together with some external persuasion from different 
levels of local government and political leaders, which may threaten the system after the 
withdrawal of CARE. Several participants argued that, as the UP Chairmen are public 
figures, they face problems unless at least one woman from each ward is recruited by the 
lottery system. CARE staff told me that they had a couple of examples of bribery in the 
UPs and PMCs, resulting in inadequate announcements, the hiding of ages, etc., in order 
to favour their own candidates during recruitment. Interestingly, I was offered a bribe 
during a visit in an implementation programme so that I would overlook nepotism while 
selecting the women. However, a few respondents from UP and Upazila also added their 
concern about the fairness of selection in the absence of CARE. 
These realities of patron-clientism are well described by Blair (2005) and Bode (2002). 
Blair (2005) tries to identify the pattern of relationship between different poor groups and 
the local power holders. He categorises four groups of poor and defines different types of 
relationships with their 'patrons'. He notices that the poor have two major concerns: for 
security (Destitution, Disaster, Crime and the State) and for development (Agriculture, 
Human Capital, Family and Infrastructure). In reality, he observes, the 'poor' (43 percent 
of his sample) rely on their 'patrons' for their survival and development. Bode (2002) 
points out the role of 'gushti' 2 9 in the patron-client system. Involvement with a large 
'gushti' secures mandates for future elections. During the meeting with CARE 
employees, a respondent informed me that once she received a recommendation from a 
central government minister to recruit an RMA member to the project. Many of the Field 
Trainers said that receiving requests from the Upazila level was not at all surprising. 
These denote some social networks and identity of 'gushti' of some candidates for a job 
2 8 This statement, in general, gives a hint of programme accomplishments without the maintenance of 
quality. But as this is not directly linked with the main objective of this paper, this issue is not discussed 
further. 
2 9 'Patrilineage' means kinship in extended family based on the male line. 
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in the RMP. The elected local leader in the UP tried to pursue material gain for these 
people for his own re-election. 
Of course, this all confirms that the UP is not carrying out its due responsibilities for the 
RMP, which might be because of either lags in their general loyalty or because they have 
no personal benefit from the RMP. The enormous corruption in 'food for work' projects 
is well known in the NGO sector in Bangladesh, which might be a factor. At that time, the 
UP was much interested to implement the RMP in their Union because they could gain a 
significant share of the food (wheat) by depriving the destitute women. 'Unfortunately', 
instead of gaining that share, they are now contributing ten percent of the total wage of 
those women from their annual revenue. Now, they have only one thing to gain from this 
project which is 'popularity' and, therefore, they try to exploit the recruitment process. 
During the FGD with them is different regions, a very common suggestion was to select 
one woman from each Ward (subsection of a Union) so that they can maintain their 
'popularity' in every corner of their jurisdiction. 
Trainings for RMAs 
In the early stage of the RMP, the women were only involved with road work. Later it 
was realised that some human resource training could make them more self-reliant, 
instead of depending on the wage only. Therefore, they were being given different 
training like health and safety, basic numeracy, basic literacy, rights and gender, business 
management and so on. This training, on the one hand, is useful for developing awareness 
of safety nets and, on the other hand, to make them economically empowered. 
Accordingly, the UP and Upazila Cell were trained on those issues ready to take over the 
programme after CARE's withdrawal. Another motive of this intervention was to recruit 
new RMA members after a four year cycle, with an objective to cover the maximum 
number of destitute women. The following section summarises the findings in this regard. 
First Year Training 
During an experience-sharing workshop with CARE employees, it emerged that PMC 
members are not attending the technical training sessions because only the UP Secretary 
is able to conduct the technical training session. The issue of the UP Secretary wil l be 
described later. 
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Second Year Training: 
In the second year the RMA members used to receive legal rights and gender training 
along with basic numeracy. It was very common that many husbands would return to their 
abandoned or separated or divorced wives because they had started receiving regular 
earnings from the RMP. In a substantial number of cases, these reunions were fake and 
only for the money. The awareness from this second year training helped many RMA 
members not to be cheated, or to take legal measures once they are cheated. Obviously, it 
is very important that the trainers must be competent in conveying such important and 
sensitive messages and for training in the final two years as well. The answers to the 
question of whether they are competent can be obtained from the following section, where 
the capacity of the UP and PMC will be evaluated. 
Third Year Training 
This training helps participants to be aware about health and nutritious food. In addition, a 
good number of RMAs initiate Income Generating Activities (IGA) just after receiving 
the elementary Business Management training. 
Fourth Year Training 
The fourth year is mainly focused on business management training as the RMA members 
are prepared to be phased out after this year and new members are recruited. The RMA 
0 
Women at Different Years 
Tk.77.45 
Tk. 18.68 
Baseline Year-5 
Tk. 69.75 
Tk.55 
Year-7 
Graph 5.1: Average Daily Income of RMA Women (Source: 
RMP/CARE) 
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member needs potential monitoring in this year as they are a marginalised group. Blair's 
(2005) study identifies 12 percent pro-poor and 31 percent moderately poor in his sample. 
However, when it is the group of women the proportion of poor will be much higher in a 
typically underdeveloped, patriarchical society like Bangladesh. It has already been 
mentioned that the RMP has been recruiting women for a four year cycle. Graph 5.1 and 
table 5.1 represent the women's group at the baseline - before joining the RMP to year 5 
- one year after graduation from the RMP and year 7 - three years after graduation. 
Table 5.1: Land Ownership of RMP Women (Source: RMP/CARE) 
Land Holding Group Baseline (%) Year-5 (%) Year-7 (%) 
Nil (Landless) 69.1 32.1 3.2 
1-5 Decimal (Absolutely Landless) 15.9 24.8 22.0 
5-50 Decimal (Functionally Landless) 14.4 37.7 58.7 
50-150 Decimal (Marginal Owner) .6 5.4 13.3 
> 150 Decimal (Small Owner) 0 0 2.8 
Though the tendency of operating IGA gradually declines after the 5 year, conversely 
the ownership of land increases after the 5 t h year. The Household Livelihood Security 
(HLS) survey shows a feeling of 'vulnerability', as discussed before, and the RMA 
members concentrate on increasing their land holding. I f the UP could be strong and loyal 
enough to support marginal women, they would concentrate on IGAs and so help to fight 
poverty. 
Facts of Inactive PMC in RMP Operation 
Before discussing the operational activities of the project, it is important to discuss the 
facts of inactive or less active PMCs. Each PMC is headed by a female member of the 
UP, organized by the UP secretary and three volunteers from the community who are 
respected by all. The PMC was assumed to be the stimulator of roadwork. However, there 
are many allegations against PMCs that they are not performing satisfactorily in RMP 
operations. This was discussed with different UP, PMC, RMA and field staff and their 
opinions are summarized below. 
• Because the PMC do not benefit they are less interested in working for the RMP. 
Some PMC members have personal commitments, like business, and they never give time 
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for the RMP, as it adds no direct value in their life. For the same reason, the UP cannot 
punish them for their non-cooperation in RMP activity. 
• It is also observed that coordination between the UP and the PMC is not working 
in many unions. In such cases, the UP Chairman takes no notice of the PMC's 
recommendations. PMC members are not empowered enough to argue with the UP 
Chairman about the RMP. 
• There are no set criteria for selecting the PMC. A noticeable number of PMC 
members were barely educated and some were illiterate. The UP chairman thinks that the 
PMC might be of benefit financially and, therefore, tries to select his favourites for the 
PMC without bothering with the criteria. Thus, newly elected Chairmen are changing the 
PMCs. Then again, new PMCs fail to operate the RMP properly as they do not have any 
training. 
• UPs are not encouraging PMCs to participate in meetings of the RMP. Thus, the 
PMC is becoming separated from RMP activity. 
• Newly elected UP chairmen, often, try to change the PMC and assign his/her 
obedient persons. Such an attitude again reminds us about the patron-clientalism, 
discussed earlier. 
• Because less qualified persons are selected to be members of the PMC, they 
perform very poorly. Filing, for instance, depends on the UP secretary but usually s/he is 
extremely busy with other development projects and certification like marriages, births, 
trade licences, etc, and fails to visit the RMA workplaces. Visits are left to the PMC 
members and they inform the secretary, who then prepares the report. This is 
unsatisfactory because the PMC members are ignorant about the information required for 
roadwork monitoring. 
• Another important observation was the apparent segregation of the UP members 
from the UP affairs because of proactive Gram Sarkar members. The evolution of the 
Gram Sarkar is discussed earlier in this thesis. However, it is essential to note here that, 
despite of the negative decision from the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, the Gram Sarkar 
was introduced and encouraged by different efforts of the BNP-led government in the last 
few years. 
• The RMP monitoring format is too lengthy and the UP/PMC is not interested in 
going through the details. Therefore, the information on the monitoring formats is not 
adding any value to effective RMP operation. 
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• Many changes have taken place in formats in the last year and the PMC members 
were not informed of those changes. 
PMC Chairmen were found to be inactive in RMP operation. In fact, being female, 
society expects PMC Chairmen to give most time and effort to her own family. Thus, they 
are also discouraged from visiting distant workplaces of the RMAs. 
Road work Performance (RMA, PMC and UP) 
Road List: It is expected that while preparing the list of important rural earthen roads for 
the RMP, the community will participate in road selection. In Austadhar Union, for 
instance, the RMP road list was prepared according to the need of common people as 
stated by the UP bodies. But, none of the respondents gave any information that refers to 
involvement by ordinary people in the road list preparation process. More importantly, the 
community does not even know that it is supposed to be involved. The respondents said 
that more priority was given to the linking roads with schools, bazaars, and such 
important places and, finally, this was approved by the UNO. 
Quarterly Roadwork Plan: After preparing the road list, UP bodies and community 
leaders are supposed to develop a quarterly roadwork plan considering all the natural and 
human events like flood, rain, important nodes, light vehicle flow pattern, etc. In reality, 
the entire project files of the UP are maintained by the UP secretary and, usually, he 
prepares the quarterly roadwork plan on his own. It is very unfortunate that i f the 
secretary remains absent, generally, no-one can provide adequate information on the 
ongoing development projects. Again, they prepare the quarterly roadwork plan as part of 
the programme and then forget to follow that plan. Respondents said that sometimes they 
can not follow that plan because of a sudden need of maintenance caused by a natural 
disruption. This implies that seasonal factors were not considered when preparing the 
quarterly roadwork plan. 
Quarterly Review Session: In the RMP, a quarterly review session was introduced to 
identify the problems experienced with programme implementation from all of the 
In this chapter 'Austadhar' is used as a pseudonym of the cited unions for the sake of anonymity. 
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counterparts at the UP level. It was found that no quarterly review session was held in the 
studied UP after organising the community leaders as a PMC. The PMC Chairman (one 
selected female UP member) of Austadhar union said that she did not know that a review 
session should be held quarterly with the UP body, the PMC and RMA members. Again, 
though they sometimes discuss the problems of the RMP among themselves in other 
official meetings, they do not inform RMA members that they should join in those 
meetings. Thus, the key beneficiaries of the RMP are always excluded from sharing their 
learning and experience with the implementers. 
> 
N. 
M- I U 
Figure 5.4: The RMA members are signing the register book after attending a 
meeting at UP office (Photo: RMP/CARE). 
Roadwork Assessment: The roadwork done by the crew members is supposed to be 
monitored by the UP bodies on a regular basis. The UP Chairman said that he visits to 
observe roadwork but he is not acquainted with the roadwork assessment system and, 
therefore, does not complete the register. Though respondents mentioned the names of 
other of UP/PMC members as active implementers of the RMP, in reality the UP 
secretary takes on all of the project-related responsibilities. For instance, the Chairman of 
Austadhar Union referred to Mr Mozemmel, a UP member, who always does the 
assessment. Mr Mozemmel claimed that he frequently visits to observe roadwork and that 
he has visited today. However, he failed to answer when he was asked to say where the 
RMP crew were working on that day. Again, while discussing this issue with the PMC 
Chairman separately, she said that Mr Mozemmel does not visit RMP workplaces 
frequently and that he always tries to be 'politically correct' in front of visitors. While 
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Box 5.1: Roadwork Assessment of Austadhar Union 
In Austadhar Union, after discussion with the UP and community leaders, the 
RMP workplace was visited at round 11.30 A M , but there was no-one to be 
found. Then, Zobeda, one of crew members, was found at her residence. Zobeda 
said that a surrogate has been appointed as she needed to attend to her familial 
work. She failed to give the name of her replacement. She said that this group has 
the practise of informing their organizer (group leader) one day before i f they 
need to a replacement, then the organizer appoints someone for that day. She 
further added that the UP secretary gives and receives roadwork assignments 
from them at the UP office without any physical verification. Then with Zobeda 
the RMP workplace was visited again but it was empty. According to Zobeda's 
information, Delu's House, where the RMAs keep their tools, was visited and was 
informed by the resident that RMA members had left with their tools at around 
11.00 A M . 
interviewing the Chairman and Mr. Mozemmel, their answers were confined to what 
'should be done' instead explaining what they were currently practising. The RMP 
employees were advised by Headquarters to suggest that the UP should promote their 
sanitation and nutrition programme. Keeping that in mind, when the Chairman was asked 
about the level of sanitation programme in his Union, he stated that in one of his nine 
wards he has accomplished ful l sanitation and wil l try to cover the whole Union i f he can 
obtain funds from other sanitation-related development programmes. However, while 
discussing this issue with another member of that UP, I discovered that the sanitised ward 
is his main constituency (Ward) of voters, where he lives. 
Assessment of Financial Management Skills 
It was assumed that all UPs would generate funds by mobilizing their own resources and 
be able to operate small-scale development programmes from their own funds. Usually, 
UP main fund-raising areas are trade and home taxes, which they fail to collect for 
political and administrative reasons. In rural areas people are very poor and are not 
familiar with the concept of taxation, so they refuse to pay. Chairmen are supposed to 
employ UP members to ensure that taxes are collected from all the probable sectors. But 
these UP Chairman and Members never force the community to pay the tax, assuming 
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that they might fail to get a mandate in next local government elections. Accordingly, 
they blame the UP Secretary as s/he is ultimately responsible for forcing the community 
to pay its taxes, but the Secretary has no power to force anyone without the written 
permission of UP Chairman. Thus, the taxation system in rural areas exists in legislation 
only and has no use in practise. However, the UP does manage the 10% contribution31 
from the 1% fund 3 2 of the Upazila. Therefore, they do not have to give any additional 
effort to prepare a budget for their 10% contribution, and accordingly, the contribution is 
deposited in time. However, they do not have any budget for the PMC as they feel they 
have a scarcity of resources. 
Assessment of Supervision Skills 
Supervision of PMC/UP Monitor: In Austadhar Union, the UP secretary is very 
irregular since joining eight months ago. He lives far away from the UP and rarely visits 
his office. The UP Chairman complained about him at the Upazila level, and the Upazila 
insisted that he show-cause. He was regular for a week and then again reverted back to 
previous non-engagement. This information about the UP Secretary was received from all 
of the respondents. However, in general, UP Chairmen do not supervise PMC/UP 
monitors. 
Supervision of RMA Members: It is observed that PMC Chairmen, who are assumed to 
be the key person of the RMP in every UP, often fail to provide basic information on 
RMP activity planning, organization and financial management. Respondents in 
Austadhar Union complained that i f they find any irregularities in the roadwork and ask 
crew women why, crew members reply that they are not working under their supervision 
but are rather working under CARE's supervision. 
Assessment of Reporting Skills of the UP 
As the UP secretary maintains the RMP files, no-one was able to comment on the 
preparation of a quarterly report, its timeliness, problem reports, and so on. However, 
3 1 The 10% fund is the contribution of the UP to RMP implementation. 
3 2 This is the fund which UP receives from upazila to implement the annual development plan. 
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respondents said that they can not maintain timeliness of reporting. There are some other 
findings on why only the UP Secretary is involved with the reporting: 
• It is observed that many UP Chairman change the PMC by appointing their 
relatives or trusted persons after newly being elected, assuming that the PMC 
might obtain some amenities from the GoB or CARE. This type of PMC never 
works for the programme. 
• There is no set rule that the PMC members have to be educated. It is frequently 
observed that they do not have formal education and, thus, they avoid the writing 
tasks of the programme. 
• The PMC, from the very outset of the programme design, was assumed to be 
voluntary participation by the community. Therefore, there is no provision of 
financial benefit to the PMCs which, eventually, discourages them to participate 
adequately. 
Financial Capacity and Development Activities of UP 
Income Sources 
Hat (local weekly or fortnightly markets or periodic bazaars) are well established growth 
centres in the surveyed unions, which are owned by the Upazila. The most common 
sources of income are: 
• Certification fees 
• Income from Union Tax (Chowkidary Tax) 
• Income from Housing Tax 
• Income from the issuing of trade licences 
• Income from issuance of vehicle (Van, Rickshaw) licences 
• Leasing Khash land, pond, etc. 
The historical background (Chapter 2) and local government structure (Chapter 4) 
explains the shift of income sources between the UP and the Upazila. Different political 
regimes have changed their political focus for their own political gain, which has 
stimulated this shift. However, this study has found the leasing of Khash Land, Pond, Hat 
and so on and development funds from the Upazila and donor organizations are the main 
sources of their income. 
Development Activities of UP 
At present, UPs have the oversight of many projects, including micro-credit and other 
development programmes of various NGOs, food for work, cash for work, VGD 
(Vulnerable Group Development), VGF (Vulnerable Group Feeding), sanitation and 
social forestry under the LGED and others. Normally the UP has limited personnel, and 
limited administrative capacity, and is unable to look after these activities properly. This 
seriously hampers effective implementation of development programmes. The UP has to 
maintain about a hundred registers, including those of the RMP without proper 
infrastructure. It is found in many cases that the UP has no power, in terms of finance and 
logistics, to run these programmes independently. 
Participation of Women Representatives 
No noticeable participation of women representatives (e.g. PMC Chairperson) was 
observed. While conducting the FGD with the UP and PMC it was observed that women 
were not participating willingly in the discussion. When asked publicly about their 
participation in the decision-making process of UP activities, they said that their opinions 
were always considered along with the views of their male colleagues. Interestingly, 
during the in-depth interviews, the women gave the reverse opinion to the same question. 
An invisible social barrier and lack of initiatives by male colleagues prevents the women 
representatives from participating in the preparation of the road list and quarterly 
roadwork plan, quarterly review session, roadwork assessment, budget preparation, and so 
on. In addition, the women representatives have numerous other social roles as mother, 
wife, housewife, and so on, which do not allow them to stay away from their family for a 
long time and hinders visits to many places in the community. This ultimately ties their 
participation to a very limited arena. 
Governance Issues 
When good governance is observed in RMA selection at all levels of participation, 
responsibility and accountability have been ensured. CARE has mainly taken the role of 
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monitoring in these cases. But in the case of activity planning or financial management 
and supervision, a lack of accountability is seen amongst the respondent unions, and in 
many cases the preparation of the road lists and roadwork plans, review sessions, and 
roadwork assessments are done by the UP Secretary. Inadequate participation of the PMC 
is identified in these areas, along with insufficient RMP budget preparation and 
supervision of RMAs. Furthermore, as mentioned in the financial capacity section, while 
preparing the budget, the UP is looking at several sources of income, which they often fail 
to collect, so no value is added to the budget preparation. Again, for the same reason, they 
fail to pay an honorarium to the PMC, though they include that payment in their budget 
preparations. This ultimately hampers the UP in supervising the PMC properly. 
Overall observations regarding institutionalization of local government bodies 
Local government institutions (the UP in this case) need to be strengthened and have to be 
developed with a strong sense of local responsibility among the popular leaders. They are 
the only body accountable to the people. Formation of the PMC is the first and most 
dynamic step introduced in the UP to institutionalise the process of planning, 
implementation and management of the RMP. The RMP conducted several external 
evaluations and these revealed that the RMP is an effective development intervention for 
the poverty reduction of women, as well as for the maintenance of rural infrastructure. For 
the sake of the development of rural Bangladesh, these local bodies should play a 
proactive role in effectively implementing development activity such as the RMP. 
Upazila RMC Cell 
Organization: The RMC Cell is formed by the below stated members: 
a. UNO (UNO is chairman of the cell in the absence of the Upazila Chairman) 
b. Upazila Engineer (Organising Secretary of the Cell) 
c. Project Implementation Officer (PIO) 
d. Social Welfare Officer 
e. Women's Welfare Officer 
f. 2 selected Chairmen 
g. 1 selected Female UP Member 
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Roles and Responsibilities 
The Upazila RMP Cell was formed to coordinate and manage road maintenance works in 
the unions. The specific functions of this cell are to monitor, review and take follow-up 
action based on reports. They are to generate project fund and performance reports. The 
cell members are supposed to visit the UP to assess their performance in roadwork related 
activities that include monitoring, PMC formation, RMA selection and training, road 
selection, task assignment, work quality monitoring and problem solving. The cell is to 
assist the participating UP to access and deposit its share and ensure timely transfer of 
crew wages to the Union Maintenance Crew Account as per guidelines and circulars from 
the LGD-RMP Cell. The Upazila RMC Cell formation was completed as per the GoB 
circular and executed by most Upazilas in April and June of 2004. Of the entire sample 
Upazilas, the RMP Cells only in planning and are yet to become functional. For 
example, the PIOs of one Upazila did not know that they are members of the Cell because 
they are not informed, even by letter. 
The cell members are often not aware of their roles. The above-mentioned circular on 
RMC Cell formation explains the roles of the cell in brief, but individual roles of the cell 
members are not laid out. The Cell members have not yet met together to discuss their 
roles as members. The Upazila RMP Cells might end up being worthless. 
The findings of these interviews with Upazila officials show that the performance of most 
of the cells was poor, though some of the respondents, without giving any noticeable 
examples, felt that the functioning of the cell was fair. The respondents stated that their 
workload, a lack of guidance and monitoring from the LGD RMP Cell, lack specific roles 
and responsibilities and, above all, the unaccountability of cell members is the major 
constraint in improving the functionality of the cell. One UNO stated that the Upazila-
LGED should take the initiative in making the cell function. He further suggested that as 
the Upazila Engineer remains highly engaged with different development activities, the 
Social Welfare Officer (SWO) or Women Affairs Officer (WAO) could be involved as 
the focal person of the cell. Another UNO referred to the GoB circular LGD/Moni-
1/RMP-11/2000/59 issued on April 02, 2000 where it was mentioned that the Upazila 
" The Upazila officials (UNO, Engineer and PIO) were interviewed from 05-15 January 2005. However, 
during the phase out workshops on April-June 2005 the findings were similar. 
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RMP Cell members should receive training for two days on RMP project management. 
He stated that the LGD is not providing adequate guidance to the cell. 
Project Management 
The cell is responsible for managing and coordinating the RMP at the union level, 
transferring crew wages to the union crew account, monitoring RMP activity on rural 
earthen roads, organising training for UPs and PMCs so that they can mange the RMP at 
union level, reviewing the UP contribution and project report quarterly and sending 
biannual project reports to the LGED-RMP cell. With reference to the GoB circular on 
RMC Cell formation, none of the sample Upazilas is providing adequate support to the 
UP/PMC. They provide support only i f the UP/PMC ask for it. 
One UNO reported that in most cases he provides support for problems in RMA selection 
and also, in a few cases, he follows-up on the problems. He also provides support in CS 
training, such as providing the venue, inaugurating the training sessions and sometimes 
even conducting sessions. He further reported that the chairman of one union under his 
Upazila asked for a 10% financial contribution from the RMP women. He warned all 
union chairmen about this matter in the Upazila coordination meeting, in order to pre-
empt such problems. The figures presented in the following table will give some idea 
about the actual scenario of how the cell is functioning and to what extent. 
Field Visits 
Again, it has been reported that none of the interviewed RMP Cell members performed 
any field visits during the reporting period. A Project Implementation Officer said that it 
is not difficult to perform field visits to the RMP along with other field visits of different 
development activities, but as the Upazila Engineer is the Organising Secretary of the 
RMP Cell, the Upazila Engineer should take the necessary initiative in this regard. A 
negligible number of the respondents have conducted field visits on the way to their other 
tasks. They presented the following findings: 
o The PMC is less accountable to the UP because their work is voluntary, 
o A female member's decision is not always considered, as they are not empowered and 
the attitude of the Chairman has yet to change. 
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o Some RMA members' roadwork quality is poor and attendance erratic, 
o The UP does not send project reports on time. 
Action against Field Findings 
The Cell feels that they have no authority to initiate action against the UPs. One of the 
respondents argued that the UP Chairman and members are elected bodies, and thus hold 
political power, which in most cases is more influential than that of the officials. Some 
respondents also said that i f they recommend discontinuing the RMP in any UP, the 
ultimate sufferers will be the RMA members, not the Chairman or any other member of 
that UP. Therefore, in many cases, it was awkward for the UNO to take disciplinary 
measures against UPs that perform poorly. 
RMP Fund Management 
The respondents confirmed that they are sending the semi-annual Upazila and UP account 
reports regularly, though a noticeable portion are either not sending the report regularly or 
are not aware about the frequency. Some of the respondents felt the need of a strong 
monitoring system of the LGD to accelerate the performance of the Upazila in this regard. 
Sometimes, they face problems in forwarding UP account reports i f the UP delays 
sending their reports to the concerned Upazila. While discussing with DTLs (District 
Team Leaders) of RMP on Upazila fund management capacity, they reported that though 
the Upazila sends the crew wage and account reports on time, there must be follow-up 
visits by CARE staff. 
Function of Upazila RMC Cell 
The interview was conducted with the UNO in most cases and in few cases with either 
Upazila Engineer or PIO. Though, according to the design of the RMP, the Upazila RMC 
Cell has a key role to play; but the response of the semi-structured questionnaire gives us 
the opportunity to think further. Out of 12 surveyed upazilas, eight respondents' opinion 
was poor and the other four were equally fair and good when they were asked about the 
function of the Upazila RMC Cell. They mentioned the constraints as below: 
a. Absence of direct supervision from any specific department (either government or 
non-government organisation); 
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b. The Upazila deal with other assignments which, to them, have more priority than the 
RMP. 
One UNO said that she always remains too busy with other administrative affairs which, 
she feels, are more important than the RMP. She added that she never even goes for an 
inauguration ceremony as, she thinks, that is a waste of time. She doesn't arrange any 
meetings on the RMP, but does regularly send reports, deposits funds, and initiates action 
against any RMP related problem (if noticed by others). She is probably right, as the 
UNOs are acting as Upazila Chairmen along with their own job. As the Upazila Chairman 
is an elected and, thus, political position, and it demands an immense amount of time in 
dealing with the public. Controversially, Rahman and Khan (1997) argue that a large 
number of civil bureaucrats are unhappy with losing their substantial power to the 
politicians because of the Upazila reform of Ershad. 
The aforesaid example is one type of reality where the UNO is providing adequate 
administrative support to the RMP but cannot spend his/her own time on it due to other 
important responsibilities. Besides, UNOs are also found to be unaware about the RMC 
cell in a considerable proportion of sample. For example, in an interview with a UNO on 
02 June 2004, he informed me that no RMC cell had been formed whereas an RMC cell 
had been formed on 24 April 2004 in that Upazila. Actually, the UNOs, in general, were 
found not to care about the RMP, which might be due to in fact to a hidden reason that 
CARE strictly monitors RMP financial leakage. Therefore, none of the counterparts can 
reap any illegal financial benefit from this project. In every case, RMP was found closed 
in a file which is maintained by the official secretary of the UNO, and UNOs were 
helpless without those files while attending this interview. 
Coordination Roles: 
Support to UP/PMC: The RMC Cell was formed with a view to providing support to the 
UP/PMC in RMP operation. Most of the respondents agreed that the RMC cell had not 
provided adequate support to the UP/PMC. Nevertheless, a few sampled Upazilas had 
been providing support as follows: 
a. RMA Selection; 
b. PMC-Formation and follow-up; 
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c. Training; 
d. Whenever any support is required from the Chairman/PMC/CAPvE authority for 
smooth RMP operation. 
None of the respondents said anything about providing problem follow-up support. 
Problems to manage UP/PMC: When UNOs were asked whether they face any problem 
to manage the UP/PMC, there was a mixed response. Those who answered 'yes' noticed 
the underlying causes: 
a. They do not have any formal meeting with UP/PMC; 
b. Most communications with the LGD cell are done through CARE i.e. circular 
distribution, GO-follow up, bank statements, etc. 
They mentioned that they, usually, resolve those problems by communicating with the UP 
chairman and the LGD. 
Facts and Recommendations for the Upazila RMC Cell: 
• Many of the Cell members do not know about their membership of that Cell. 
Again, there is much confusion among the UNO, Upazila Engineer and PIO about 
their roles in the Cell. In the GoB circular on RMC Cell formation the role of the 
Upazila Cell is given in a very brief account which, actually, does not make any 
sense. Therefore, the elucidated roles of the Cell should be circulated. For 
instance, a detailed guideline of the Cell is essential for coordination meetings, 
field visits, monitoring UP/PMCs, sending crew wages, bank follow-ups, sending 
reports to LGD, etc. In addition, roles and responsibilities of each individual Cell 
member should also be mentioned in the guidelines. 
• Cell members are not accountable for their roles as no management tool is yet 
introduced in this regard. The accountability of the Cell as a whole and members 
in particular should be increased through introducing different management tools. 
• It is true that Government officials like the UNO and the Upazila Engineer remain 
busy with many assignments. This usually keeps them away from helping with 
RMC Cell functioning; therefore, they could very well tag RMP with other 
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activities. For example, they can keep RMP as an agenda item in their UDCC 
meetings or visit RMP roadwork on their way to other assignments. 
• According to the Government circular on disciplinary actions against the RMA, 
PMC and UP, i f the UP commits any offence in the subsequent two quarters it will 
be dropped from RMP intervention. In such a case, RMAs of the same UP are also 
ultimately punished without committing any mistakes. Thus, the provision of 
punishment against the UP for any misdeed should be revised so that the RMA 
members will not be the ultimate sufferer for any action by the Upazila against the 
UP. 
• The LGD RMC Cell is not participating in the RMP monitoring system directly. 
Therefore, they should revise, and i f not available, should develop monitoring and 
evaluation systems for successful implementation. 
• As the UNO and Upazila Engineer are busy with diverse activities, they have less 
opportunity to participate in RMP activities. I f convenient, the key role of the Cell 
should be shouldered by other Government officials. 
• Although the Upazila is supposed to participate in the CS training conducted by 
CARE, so that they can take over the responsibility of training up UP/PMC in 
future, they generally do not participate except in inauguration sessions. The 
Upazilas need to build their capacity so that they can train the UP/PMC for 
managing the RMP at Union level. In this regard, they may need to be skilled in 
module development, conduct training, etc. 
• The fund management capacity of the Upazila is satisfactory in most cases but, in 
reality, this demands many follow-up visits by CARE staff. Therefore, the 
Upazilas have opportunities to be autonomous regarding RMP fund management. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has addressed a cross section of four participating actors: destitute women, 
local leaders, an NGO and government. Among them the destitute are most vulnerable in 
the society. Their roadwork all over the Union introduces them to many people and 
increases their affiliation with and access to different social resources. Consciousness-
raising makes them aware of their rights, existing laws and legal support providers. 
Operating IGAs empower them by giving ownership. Thus, the above services can help 
women escape the curse of destitution. A decentralised structure of governance can only 
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promise these services at the doors of community. Of course, in a centrally governed 
decentralised structure like Bangladesh, the elected local bodies are providing some of the 
services to the grassroots by considering them their clients. However, these services are 
the democratic rights of the community. 
In my field observation, I realised the extensive need of accountability of the community 
leaders and the bureaucrats, which can only be obtained through a strong law and order 
system. The elected UP leaders enjoy control over the community by virtue of their 
monopolistic control over resources. Again, at the Upazila level, the UNO and his 
associates do not feel themselves to be accountable to the community as they are not 
elected; therefore, they remain more loyal to the systems focused on Dhaka, which serve 
their purposes and favour the UP Chairman. The present crisis of governance derives 
from such politico-bureaucratic circumstances, which are obstacles to the performance of 
NGOs. Again, the NGO's nature of 'target accomplishment' and giving less priority to 
the quality is also responsible to some extent, as exemplified by in the case study of 
training at the Upazila level. 
To give one example of disorganisation, I attended a district level workshop in a DC 
office. The day before the workshop the DDLG of that office informed me that the 
meeting would start informally at 12:30 PM, though in the issued invitation the time of 
meeting that was mentioned was 2:00 PM. The resource persons, and I , from CARE were 
present at the DC office by 12:00 PM. But the participants arrived at the meeting place at 
around 2 PM. Again, as the DC was not able to participate in the meeting before 2:00 PM 
no one was interested in starting it. The DCs participation was only to inaugurate the 
meeting and added no value to the objective of the meeting. However, the meeting finally 
started at 3:00 PM; the DC then left the meeting place within 5 minutes and it ended 
shortly after without extracting the findings in detail. We came to understand that there 
are protocols among Government officials. I f this is the reality, then the RMP wil l be 
under threat after the withdrawal of CARE because the flexibility of decision-making, 
which is essential in any development project, will be gone. This example is not to make 
any personal attack but to offer some desperately needed criticisms of a system that has 
taken over the responsibility of the largest development programme in the world. 
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Chapter Q&ix 
Cotulubtng Hemarfeg 
INTRODUCTION 
"My congressional opponents would not weaken my resolve", US President George W 
Bush recently said as he robustly defended his new Iraq policy in a television interview 
(http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/middle_east/6261933.stm). Pulok Gupta, in the 'Provati' news 
of the BBC Bangla on 15 January 2007, said that the declaration came from Mr Bush 
when the US Congress decided to hold a vote on the criticisms of his new Iraq policy. It 
is perhaps a political irony that this, the most militarily powerful and interventionist 
country in the world, has through its dominance of international financial organisations 
and geopolitical mastery pioneered a global 'decentralisation wave' as a recipe of 
(neoliberalised) 'democracy'. Of course, 'decentralisation' is a very strong means to bring 
government closer to the people and, thus, is a functional synonym of 'democracy'. 
However, i f we look back to the discussions on different approaches of decentralisation, 
we can find both centralised and decentralised forms of decentralisation. For instance, 
Russian and Chinese local government is fully centralised and works as a part of a central 
hierarchy. It denotes a link between political philosophy and local government structures 
in a state. In the case of Bangladesh, political desire is also very important in addition to 
political philosophy. Chapter Two hinted at a Russia-India backed 'socialist' government 
in the initial years after independence, which restored the British-inspired and Pakistani-
administered centrally controlled local government system. Despite a militarised multi-
party democracy for fifteen years and, then, a parliamentary (electoral) democracy since 
the early 90s, the decentralisation approach has remained remarkably constant. Starting 
off from the secularist point, every political regime promised to decentralise local 
institutions, however consolidated and politicised those institutions turned out to be in the 
long run. Therefore, political philosophy has never been important in shaping the local 
government institutions of Bangladesh; rather, the political desires of different regimes 
have been much more important. 
Politics, like much else in Bangladesh, has always been characterised by violence and/or 
corruption. Since independence from Pakistani rule, the nation's first two rulers, Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman and Ziaur Rahman, were assassinated; between 1974 and 1990 the 
country was governed largely under a state of emergency and/or marshal law, the 
aftermath of which was a democratised electoral system but one showing little political 
progress. This electoral system only applies to general parliamentary elections, which 
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occur every five years. Whichever party has formed the government has tried to influence 
elections at the local level. This received mass media coverage during the infamous 
'Magura by-election' in 1994 and the 'Dhaka-10' by-election (2004), which the 
opposition (the Awami League) claimed was a dress rehearsal for the parliamentary 
elections that were due to be held in January 2007 and which it said would be rigged. 
Both led to calls for a politically neutral 'caretaker' government to be given responsibility 
for organising free and fair elections. 
This dissertation has been about identifying gaps in the literature on the political 
geography of local government in Bangladesh. It recognises this gap by providing a 
historical review of decentralisation. In Bangladesh, decentralisation efforts simply entail 
bureaucratic changes which crucially lack political wil l . Though decentralisation bears a 
sense of bringing government closer to the people, unfortunately, in Bangladesh, 
decentralisation efforts were instigated by global neoliberal forces, albeit backed by 
public demand. In the early 1980s, for instance, the new decree of the IMF stipulated that 
the international community would not address third-world countries' economic problems 
i f their respective governments complied with 'Structural Adjustment Programmes' 
(Tickell and Peck, 2003). This 'Structural Adjustment' includes austerity measures, high 
interest rates, cuts in government spending in fields like education and health, the 
liberalisation of foreign trade and investment and the privatisation of public enterprises. 
Ershad had to agree to implement an unyielding neoliberal reform programme to gain 
international support to legitimate his office and, thereby, promulgated the Upazilla 
centralised local government system (Siddiqui, 1996). Peck and Tickell (2002) explain 
the politics of neoliberalism as local institutions and actors being given responsibility 
without power, where the international financial institutions and actors were gaining 
power without responsibility. 
In the same vein of Ershad, the successive political regimes did not put any meaningful 
effort to design decentralisation plans, other than renaming those institutions. In lieu of 
that, their power struggle, politicisation and corruption made substantial changes in the 
local leadership and weakened informal social organisations. A l l the formal local 
government institutions, apart from the UP, were bureaucratised and power was given in 
the form of delegation, whereas, the elected lower tier was made financially dependent on 
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the bureaucratic elites. On top of that, the lower tiers were used to spread a political base 
at local level. 
Again, there was another issue around the functional hierarchy of civil servants and 
elected local bodies. I noticed, for example, how the UP Chairman struggles to manage 
the UP Secretary. Again, Siddiqui (1994, 1996 and 2005) writes about the refusal of 
UNOs to work under the supervision of politicians. Cultural elements, changing 
relationships, timing, sequence, mechanisms of participation, partnership and so on were 
not considered while designing the decentralisation plan; rather it was the means of 
political gain. Rahman and Khan (1997) argue that Khaleda Zia received substantial 
support from the civil bureaucrats in the 1991 general election as one of her manifestos 
was to abolish Ershad's Upazilla system. 
Chapter Five explains the state of responsibility and accountability of the civil servants 
and elected local bodies. Where local government institutions are weak and ineffectual, 
civil society or informal organisations often emerge to f i l l the gap. This can be positive, 
in terms of bridging gaps in service provision and capacity building within communities, 
or can be negative in terms of allowing the state withdraw from local governance and, in 
its worst forms, facilitating corruption, gangsterism and so on. The stick and whistle is a 
good example because it appears to be an emergent civil society organisation, set up to 
counter poor governance and corruption. 
R E C E N T P O L I T I C A L TURMOIL IN BANGLADESH 
Political Power Struggles: Constitution vs Democracy 
The call for caretaker government reform in 2006/7 helps to explain the political desires 
of different political parties in Bangladesh. The need to examine the Election 
Commission became a burning issue at the beginning of 2006 when it was claimed that 
the then chief election commissioner, Justice M A Aziz, had published a voter list in 
which there were around fourteen million false voters. News of false voters was 
especially common in the national dailies in the period April-June 2006. There was, for 
instance, found to be a voter list for an area which had disappeared due to river bank 
erosion. The situation worsened when Justice K M Hasan, former foreign affairs secretary 
of the BNP, became the first option as chief of the caretaker government as per the 
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Figure 6.2: Newspaper coverage on the 28 October 2006 protests. From the left The 
Daily Ittefaq: violent protests on different important points of Dhaka city; The 
Prothom Alo: Mass destruction as a symbol of protest and The New Age: A jamaat 
activist killed by the AL activists. 
constitution. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 portray the political violence at the end of October 2006. 
The situation drew international attention when the video footage of the killing of a 
political rival was telecasted. 
However, finally, President Iajuddin Ahmed assumed the chair of the chief advisor, and 
so sustained his presidency. Though, Professor Iajuddin, after taking up the new 
assignment, appointed ten advisors by discussing with the major political parties, he 
nevertheless failed to prove himself as a neutral person. The President-cum-Chief Advisor 
experienced the first hurdle when four of his advisors left office accusing him of partiality 
to a political ally. Until this event, the A L and its allies were enjoying public sympathy as 
the BNP's invisible influence over the caretaker government was no longer concealed 
from the public. However, the AL's contentious 'election' accord with an orthodox 
'Islamist' party brought them in line with the BNP. The general public could see no 
difference between these two parties when it became clear that both of them wanted to 
incorporate Ershad's JP in their coalition, although they had once fought together to 
overthrow him from the power. The public dissatisfaction with the two major parties was 
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Figure 6.1: Scenes of mayhem: Activists of the 14- party alliance set fire at various 
points in the city; riot police swoop on the activists; workers of the 14 party alliance 
carry off a fellow activist who was shot in head during clashes with Jamaat activists 
(Source: The Daily Star Weekend Magazine, Vol 5, Issue 118, November 03, 2006) 
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clear in the media. The BBC Bangla organised public discussions, named Bangladesh 
Sanglap (http://www.bbc.co.uk/bengali/indepth/), in which a substantial majority opinion 
was against both the BNP and the AL. The struggle between the two rivals became so 
death-defying that international agencies refused to participate in observing the election, 
which had previously been announced for 22 January 2007. In such a crisis, President 
Iajuddin had no option but to declare a 'state of emergency', which brought the army on 
to the streets, suspended basic rights, muzzled the press and media, and appointed a 
technocratic caretaker government by handing over the office of the Chief Advisor to Dr. 
Fakruddin Ahmed. 
From the very beginning, the new caretaker government was bold, and at the time of 
writing (end February 2007) more than twenty political leaders have been imprisoned 
among fifty blacklisted for corruption (The Daily Prothom Alo, 14 February 2007). The 
judiciary has been separated from the administration department (The Financial Express, 
16 January 2007), and an independent Anti-corruption Commission has been formed (The 
New Nation, 13 February 2007). The Anti-corruption Commission has already asked for 
income-expenditure balance sheets from fif ty influential political leaders and 
businessman (The Malaysia Sun, 18 February 2007), and some 40,000 low-level 
gangsters and political thugs have since been detained (The Economist, 08 February, 
2007). The controvertial Election Commission is to be reformed (The Daily Star, 06 
February 2007), and so on. The present government have a credible achievement of 
arresting the political giants who became millionaires within a short time by exploiting 
their political influence. Within a month, this new 'undemocratic' government has 
achieved many things which the democratically elected government has failed with over 
the last fifteen years. The Economist published a news story on 08 February 2007 about 
the present situation of Bangladesh, entitled "everybody but the politicians is happy". 
Roll-Back Neoliberalism 
This account is not a manifesto for a technocratic government, rather a criticism of the 
undemocratic practices over the last decade and a half. The present government has some 
similarity with the previous military regimes as many political leaders were imprisoned 
accused then of rampant corruption, but now, conversely, the military force is working as 
a supporting hand to civil bureaucracy unlike in the past. Notwithstanding the initial 
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success of the 2007 technocratic caretaker government, there are rumours that it is backed 
by the international agencies. The basis of such conjecture derives from abrupt decision 
of Mr. Iajuddin to leave the chair of the Chief Advisor and to declare the 'Emergency' 
immediately after a notice of noncooperation from the international agencies like the 
European Commission and the United Nations. Strict measures of the interim government 
against the corrupted politicians of the A L and the BNP and their associates and the 
coincidental declaration of a new party, the Nagorik Shokti (citizen's power), by 
Professor Yunus has confirmed that rumour in the minds of some. In the editorial of the 
Prothom Alo on 01 March 2007, Dr. Zafor Iqbal hinted at the influence of international 
force over the interim government; mentioning one of the Advisor's who stressed 'good 
governance' as a priority and rejecting the chance of elected government soon. 
Whatever the hidden facts, there is no doubt that hitherto the accused politicians 
monopolised the economy and restricted the access of global corporations and/or their 
ability to survive in this market. Therefore, the anti-corruption activities of the present 
government will obviously favour the international corporates to enter, compete and 
survive in this market. This does not rule out the restoration of social and economic 
justice, rather it emphasises the likely pragmatic link with the 'roll-back' neoliberal 
idealism about the virtues of instituions building, authoritarianism, free market, openness 
and global economic integration in the long run. 
Patron-Clientism 
The previous chapters and the above description of Bangladesh's current political crisis 
have shed light on a situation of chronic political-gangsterism in central politics, which is 
also deeprooted at the local level. Local political activists work for their central political 
patrons, thus enjoying logistical and administrative support to strengthen their control on 
local resource mobilisation. A substantial number of the rural poor, who live near and 
below the poverty line, have come to depend on these local political elites for their 
livelihood security. Hence, the central politicians have a control over the local power 
structures. Chapters Four and Five discussed the theoretical understanding and empirical 
evidence of such a patron-client system. It can be argued that i f the political corruption 
has reached such a high level, how can these people be elected by public mandate? How 
do the AL and the BNP share 80 percent of votes in general elections? 
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Table 6.1: Security and Development Concerns in Rural Bangladesh (Blair, 2005) 
Main 
type Sub type 
Progress 
in the 
last 
decade 
Potential sources o ' improvement 
Patrons Market State 
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- X X 
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Energy t X X 
'Progress' Indicators: significant improvement; "["["'even more improvement; ' ! ' 
significant deterioration and ' - ' little change. 
The answer is very simple: first, according to the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, in 2001 
less than half of the total population (above 7 years) could sign their name and half of 
these have reading and writing skills. In addition, being 80 percent rural, a huge 
proportion of people are not aware about the rampant corruption of the urban-based 
political leaders. Furthermore, the law and order system of Bangladesh never had 
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sufficient autonomy to challenge corrupt leaders under the judicial system. Second, a vast 
majority of people at the bottom economic level rely upon their patrons for survival. For 
instance, Ershad, the former President of Bangladesh of legendary corruption, and his 
party had a noteworthy mandate from the greater Rangpur area, his hometown, in the last 
three general elections. Third, the state has failed to assure the security of its people from 
violence, extortion, evictions, and so on, hence, people are compelled to obey their 
patrons. Fourth, in previous times, no other alternative forces could emerge (have 
emerged) with a different manifesto/image from the existing parties. 
Table 6.1 gives a detailed idea of the dependence of the moderately poor and pro-poor 
groups on different potential sources of support. It is important to mention that the pro-
poor and moderately poor depend on their patrons for security concerns, rather than 
development concerns. The table also depicts an extensive involvement of civil society 
both in the development and the security concerns. In this regard, we wil l recap the Stick-
Whistle Committee, formally the TERAC, which was introduced in Chapter Four. 
Emergence of Civil Society 
No drastic action against the mass violence and corruption has so far happened in 
Bangladesh, which led the country to the top of the world corruption league for five years 
in a row. Natore, a small town in the North-Western Bangladesh, was no different to other 
parts of Bangladesh in terms of violence and extortion. While violence and corruption 
took on an institutional shape all over the country, with killings, rape, hijacking and 
! 
4 l / •mm 
m 
Figure 6.3: The Stick-Whistle Committee; Left: From one stick and one whistle to 
many sticks and many whistles: mass protest against violence; Right: The hijackers 
caught by the committee (Shaptahik 2000, 25 January 2002) 
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extortion regular events, with the public administration surrendering to the extortionists, 
the TERAC decided to protest against gangsters in Natore. The TERAC was an emergent 
civil society organisation, set up to counter poor governance and corruption. It was 
informally instigated on November 1999 by Mr Abdus Salam, the then Chairman of the 
Bangladesh Fertilizer Association, and formally registered on 20 November 2000 as 
(Registration No. Nat-293), a legal organisation (Shaptahik 2000, 25 January 2002). The 
Shaptahik2000, a national weekly, covered detailed news of the Lathi-Banshi Samity of 
Natore and its portrait in Gopibag, the worst crime zone of the capital. According to their 
report, within two years the samity captured 50-60 criminals and handed them over to the 
police. Mr Faruque Ahmed, the then Officer in Charge of Natore Thana, told The 
Shaptahik2000 that they often fail to arrest the criminals because of legal complexity and 
political pressure, however, the samity helped them to control the law and order system 
by refusing any political pressure. Mr. Sodor Uddin Ahmed, the then District 
Commissioner of Natore, said that the samity was efficiently working as a substitute for 
government and, therefore, the government should conduct research on such 
organisations as examples of best practice that can be introduced all over the country. In 
the same vein, the then Police Superintendent (SP) of Natore, M Nazrul Islam, saw the 
samity working as a cohort of government. Overall the Stick-Whistle Committee can be 
seen as a civil society organisation and a corrective at the local level to poor governance. 
However, there is also the view that the radical potential of civil society organisations is 
being appropriated and that they are being used to fill gaps in service delivery, allowing 
the state to withdraw. This view is obviously characteristic of critics of 'roll-back' 
neoliberalism. 
Like many other positive efforts, however, the Stick-Whistle Committee was short lived. 
On 15 November 2003, the law and order meeting at the DCs conference room, chaired 
by Deputy Minister for Land Ruhul Kuddus Talukhdar34, observed that the TERAC 
activities contradict the law of the land as a number of businessmen gather with sticks to 
resist criminals (The Daily Star, 19 November 2003). A gathering of five or more people 
with sticks is a crime, the meeting observed. The DC and the SP, who were very positive 
3 4 Former BNP state minister for land Ruhul Quddus Talukdar Dulu allegedly helped the rise of militant 
kingpin Siddiqul Islam Bangla Bhai in greater Rajshahi area in 2004, while the ex-minister also raised a 
gang of criminals led by his cousins and nephews, who terrorised the people of Natore and gradually took 
over the district's underworld (The Daily Star, 05 February 2007). 
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towards the organisation, could not help. The TERAC received sympathy from different 
quarters and organised peaceful processions which promised nothing. At length, the Lathi 
Banshi Shilpa Banik Samity floated under the wing of the minister and he used it to 
reorganise his party activists35. 
CONCLUDING R E M A R K S 
Different political regimes have formed commissions and reformed local government, 
however, these decentralisation initiatives have suffered from a lack of genuine political 
commitment to devolution. The following paragraphs explain how the vicious circle of 
poverty and central politics have absorbed decentralisation efforts. I f we think about 
Jahanara Begum and Sajeda Khatun, as described in Chapter Four, they will always be 
loyal to their local patrons (elected bodies) to ameliorate and survive in their non-poor 
and pro-poor conditions. It is really difficult to break this chain all of a sudden by a policy 
initiative as the main problem belongs to political aspirations. The last two caretaker 
governments under Dr. Iajuddin Ahmed and Dr. Fakruddin Ahmed exemplify this point. 
I f we think about different reforms of local government, the gazettes of the Palli 
parishad, Gram par is had and Gram Sarkar show no major differences in their principles. 
Then why have opposition parties always protested? Does it only serve the government? 
Again, the local government commission, formed under different regimes, came up with 
many recommendations that were nullified at an early stage, on the unspoken grounds 
that they might obstruct their direct influence at local level. I f we conceptualise the 
decentralisation of Bangladesh, from our understanding in Chapter Three, inadequate 
thought has been given to the hierarchy of local government tiers and for the most part 
results have been no more than mere deconcentration. The UP is the only tier that enjoyed 
administrative and political decentralisation for a length of time, and even here the lack of 
financial devolution eventually centralised this institution. Although Ershad gave the 
Upazila adequate administrative and financial devolution, unfortunately, this was another 
effort to exploit policy within a legal framework. Despite many debates on the need for a 
Zila Parishad, there has not been a single serious political attempt to decentralise this 
institution; rather, bureaucrats have practised substantial power by remaining loyal to the 
sovereign. 
3 5 http://www.asiarnedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=7515. Accessed on 06.02.2007. 
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Restoration of Law and Order System: Finally, this thesis suggests that the restoration 
of law and order system and assurance of transparency are prerequisites of efficient local 
government system. In former times, the common people had only the right to vote and 
the politicians were not accountable to the public. It was possible as a result of a form of 
negotiation between black-money, gangsterism and extreme poverty. Thus, lawlessness 
allowed the politicians to enjoy endless freedom and to centralise the local institutions. 
Without the restoration of law and order, political gangsterism will never be uprooted and 
the participation of the masses is impossible to attain. 
Assurance of Transparency: Advantageously, the present caretaker government is 
taking bold steps to separate the judiciary from the administration wing, to form an 
independent Election Commission and Anti-corruption Commission and, thus, is striving 
to make the political leaders accountable to the public and to depoliticise the national 
institutions. Ironically, it is not possible to make an abrupt change in the political culture, 
hence, it is really difficult to speculate whether the next elected government will endorse 
all the efforts of the interim government or will politicise those institutions as before. In 
such case, we can think of alternative institutions parallel to parliament. 
Social Mobilisation: Again, we cannot provide transparency without ensuring a flow of 
information by educating the people. Here, 'education' is a means to provide them with 
institutional education; rather to inform them about their civil rights, help them to access 
to different service providers, assure their access to resources, educate them to ameliorate 
their livelihood security and so on. It is very important that they are accessing to services 
and resources through organised state mechanism rather than from their (political) 
patrons. It can be a potential way to break the patron-client system. Because of past 
anarchy, people are not confident of getting justice from the state; again, many people are 
not even aware of their basic rights that the constitution promises to provide. We can 
educate them by informing them of their rights and the places to claim those rights. Since 
it might not immediately be possible for the government to satisfy the needs of all its 
citizens, they will need cooperation from the NGOs and organisations in civil society. 
Jahanara Begum, for instance, refused to give dowry in her daughter's marriage as she 
was informed (in RMP training) about the legal matters around dowry. I came across 
many RMA women who obtained their rights from their husbands by accessing to legal 
service providers after being divorced or abandoned. In addition, Graph 5.1 and Table 5.1 
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(see chapter five) portray a significant average success of RMA women in terms of their 
monthly income and fixed property. 
Delegation of Responsibility: The above paragraph hints at some ideal roles of NGOs 
and civil societies to accelerate overall development. In Chapter Four and Five, I 
explained the role of TERAC and CARE in restoring law and order and helping a group 
of destitute women to attain sustainable livelihood security. On the contrary, the Lathi 
Banshi Shilpa Banik Samity, which was politicised and reformed from TERAC, 
established gangsterism within the same community. Again, while conducting the 
Livelihood Security Survey of the RMP, many respondents informed me that they were 
cheated by some local NGOs who provide micro credit. However, such kind of incidents 
can happen i f the government fail to provide some efficient regulatory system. It is 
essential to have a monitoring wing within the governmental system which can handle 
such issues in liaison with other governmental agencies. Despite some drawbacks, 
Bangladesh has many successes in immunisation, nutrition, drinking water and sanitation, 
primary education and so on, which would not have been possible without the help of 
NGOs. While visiting Ainer Khop, Baher Bali, and many other chars, I noticed no 
government institutions other than a few NGOs who are providing primary education and 
primary care services. It is really difficult for a third world government alone to reach 
every corner of their country with adequate services. Therefore, delegating responsibility 
for service provision to other quarters like NGOs and civil society can help to address the 
development concerns of the people. 
Considerations of Informal Institutions in Formulation of Decentralisation Plan: As 
I discussed in the theoretical framework, one of the major considerations in designing 
decentralisation is to think about the existing cultural elements. Such considerations 
include the images of a community about regarding the issues of authority, the role of 
government, the role of the citizen, conflict, consensus, power, the role of elites, the role 
of elderly lineage, the role of the poor, the role of women, kinship pattern and a host of 
other issues. In the Chapter Four, I explained about 'samaj' which, broadly, is considered 
as a unit of our community. Therefore, endorsing such traditional informal institutions, in 
particular, can reduce the pressure on government in matters such as dispute resolution, 
social awareness, immunisation, health and safety and so on. Westergaard explains the 
role of'samaj' in dispute resolution which is mentioned in previous chapters. 
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Installation of Democracy: Despite the popularity of the present technocratic 
government, there is no clue to the dream of a democratised Bangladesh in future. The 
previous two military governments made promises against corruption, locked up corrupt 
politicians and, finally, legitimised their own power in collaboration with opportunist 
politicians from previous governments and 'so-called' civil society. Therefore, it is 
difficult to speculate about the future of democracy as well as local government of 
Bangladesh unless the interim government hands over their power to an elected 
government after a free and fair election. 
Capacity Development: Again, the government officials at local level should be made 
accountable to both the elected bodies and their central hierarchies. In addition, the local 
bodies need to be capacitised so that they can manage their institutions efficiently. Of 
course, alongside the government, different national and international agencies can help 
in capacity building. However, these agencies should be accountable for the output of 
their activities. Thus, a cross-monitoring system can increase participation and reduce 
corruption. 
Devolution of Power: The most common recommendation for decentralisation is to 
pursue a policy of devolution. In rural Bangladesh, only the UP has elected bodies though 
they have extensive dependence on the Upazila for their funds. Instead of developing 
strong monitoring tools and making the UP bodies accountable, the UP's common 
properties are administered by the Upazila. A think-tank could perhaps help the 
government to rethink the number of tiers and delimit their activities. This thesis, 
suggests the execution of financial devolution along with administrative decentralisation 
at different tiers. 
SUMMARY 
The thesis reveals that the principal reason for action in civil society like the TERAC was 
social insecurity. Promoting such action can be interpreted negatively as a withdrawal of 
the state or positively as a supporting hand of government. However, as Bangladesh is 
already characterised by poor governance and will take much longer time to rebuild what 
has decayed without supporting hands; civil society has an important role to play as a 
partner to government. This should not be interpreted as the civil society allowing the 
state to withdraw, rather the spirit of civil society should be focused in helping the 
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government to accelerate development and/or allow government to focus on other areas 
where civil society has no scope. 
The above discussion suggests the need for further study on a number of questions: 
1. How to protect local institutions from central authoritarianism; 
2. How to make the leaders more accountable to the public; 
3. What should be the mechanism to make the parliament accountable for any 
decisions when they are in power; 
4. How to encourage informal local institutions to support service delivery efforts, 
and decision-making; 
5. What should be the level of involvement of the civil society and informal 
institutions along with the formal structures; 
Notwithstanding its weak local governance, Bangladesh has made noticeable 
improvements in several sectors such as food production, safety net programmes, rural 
infrastructure, credit provision, primary education, child inoculation, family planning, 
drinking water and sanitation (Blair, 2005; Rahman, 2002). While important efforts by 
NGOs and central government agencies enjoy credit for the above-mentioned 
achievements, the 'why' of decentralisation comes to the forefront as poverty alleviation 
is rarely achieved without a successful decentralisation agenda. Rahman (2002) reports 
that the net rate of poverty alleviation in the 1990s appears to have been stuck at around 
one percentage point per year, which is depressingly slow. In such circumstances, local 
government, as a political and institutional process, can enhance developmental choices 
locally that are more inclusive of all social groups. 
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